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This thesis analyses the findings of empirical research carried out in three case study UK health 
authorities in 1996-97, using repeat interviewing of senior managers. It aimed to test three 
competing hypotheses: 
i. Markets are one possible system for allocating scarce resources. The process of contract 
specification in a complex quasi-market is likely to make rationing more explicit than it 
would be in a hierarchical system 
ii. In the complex context of the NHS the quasi-market may fail to produce clear contracts 
and unambiguous allocations, because of prohibitive transaction costs, political costs and 
ethical costs of greater explicitness 
iii. Other pressures in favour of explicitness (e.g. rising expenditure, effectiveness evidence 
and the Patient's Charter) may be irresistible, whatever structural form the NHS takes. 
The complex relationship between explicit rationing, the internal market and other factors is 
discussed. Results suggest the quasi-market has contributed to the growth in explicit rationing, 
notably by decoupling purchasers and providers from their previously shared responsibility to 
manage resources. In other respects the market has speeded up or magnified the effect of other 
factors which would or could have happened anyway. Concern to control rising expenditure has led 
to more explicit decisions but is now rekindling interest in the value of fixed budgets for providers 
and implicit clinical decision-making. Factors such as the Patient's Charter have also had an 
independent effect on greater explicitness. Implicit rationing remains significant. 
The implications for health care rationing of government proposals to abolish the internal market 
are examined. The results suggest that explicit rationing will probably continue to grow, but with a 
greater emphasis on explicit criteria to guide clinicians in determining who gets treatment, rather 
than the exclusion of whole services. The retention of some form of commissioner provider split 
may also exercise continuing pressure towards explicitness. 
'EXPLICIT RATIONING WITHIN THE NHS QUASI-MARKET - THE 
EXPERIENCE OF HEALTH AUTHORITY PURCHASERS 1996-97* 
'As we become aware of what we, as a society, are doing, we bear responsibility for 
those allocations that will be made as well as for what has been done in our names. If 
one understands more than before for having read this essay, one can still appreciate 
that tragic decisions need be made and are not the easier for the understanding.' 
'Tragic Choices', Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, 1978 (p. 199) 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Health care rationing is not a new subject; there is a broad consensus that it has always 
existed both within the NHS and before its inception. However, much of this rationing has 
been achieved through mechanisms such as waiting lists, global budget setting, unequal 
distribution of resources between specialties and geographical areas, and individual clinical 
decisions about whether or not to treat a particular patient. These mechanisms mean that 
the nature of the choices being made between individuals and groups of patients is kept 
largely concealed or implicit, even if it is evident that some rationing is taking place. 
More recently, there has been pressure from a number of quarters to bring health care 
rationing out into the open and make it more explicit and systematic. This pressure is being 
experienced internationally; countries such as New Zealand, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the State of Oregon in the US have all been involved in attempts to clarify the priority-
setting process by which limited funds are allocated. The question of explicit rationing has 
generated a considerable amount of literature; it has also resulted in heated debate in 
academic, managerial, medical and political circles. Health authorities which have made 
explicit decisions often attract enormous media attention, as in the case of Cambridge and 
Huntingdon which refused to pay for further leukaemia treatment for Child B. There is a 
fundamental public concern that such decisions threaten the comprehensive nature of the 
NHS, as well as a distaste for the ethical consequences in individual cases. 
In these circumstances it comes as no surprise that even the meaning of explicit rationing is 
disputed, let alone whether it should be done, and if so how and by whom. These issues 
remain unresolved and a discussion of them will form part of this thesis. However, they 
have been the subject of some academic enquiry already. In contrast, an issue which has 
received very little attention to date is the relationship between explicit rationing and the 
quasi-market reforms within the NHS introduced in April 1991. It is this issue which is 
explored in this thesis. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part One, 'Theory and International Experience1, 
begins with a review of theories of resource allocation and their application to health care. 
This chapter takes as its starting point the argument that all resources are ultimately scarce 
and must be rationed in some form. The question is therefore not whether a particular 
health care system rations, but how it rations. It examines different methods of resource 
allocation, including markets, with particular reference to Williamson's work on 
'organisational failures' and Bartlett's application of this to quasi-markets in health care 
(Williamson, 1975 and 19B5; Bartlett, 1991) 
From the theoretical analysis of the potential relationship between quasi-markets and 
explicit rationing, the following competing hypotheses emerge: 
i. Markets are one possible system for allocating scarce resources. The process of 
contract specification inherent in a complex quasi-market system constitutes a form 
of rationing, which formalises resource allocation decisions and makes them more 
explicit than they would be in a hierarchical system. The theory that lies behind the 
move from hierarchy to quasi-market in health care would thus predict that rationing 
in the NHS will become more explicit as a result of the introduction of the internal 
market. 
ii. An alternative view is that in the complex context of the NHS the quasi-market may 
fail to produce clear contracts and unambiguous allocations, for two main reasons: 
the contracting process is likely to be inefficient, because of high transaction costs, 
and the explicitness of clear contracts is likely to carry high political and ethical costs. 
This view predicts either that the contracting process will be conducted in form only, 
with a continuation of more implicit rationing mechanisms, or that it will be 
abandoned altogether. 
iii. A third possibility could emerge; this is that other pressures in favour of greater 
explicitness - particularly resource pressures, outcomes research and the Patient's 
Charter - are so strong that explicit rationing will continue to increase, either through 
the costly quasi-market contracting system, or through some other mechanism if 
contracting fails to provide an adequate means of achieving it or is abandoned. 
These hypotheses provide the framework for fieldwork carried out for this thesis. 
Chapter Three returns to the history of rationing in health care and the current debate 
about what form it should take. Addressing^he^wo questions 'how much' and 'for whom?' 
is fundamental to the management of public services, although the use of the word 
'rationing' to describe this process is politically sensitive and does not go unchallenged. 
Examples are given from pre-NHS days, such as the Victorian principle of less eligibility 
and deserving/undeserving poor and the National Insurance Act of 1911. Examples from 
the post 1948 NHS, but before the market reforms, include charges and budget capping, 
waiting lists, rationing by specialty or care group, geographical rationing, the operation of 
clinical freedom to ration implicitly, explicit denial, age limits for screening programmes 
and the use of QALYs (quality adjusted life-years) to make priority resource decisions. 
The analysis of the current debate examines whether different commentators believe a) 
rationing health care is necessary and b) even if it is, does it have to be explicit? The 
impact of evidence-based health care will be assessed - is it an alternative to rationing or a 
sensible means of achieving it? Is political reluctance to undertake or even acknowledge 
rationing evolving slowly towards acceptance and encouragement of purchasers? 
The very fact that there is such disagreement about what rationing is and whether to be 
explicit could be seen as reluctance to accept the logic of contracting in some quarters, 
because of concern about its high political and ethical costs. On the other hand, there is a 
very strong movement in support of explicitness in priority setting, despite frequent 
reluctance to call this rationing. 
Chapter Four summarises international experience of both rationing and quasi-market 
experimentation, and concludes that it is tax-funded systems which are especially prone to 
the resource pressures which give rise to both explicit rationing, as a way to handle 
scarcity, and quasi-markets, as a way of trying to improve efficiency and value for money. 
Quasi-markets also provide their own impetus towards explicitness, as governments 
experimenting with market forces want to protect consumers against possible inequities 
and therefore seek to define a basic minimum package of services. This assessment of 
international experience sets the context for an examination of the UK reforms. 
Part Two of the thesis reports fieldwork findings. The methods used are described in 
Chapter Five. 
Chapter Six summarises early experiences of explicit rationing and the internal market. It 
begins with a pilot fieldwork survey of eight health authority purchasers carried out in 
1994. It also includes a summary of evidence presented to the health select committee 
investigation of purchasing and priority setting (House of Commons, 1994a, 1994b), and 
compares these findings with the analyses of purchasing plans carried out over several 
years by Klein's team at Bath University (Klein and Redmayne, 1992; Redmayne, Klein and 
Day, 1993; Redmayne, 1995; Redmayne, 1996). This early fieldwork concluded that 
explicit rationing was increasing, although it was still relatively marginal, and that the 
market was one important cause of this, but not the only one. 
Following the pilot survey, three new health authority case studies were designed and 
carried out during 1996-97, to explore in more depth the complex relationship between the 
market and explicit rationing. The evidence from these case studies is presented in 
Chapters Seven and Eight. This examines what evidence there is of growing explicitness in 
rationing in the three districts concerned. It places particular emphasis on the contracting 
round for 1997/98 contracts, but also looks back at previous years' rounds. Interviewees' 
perceptions of the driving forces in favour of explicitness are presented, as well as their 
views of the obstacles they face in being explicit and the pressures in favour of remaining 
implicit. Respondents were also asked to compare how resource allocation decisions were 
made before the market was introduced with current decision-making. 
In Part Three, Chapter Nine draws together the evidence in a discussion of the relationship 
between explicit rationing, the NHS quasi-market and other factors. The thesis concludes 
with an assessment of the implications of the White Paper (Secretary of State for Health, 
1997) in Chapter Ten. 
Part One 
Theory and International Experience 
Chapter Two 
Theories of resource allocation 
The line of argument to be followed in this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
1. All forms of resource allocation are rationing 
2. The question is therefore not whether a system does or does not ration, but how it 
rations, and to what extent it does so in an efficient and sustainable way 
3. In orthodox economic theory, the market (which rations by price and willingness to 
pay) is the most efficient method 
4. Even an efficient market may produce socially unsustainable results, particularly if the 
outcome is judged to be unacceptably inequitable 
5. A pure market in health care is likely to fail on efficiency grounds, as well as 
producing high levels of inequity 
6. A quasi-market is intended to overcome some of the problems of a pure market 
(particularly imperfect information and inequity), using tax-funded purchasing by an 
informed agency acting on behalf of consumers, whilst using supply-side competition 
to improve value for money and consumer responsiveness 
7. In a complex environment such as health, a quasi-market can operate only through 
written contracts, which can be expected to formalise resource allocation decisions 
and make them more explicit than they would be in a hierarchical system 
8. However, such contracts may be unsustainable, for two main reasons: achieving 
compliance may involve high transaction costs, and their explicitness may carry high 
political and ethical costs. This could result in the contracting process being carried 
out in form only, with a continuation of more implicit rationing mechanisms, or in it 
being abandoned altogether. 
9. A third possibility is that other pressures in favour of greater explicitness (particularly 
rising expenditure, improved understanding of outcomes and the Patient's Charter) 
may be so strong that explicit rationing will continue to increase despite these costs, 
either through a quasi-market contracting process or through some other mechanism 
if the quasi-market is abandoned. 
General theories of resource allocation 
Economics is 'a science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends 
and scarce means which have alternative uses' (Robbins, 1932, p.l 5). 
'Economics... centres upon the issue of scarcity ...It starts from the fundamental 
proposition that resources are too few to satisfy all the wants of mankind' (Culyer, 1985, 
p i ) . 
The question of how scarce resources will be allocated is fundamental to human society. 
(As suggested by Culyer, the word 'scarce' here has a specific meaning, which differs from 
the popular meaning of'rare'; to the economist, it means that all goods, however plentiful, 
are ultimately in limited supply. Therefore not all demands can be met, and to choose one 
option is to rule out another). 
Economists have tended to use the word rationing to mean the allocation of scarce 
resources by means other than the market. According to this view, it is merely one form of 
resource allocation, generally associated with government intervention and clearly stated 
maximum consumption levels. More broadly, however, it can be argued that rationing and 
sharing out limited resources are the same thing, so that all forms of resource allocation, 
whether through the market or not, are a means of achieving rationing. Rationing in this 
sense will sometimes be explicit and sometimes implicit or indirect. 
It is this latter definition of rationing which will form the basis for this thesis. In looking at 
different resource allocation theories, therefore, I shall not be questioning whether goods 
are rationed but rather how they are rationed and to what extent the method of rationing is 
efficient and sustainable in particular circumstances. 
There is no doubt, however, that the popular image of rationing reflects the first of the two 
definitions, and also tends to equate scarcity with rarity. It is indelibly associated with 
crisis, especially war-time, when basics such as food, clothing and fuel are in such short 
supply that government regulation is required to ensure a fair distribution and prevent 
over-consumption by those with a greater ability to pay. 
In his work on the structures of kinship, Levi-Strauss demonstrates that such action is part 
of a much older tradition. He describes primitive societies' rules about incest and marriage 
as an intervention designed to cope with 'the insufficiency or the risky distribution of a 
valuable of fundamental importance', in this particular case the 'distribution of women', but 
equally applicable to valuables such as food or land. He continues: 
'Certain forms of rationing are new to our society and arouse surprise in minds cast 
in the traditions of economic liberalism. Thus we are prompted to see collective 
intervention, when it affects commodities vital to our way of life, as a bold and 
somewhat scandalous innovation. Because the control of distribution and 
consumption affects gasoline, we readily think that its formulation was only 
contemporaneous with the motor-car. But nothing is less true. 'The system of the 
scarce product' constitutes an extremely general model. In this and many other 
cases these periods of crisis, to which until recently our society was so 
unaccustomed, merely re-establish, in a crucial form, a state of affairs regarded as 
virtually normal in primitive society. Thus, 'the system of the scarce product', as 
expressed in collective measures of control, is much less an innovation, due to 
modern conditions of warfare and the worldwide nature of our economy, than the 
resurgence of a set of procedures which are familiar to primitive societies and 
necessary to the group if its coherence is not to be continually compromised' 
(Levi-Strauss, 1969, p.32). 
There are several points to note here. Firstly, that rationing is not simply a modern 
phenomenon, and secondly, that collective intervention to achieve it is a broader concept 
than government regulation as we know it. However, it is not entirely clear whether Levi-
Strauss sees all forms of resource allocation as rationing; he seems to tend towards the 
definition of scarcity as rarity, in implying that until recently the western industrialised 
world has not really had to confront the problem of scarce resources, and suggests that the 
liberal market tradition does not itself constitute rationing. Rather he equates rationing 
with collective intervention of some sort, in the face of crisis. 
It is true that when the extreme scarcity of war-time is over, and goods are more readily 
available, the government can relinquish control over distribution and revert to allowing 
the market to determine how resources will be allocated. However, this does not mean that 
scarcity according to the economist's definition has been eliminated. In these 
circumstances, the market rations access to goods by willingness to pay, which itself is 
made up of ability to pay and the exercise of preferences - those with more money can 
afford to buy more expensive types of food, buy more clothes, or use fuel more freely, if 
they choose to do so. The oil crisis in the mid-1970s provides a dramatic example of how 
restricted supply can lead to rationing by price at international level. If that leads to 
unsustainable general inflation, then administrative rationing may follow, as it did for short 
periods in many countries as a result of the oil crisis. 
Calabresi and Bobbitt (1978) argue that society deceives itself (deliberately, in many cases) 
if it thinks that markets and all other methods of resource allocation are not in the end 
about rationing. They examine what they call first and second-order determinations or 
decisions about 'the scarce good'; first-order decisions concern how much of the scarce 
good will be produced, within the limits of natural scarcity, whilst second-order decisions 
determine who will get what is made. They emphasise therefore that scarcity is not only 
about the natural availability of goods, but is also frequently self-imposed by 'the decision 
by society that it is not prepared to forgo other goods and benefits in a number sufficient 
to remove the scarcity' (p.22). A second-order outcome, such as who dies in a road 
accident, may appear to be an unavoidable and fatal misfortune, but it can in fact conceal 
an original first-order determination to limit the amount of money spent on road safety, 
which has led to the accident. This appearance of random bad luck protects society from 
the implications of the tragic choice it has made. 
Calabresi and Bobbitt identify four main allocation processes: markets, accountable 
political approaches (e.g. war-time rationing), lotteries and the customary or evolutionary 
approach. The latter process is in some ways a non-process, in that it allows allocations to 
evolve with no explicit selection - an example given is that we have intuitively decided an 
acceptable level of child-bearing, and that a system of incentives has evolved which 
reinforces this, although the example is not without complications, such as the effect of 
market forces on how many children individuals can afford. All of these processes can be 
modified and used in combination - for instance, a first-order decision may be political, 
whilst the second-order allocation operates through a market. In the road safety example 
above, the first-order decision is political, whilst the second order outcome is determined 
by lottery. This can enable society to hold conflicting values simultaneously at the two 
different levels. 
None of these approaches can evade the necessity of first and second-order decisions, 
although some are better than others at concealing the real nature of what is going on. An 
accountable political process is often transparent in its rationing activities, whereas 
markets and lotteries, by presenting resource allocation as the result of1 thousands of 
independent, atomistic actions' (p. 29) or of chance, seem to 'absolve societies from 
responsibility for outcomes' (p.31). On the other hand, the apparent randomness of market 
outcomes may also become unacceptable; a market which allows the rich to buy kidney 
dialysis and the poor to die will lay bare tensions between conflicting values which society 
may not be able to tolerate. Society is therefore constantly seeking to recast its allocation 
decisions in ways which conceal these tensions and apparently avoid tragic choices, until 
the conflict becomes evident again and a new shift takes place. 
Calabresi and Bobbitt do not claim that any one of these allocation processes is more 
efficient than the others; they seek rather to demonstrate that society needs all of them. 
Using one approach and then rejecting it in favour of another is a rational way of 
preserving essential but conflicting values and keeping in check the potentially destructive 
impact on society of openly acknowledging tragic choices. They therefore cannot regard 
the market as a uniquely successful way of distributing resources - quite apart from its 
frequent failures ('the arthritic invisible hand' (p.83), as they describe it), even a supposedly 
perfect market will produce outcomes that society cannot accept. 
The government's choice of a form of market system for health care in this country was at 
least partly founded on the more orthodox economic view that markets are indeed the 
most efficient way of allocating resources, provided they are working perfectly. (The 
government's motives in setting up the NHS market are discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter). It should be reiterated at this point that achieving efficiency in distribution 
does not mean avoiding rationing. Even if one rejects the Calabresi and Bobbitt line that 
the market involves more deliberate choices than we might care to believe, in favour of the 
Hayek view that it is an impersonal force which creates its own 'spontaneous order' 
(Hayek, 1976, p. 109), it still results in the rationing of scarce resources, albeit in 
theoretically the most efficient way possible. 
In practice, of course, markets do not always work perfectly. According to the 'Invisible 
Hand Theorem', markets will be efficient if, and only if, a number of assumptions hold. 
These are: perfect competition, no market failures and perfect information (Barr, 1993). 
The difficulties in ensuring a perfect market in health care will be dealt with later in this 
chapter. In general terms, when a market does not work perfectly there are a number of 
possible options to correct the problems which arise. These options are identified by Barr 
as regulation (such as compulsory insurance), financial intervention (in the form of price 
subsidies or taxes, for example on pollution) or public production (for instance the NHS), 
all of which intervene in the mechanism of the market to restore efficiency. If, however, 
none of the standard assumptions fail, there can be no justification on efficiency grounds 
for intervention. 
Barr stresses that, although equal power for all participants is a pre-condition for perfect 
competition, this principle 'is not violated if some individuals have higher incomes than 
others' (p.81). The market will still achieve efficiency (in the sense of maximisation of 
social welfare), no matter how unequal the distribution of income. If we are concerned that 
some people are therefore not able to take part in the market as fully as others, this is a 
question of social injustice, not of inefficiency, and can be resolved by redistribution of 
income, leaving the market mechanism itself intact. The extent to which redistribution is 
supported by society depends on the prevailing view of what constitutes social justice, and 
on the relative weight accorded to it. (It should be noted that a degree of inequity in 
distribution may be tolerated by society for the sake of preserving efficiency, and the point 
at which intervention to redress inequity is judged necessary will differ from society to 
society. The United States, for example, tolerates higher levels of inequity in health care 
arising from a market distribution than would probably be acceptable in Britain). 
The basic problem is that the maximisation of welfare may well conflict with what is 
regarded as a just distribution of welfare. This underlines Calabresi and Bobbitt's point 
that even a perfect market can produce unacceptable results. For instance, rationing access 
to housing via the market could be efficient in the sense of maximising the total quantity 
and quality of housing available, but could create socially unacceptable levels of 
homelessness amongst the poorest. 
A utilitarian response is possible, by arguing that it may satisfy the quasi-altruistic 
preferences of wealthier people to sacrifice some of their income to alleviate poverty, or in 
this case specifically homelessness. This could make a degree of non-market redistribution 
consistent with efficient maximisation, although significantly the motive is not justice but 
an increase in utility. 
An alternative approach is to argue that efficiency is not itself a primary aim, but is 
secondary to agreed policy aims; in other words, a particular system of allocating 
resources is only efficient to the extent that it moves society towards its primary social 
objectives (Le Grand, 1991). This means that if the outcome of the market is regarded as 
unacceptably unjust, it cannot by definition be efficient. In practice, Le Grand tends to 
agree with Barr that the best way to rectify this position is often by cash transfers to 
facilitate more equitable participation in the market, rather than intervening in the market 
itself, but this is nonetheless a response to market failure. Thus the housing market 
becomes inefficient because it is unjust, as opposed to Barr's view that it is efficient but 
unjust. 
Hayek disagrees strongly that redistribution is desirable in the interests of social justice, 
and believes that it cannot take place without affecting the operation of the market. He 
describes social justice as a mirage, the pursuit of which endangers the overriding goal of 
personal liberty. He argues only subsistence levels of welfare redistribution can be justified; 
otherwise the market should hold sway, and will spontaneously allocate resources in the 
best possible way, although its very spontaneity makes it a nonsense to describe the 
outcome as 'just' or 'unjust'. Allowing anything more than minimal redistribution to take 
place outside the market will prevent it from working efficiently, notably by creating 
perverse incentives. For example, someone receiving benefits while not working may find 
it financially disadvantageous to take up work because of high marginal tax rates. Thus, he 
suggests, even cash transfer redistribution does interfere with the mechanism of the market 
and is a cause of market failure, as well as posing a threat to liberty because of the 
centralisation of power it requires (Hayek, 1976). 
Libertarians such as Hayek and Friedman, whilst accepting a limited role for government in 
ensuring perfect market conditions are maintained, are also concerned about the effects of 
traditional responses to market failure such as regulation and public production (Hayek, 
1944; Friedman, 1962). The results of government action, far from correcting failure, are 
often a cause of it, and are almost bound to be inefficient. (An illustration suggested by 
Barr (1993, p. 103) is that 'if there were a competitive market for health care, people 
would acquire better information, in part because market institutions would arise to supply 
it.' Suppressing competition simply makes the problem of imperfect information a self-
fulfilling prophecy). 
This forms part of a wider analysis of public choice theory and government failure. At the 
level of electoral politics, competition for votes may affect the way a government manages 
the economy, including public services; seeking to maximise popularity may take 
precedence over pure economic efficiency, especially as an election approaches. Individual 
ministers also have to strike a balance between action to ensure re-election and the desire 
to maximise the power of their own departments (Mueller, 1989). Bureaucrats may have 
personal or professional interests which conflict both with ministerial ambitions and with 
the public interest, either in the form of maximising their departmental budgets (Niskanen, 
1971) or of diffusing and distancing themselves from uncomfortably hard decisions 
(Dunleavy, 1991). These factors can result in inefficient and self-perpetuating expansion of 
government activity, and necessitate caution in assuming government action will always 
correct market failures. However, as Barr (1993) points out, assuming that the private 
sector will therefore automatically be more efficient in raising social welfare is equally 
dangerous. 
A specific approach to market failures with particular relevance for the NHS market is 
found in Williamson's work on organisational hierarchies and markets as alternative 
allocative mechanisms. Rather than looking at government intervention as the response to 
market failures, Williamson seeks to explain how firms react to market failure by creating 
an internal hierarchical organisation instead (or alternatively how they react to internal 
organisational failure by shifting transactions to the market-place, although this is not the 
main focus of his work). He summarises his approach as follows: 
'(1) Markets and firms are alternative instruments for completing a related set of 
transactions; (2) whether a set of transactions ought to be executed across markets 
or within a firm depends on the relative efficiency of each mode; (3) the costs of 
writing and executing complex contracts across a market vary with the 
characteristics of the human decision makers who are involved with the 
transaction on the one hand, and the objective properties of the market on the 
other:; and (4) although the human and environmental factors that impede 
exchanges between firms (across a market) manifest themselves somewhat 
differently within the firm, the same set of factors apply to both. A symmetrical 
analysis of trading thus requires that we acknowledge the transactional limits of 
internal organisation as well as the sources of market failure.1 (Williamson, 1975, 
p.8-9) 
The question of contracting and the associated transaction costs are central to Williamson's 
'organisational failures framework'. Contracts are an essential component of all systems of 
exchange, although in many cases the nature of the transaction is straightforward enough 
for the contract to remain implicit or verbal only. Williamson, on the other hand, identifies 
circumstances in which explicit written contracts are required to underpin the exchange 
between market agents but in which the transaction costs are so high that the system 
becomes inefficient. Key factors include 'bounded rationality', uncertainty/complexity, 
opportunism and small numbers exchange. On their own, these factors may not be 
significant enough to cause a market to fail, but in combination with each other they can 
have a powerful effect. 
Bounded rationality refers to the fact that human beings, whilst trying to behave rationally, 
have only limited powers of receiving, storing, retrieving and processing information and 
limited linguistic abilities to 'articulate their knowledge or feelings ... in ways which permit 
them to be understood by others' (p.22). Bounded rationality is not a problem when the 
environment or information to be mastered is relatively simple, but combined with 
conditions of complexity and uncertainty it becomes very difficult to assemble information 
about all possible future contingencies. In these circumstances, it is not feasible to rely on 
an implicit or verbal contract, as in simple market exchanges. However, specifying an 
indisputably clear contingent claims contract (i.e. where the outcome is contingent upon an 
uncertain environment) becomes virtually impossible or at least prohibitively costly. This is 
clearly a variant on the theme of imperfect information resulting in market failure. 
Internal organisation within a firm can help overcome this difficulty because it 'permits the 
parties to deal with uncertainty/complexity in an adaptive, sequential fashion ... Rather 
than specifying the decision tree exhaustively in advance, and deriving the corresponding 
contingent prices, events are permitted to unfold and attention is restricted to only the 
actual rather than all possible outcomes' (p.25). 
Opportunism and small numbers exchange also interact to create high costs. If it proves 
impossible to put together a detailed contingent claims contract, an alternative might be to 
agree an incomplete contract, which does not spell out every detail and includes a clause to 
the effect that both parties should co-operate 'in a joint-profit maximising way, when 
unforeseen contingencies develop' (p. 91). However, this offers a temptation to behave 
opportunistically (which Williamson defines as 'self-interest seeking with guile', p.26) and 
can manifest itself as 'selective or distorted information disclosure or ... self-disbelieved 
promises regarding future conduct' (p.26) in the interests of gaining an advantage over the 
other party. This can lead to unanticipated price increases or inefficient performance; 
trying to combat opportunism by more elaborate contract monitoring is also costly. The 
problem is even worse when combined with uncertainty, which leads to what Williamson 
calls 'information impactedness' (p.31) - this is when one of the parties has much better 
information than the other, and the second party can neither achieve information parity 
without great cost nor rely on the first party to reveal the information. 
Opportunism would not in itself be a very great problem in a competitive market with 
plenty of other competitors, as companies behaving opportunistically would soon find 
themselves unable to renew their contracts. In a small market, however, especially where 
new entrants to the market would need to invest heavily in specialised equipment and 
skills, there is little scope for countering opportunism. In a subsequent work, Williamson 
elaborates on this problem of asset specificity in combination with bounded rationality and 
opportunism, and argues that it is a crucial obstacle to efficient competition (Williamson, 
1985). A more promising way to avoid this kind of domination of a complex market is to 
opt for internal hierarchical organisation instead. 
Application of resource allocation theories to health care 
Health care is a scarce resource which has to be allocated in the same way as any other 
good. Its scarcity derives from both the amount that society and individuals are willing to 
spend on it, and from the availability of sufficient professional skills, knowledge and 
equipment to deliver it, which is only partly determined by the amount of money available. 
If, as argued in the previous section, rationing and sharing out resources are the same 
thing, all forms of resource allocation in health care constitute a means of achieving 
rationing, whether implicitly or explicitly. Denying or limiting access to potentially life-
saving interventions is a prime example of a 'tragic choice', making the selection of 
rationing method in health care a more contentious matter than for most other goods. 
The chief debate in health care resource allocation is whether to opt for a market system or 
what Calabresi and Bobbitt would call an accountable political system, although there may 
also be an element of lottery involved in either. The NHS reforms reflect the current 
government's preference for moving away from purely political systems towards a market 
allocation of resources, although still within a regulated political framework. (This 
corresponds with Calabresi and Bobbitt's view that it is possible to combine different 
allocation methods simultaneously at different levels). 
Will a market system in health care in fact be an efficient and socially acceptable way of 
rationing resources. Before addressing this question, it is worth identifying what efficiency 
means in the health care context. 
Barr (1993) identifies three main types of efficiency: efficiency in production, in product 
mix and in consumption. In health care, efficiency in production is the maximum amount of 
care that can be provided within available resources. Efficiency in product mix means 
offering the optimal mixture of types of treatment to meet patients' needs, given what is 
known about medical technology. Efficiency in consumption implies equilibrium between 
the resources we are prepared to spend on health and the amount of treatment we need; 
one of the most common objections to publicly provided health services is that they distort 
this relationship between willingness to pay and consumption and encourage excessive use 
of services. Again, it should be noted that this concept of efficiency makes no comment on 
the justice or otherwise of the distribution of services. 
Imperfect markets 
Barr states that 'health care conforms only minimally with the assumptions necessary for 
market efficiency' (p.332), that is to say perfect competition, no market failures and perfect 
information. Furthermore, the complexity of health care and the subjectivity of questions 
about the value and quality of life make defining and measuring efficiency extremely 
difficult. 
Perhaps the greatest problem for markets in health care is imperfect information, which 
significantly affects efficiency in consumption. This may occur in any of the following 
ways: 
- people may not realise they are ill and need treatment 
- health technology is highly specialised; even doctors struggle to keep up with new 
developments, let alone individual lay people 
- this makes consumers reliant on the supplier for information; they lack the knowledge 
to judge between advice from different professionals, and in cases of acute illness do 
not have time to shop around 
- illness is an emotional and frightening subject, compromising the consumer's ability to 
make rational judgements 
- patients have little knowledge of appropriate prices for each treatment 
- knowledge about future health care needs is generally not available 
Insurance is only a partial solution to the uncertainty of future needs, and has its own 
problems, particularly the inability to cover all risks and the danger of over-consumption 
resulting from third party payment. The US provides a salutary example of how costs can 
spiral under an insurance-based system, especially where insurers can pass on higher 
premiums to employers rather than individuals - almost a system of fourth party payment, 
one might say. Third party payment may also create incentives to over-produce, as 
illustrated by the duplication of high technology and low occupancy rates found in 
hospitals in the US. 
There are also problems with maintaining perfect competition in health care - doctors 
exercise a monopoly over the practice of medicine and are more likely to seek the approval 
of their colleagues than their consumers, argues Barr. As well as affecting efficiency of 
production and regulating entry to the market by new practitioners, this is likely to result 
in an inefficient product mix, as doctors gravitate towards more glamorous, high 
technology forms of care. At a broader level, hospitals require significant advance 
investment in skills and equipment. This can make it difficult for new competitors to gain 
entry to the market and succeed in operating efficiently. Perfect competition also relies on 
equal power between producers and consumers; this in turn relies on consumers having 
access to perfect information, which has already been seen to be lacking. 
Barr (1993) does not consider market failures related to externalities a significant 
efficiency problem in health care; although they do exist (e.g. controlling communicable 
diseases through vaccination), they can be solved by regulation without recourse to public 
production (e.g. compulsory vaccination). It could also be argued that general good health 
amongst the population as a whole produces external benefits, as it ensures people remain 
economically productive tax-payers rather than expensive social security consumers. This 
argument is complicated by the role of other factors such as good housing, sanitation, 
education or socio-economic status in producing good health, with health care itself 
playing a relatively small part. (See, for example, Townsend and Davidson, 1982; Office of 
Health Economics, 1985). 
Although Barr is not convinced non-market alternatives provide a better solution to these 
problems, he offers the following view: 'Information failures and the lack of competition 
justify regulation: the externality, coupled with major insurance problems, may justify 
public funding; and a strong (though not overriding) argument for public production and 
allocation arises out of the serious problems with both consumer information and private 
insurance' (p.86). 
McGuire et aL (1994) have also produced an extensive economic analysis of market 
failures in health care. They emphasise the problems involved in trying to measure output, 
define efficiency and monitor performance, and suggest these require at least the regulation 
of finance and provision. They are critical of the belief that institutional reform of the NHS 
can avoid the problem of trying to ration services to match available funding, and conclude 
there is no simple way of defining the correct level of health expenditure. 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that pure markets are unlikely to allocate 
health care efficiently. The inequity of a market distribution has already been mentioned. 
Some societies may be able to tolerate a situation where money determines the extent to 
which preferences for health care can be exercised, but the fact that health care affects 
such basic aspects of life as survival, pain and physical capacities makes inequity in its 
distribution a contentious and emotive matter. Even the US does not allow the market to 
take its full natural course and intervenes on behalf of the poorest in society through 
Medicaid, although this still leaves millions of low-paid uninsured people to struggle with 
market forces. 
The inequity arising from choices being determined by ability to pay combines with the 
inefficiency arising from those choices being poorly informed and subject to monopolistic 
provision to make pure markets an unsuccessful means of rationing health care. 
Quasi-markets 
The Conservative government to some extent acknowledged the problems that exist in 
health care markets, both by opting to retain public funding and public production and by 
describing the system it established in 1991 as a 'managed market'. There has been 
significant intervention to regulate the NHS market, and ministers have strongly denied 
that NHS Trusts represented the first stage of wholesale privatisation as their critics 
argued. 
There are two main components of quasi-markets which seek to reap the potential benefits 
of a market system whilst retaining the control of an accountable political process: these 
components are the separate identification of purchasers and providers, and the creation of 
competition between providers. 
Glennerster and Le Grand (1994) have examined possible explanations for the 
government's choice of quasi-markets in several areas of social services, including 
education as well as health, and conclude that the main driving force was not an 
ideological commitment to markets, a desire to cut public expenditure and state 
intervention, or to privatise welfare, although all these elements were undoubtedly present. 
They conclude rather that the government was trying to find a way of making services 
more responsive to rising consumer expectations without increasing taxes or abandoning 
the popularly supported principle of public funding. Having exhausted the potential for 
greater managerial efficiency during the 1980s, the government then turned to competition 
as a way to squeeze out greater efficiency and more responsiveness to consumer 
requirements. The White Paper 'Working for Patients' (Secretaries of State etc., 1989) in 
which the reforms were first announced is indeed shot through with the rhetoric of 
improving patient choice. 
For competition to work effectively there must be an identifiable purchaser who responds 
to the competing offers made by providers. A market-place with no customers is simply a 
contradiction in terms. Given the inefficiency and inequity of health care markets where 
individuals are the consumers, the solution of the quasi-market is to substitute purchasing 
by an agency, in the form of either health authorities or GP landholders. 
Quasi-markets only function efficiently if certain conditions are met, like real markets 
(Glennerster, 1992); quasi-markets in social services face a number of common difficulties, 
and the NHS market has its own specific problems, the result of which may be called 
'quasi-market failure'. These problems fall into two main categories: imperfect competition 
and imperfect information. I shall deal with imperfect competition first, before moving on 
to imperfect information, which is more directly relevant to the quasi-market's impact on 
rationing, although issues of competition also have some relevance. 
Perfect competition in the NHS is threatened by a number of monopolies and 
monopsonies, in addition to the monopoly of the medical profession as a whole. In many 
areas of the country, following years of centralised planning, there is only one possible 
hospital or community service to turn to. District general hospitals were developed to 
ensure local accessibility and a more even distribution of facilities around the country. 
The evidence about whether people are prepared to travel long distances to obtain better 
health care is conflicting. Mahon et al (1994) found that most people do not wish to be far 
from family and friends whilst in hospital, although responses differed by specialty. Middle 
class patients have been prepared to travel to famous London hospitals to obtain better 
quality care, but this has been a limited phenomenon both socially and geographically and 
is illustrates the unequal distribution of information about services within the population. 
Recent waiting list initiatives have been used to send people to more distant hospitals to 
get their operation performed more quickly, and this may reduce resistance to the idea 
amongst the population more widely, but it seems unlikely to become the norm. It would 
also not be practicable for emergency needs. To some extent, therefore, competition could 
actually conflict with patient preferences for local care, even more so if it resulted in the 
closure of some uneconomic but locally valued services. 
In highly specialised services, it has been argued that local accessibility is less important 
than maintaining high quality services which concentrate expertise and patients in one 
place. This creates a different kind of geographical monopoly. (See, for example, the 
recent proposals for rationalising cancer services, Department of Health, 1994). However, 
recent work by the NHS Centre for Reviews and Dissemination (1995) has queried this 
supposed relationship between volume and quality. 
These monopolistic obstacles to competition can be overcome in conurbations with a large 
number of health care institutions in one area. However, the majority of NHS consumers 
do not live in such areas. 
In addition to the problem of provider monopolies, there is the problem of purchaser 
monopolies and monopsonies. Unless an individual is registered with a GP fundholding 
practice, all health care services are currently purchased on his or her behalf by the local 
health authority. Unlike an insurance-based system, there is little choice of purchasers; the 
only possible choices for an individual consumer would be either to move to another health 
authority, or to change GP to a fiindholding practice. 
A health authority monopsony occurs when the authority is the only major purchaser of 
services from providers in that area. This could mean that providers have little choice but 
to fall in with purchaser requirements. Even where GP fundholding has become 
widespread, undermining purchasing monopsonies for the elective and out-patient services 
which fundholders are able to buy, the monopsony may persist in other services which do 
not form part of fund-holding, such as emergency services or very expensive procedures, 
unless a total purchasing pilot has been operating. 
In the above discussion of imperfect competition, the question of consumer or patient 
choice has already cropped up more than once. The problem in arguing that a quasi-market 
will improve patient choice is that in a quasi-market the consumer and the purchaser are 
not the same person. This in turn is linked to imperfect information as a major cause of 
market failure in health care. Where the inequality of market knowledge between 
consumer and provider is too great, quasi-markets offer an alternative to individual 
purchasing by introducing supposedly more informed purchasing agencies, namely health 
authorities and GP fundholders. Thus quasi-markets are not in themselves designed to 
enhance individual consumer choice. Given the lack of competition between purchasers, 
the extent to which services become more responsive to consumer preference is dependent 
upon how seriously committed purchasers are to acting on consumer views. Realistically, 
even this must be largely at the level of collective views and preferences, rather than 
individual choices. This is particularly true at health authority level, where the scale of 
purchasing means the majority of decisions are at group or specialty level; GP fundholders 
may reflect individual patient wishes more accurately, although even they must ultimately 
manage their budget for the collective benefit of all the practice's patients. 
Quasi-market purchasing is similar to social insurance models, in trying to pool risk and 
uncertainty about future individual needs. Like any third party payment system, however, it 
disrupts the relationship between willingness to pay and consumption. Some might argue 
health authorities have even less control over utilisation than insurance companies, 
particularly as referrals are controlled by GPs. However, health authorities' inability to pass 
on spiralling costs in the form of increased insurance premiums does create some 
budgetary incentive to restrain over-consumption. Ate least GP fundholding offers 
congruence between the purchaser and the referrer, if not the patient. 
Does the introduction of agency purchasing really do anything to solve the problem of 
imperfect information? To some extent it does. Obviously, health authorities can never 
replicate the understanding each individual has about their own health or illness, but they 
are in many ways better informed than an individual member of the public can be. They can 
predict levels of different types of illness in their local population, build up knowledge of 
the variety of conditions and potential treatments that exist, and gather information about 
potential providers. 
However, there is still a huge gap between their level of knowledge and the goal of perfect 
information. There is only limited understanding of how to measure need, outcomes and 
the effectiveness of different treatments for the population as a whole. Health authorities 
do not know enough about the costs and quality of services offered by different providers -
partly because of the difficulties of measurement, and partly because of the difficulties of 
gaining access to information held by providers. This latter point illustrates the 
combination of opportunism and small numbers exchange described by Williamson (1975), 
demonstrating that imperfect competition also has a bearing on imperfect information. The 
relevance of Williamson's work will be discussed in more detail shortly. 
GP fundholders have some information advantages over health authorities, stemming from 
their closeness to their practice populations, which enables them to assess need and 
evaluate treatments provided to individuals more effectively, and from their experience as 
referrers to different hospitals. However, they still have to contend with the more general 
difficulties in measuring need and outcomes, and perhaps have less experience of costing 
hospital services than health authorities. The Audit Commission (1996) has criticised the 
majority of GP fundholders for making purchasing decisions which are not informed by the 
latest research on clinical effectiveness; health authorities may stand a better chance of 
keeping up with research through their public health departments than an individual GP. 
Fundholders may be able to overcome provider opportunism more successfully than health 
authorities through their inside knowledge of hospital medicine and by their ability to be 
more flexible about changing contracts away from an unsatisfactory provider, especially 
given the elective nature of most of the services. This is supported by the finding that 40% 
of GP fundholders felt the reforms had increased their freedom of choice in referral, 
compared to only 5% of non-fundholding GPs (Mahon et al., 1994). None of the 
fundholders felt their freedom of referral had been reduced, compared to 17% of non-
fundholders. 
In summary, purchasing agencies may go some way to reduce the problems of imperfect 
information, but the complexity and uncertainty of health care is such that only limited 
success is possible. The continuing impact of imperfect information leads on to the issue of 
contracts. 
Contracts 
The very complexity and uncertainty of health care means that market exchange in this 
field cannot easily be left to implicit or verbal contracts. The quasi-market therefore relies 
on written contracts. 
Theoretically, the specification of contracts between purchaser and provider should 
formalise resource allocation decisions and make them more explicit than they would be in 
a hierarchical system, bringing to the surface previously implicit or covert choices. The 
discretion for providers to decide how to spend their budgets has been considerably 
circumscribed, and the market culture has encouraged providers to view their workload as 
fixed and to believe that they should take on more patients only if additional funding can 
also be agreed. Purchasers are under pressure to carry out needs assessments for their 
population and make clearer choices about what type and quantity of treatments they need 
to buy (Hunter, 1993 a). 
There are three levels of rationing decision which could be made more explicit by 
contracting: what, how much and for whom. The corollary of specifying more clearly what 
will be provided is that one must also specify what, if anything, will not be provided; 
examples of treatments which have been excluded from contracts altogether by some 
health authorities include tattoo removal, sterilisation reversal and in vitro fertilisation 
(IVF). Having once made clear what will or will not be provided, contracts should 
theoretically specify how much of particular services or treatments will be provided. In 
practice, the level of detail to which this aspect of contracting is pursued could vary from a 
statement of the total volume of in-patient episodes expected in one hospital to a break-
down of the volume of episodes in each specialty or even the number of different 
operations or courses of treatment for patients with different conditions. Together, these 
two levels ('what' and 'how much') constitute what Calabresi and Bobbitt would describe 
as a first-order decision (Calabresi and Bobbitt, 1978). 
The second-order decision is who will receive those treatments which are purchased. In 
many contracts, this may not be specified and the selection of recipients will be left to 
frontline clinical staff, very much as it was before the introduction of the market. However, 
some authorities have started using contracts to specify how limited numbers of treatments 
should be allocated. Most frequently this is based on effectiveness evidence (e.g. age limits 
for IVF) or on the grounds that not treating will result in significant psychological 
morbidity (e.g. exceptions made for tattoo removal). Occasionally social criteria are 
applied (e.g. IVF only for married couples with no children by a previous marriage). All of 
these examples will be discussed in greater depth later on. 
When cost-per-case contracts are used, the first and second order decisions are 
simultaneous - this is more common in GP fiindholding, although it is used by health 
authorities, particularly for extra contractual referrals and for some low volume specialised 
services. 
Although the logic of quasi-market contracting should produce more explicit rationing 
decisions, two potential problems may prevent this logic from being fully realised. Firstly, 
contracts may be inefficient, in that they result in high transaction costs, or even impossible 
to draw up. Secondly, explicitness carries high political and ethical costs. This could result 
in the contracting process being carried out in form only, with a continuation of more 
implicit rationing mechanisms. These two problem areas will be examined in turn. 
The efficiency of contracting 
Bartlett (1991) has used Williamson's organisational failures framework to analyse the 
theory of quasi-markets and contracts in the context of the NHS. He suggests that the 
NHS provides an excellent illustration of Williamson's theories in practice. 
Firstly, he examines the difficulties of writing, implementing and enforcing clear contingent 
claims contracts in circumstances where bounded rationality interacts with a complex and 
uncertain environment. To foresee and describe all possible eventualities in all specialties 
and set up an appropriate pricing structure in a complex field such as health care is a 
formidable task. Bartlett argues that the information-gathering and monitoring effort 
required to specify such contracts will lead to spiralling transaction costs; indeed, it is 
probable that no matter how much is spent on the contracting process it will in any case 
prove impossible to establish truly satisfactory contracts. In these circumstances it is likely 
that purchasers will revert to incomplete 'block' contracts instead, which do not make such 
clear allocative decisions and which show more similarities with the internal hierarchical 
organisation of the pre-reforms NHS than a quasi-market structure. 
As already pointed out, the problem of imperfect information also stems partly from the 
difficulties for purchasers of obtaining accurate information from providers. This illustrates 
the interaction between small numbers exchange (i.e. very limited competition) and 
opportunism. Thus block contracts are made more likely both because of the inherent 
complexity of health care and because of obstacles to competition in the NHS. They may 
reduce the transaction costs of information gathering on the one hand, but they perpetuate 
the problem of opportunistic behaviour by providers. Opportunism has its own 
implications both for costs and for the control of allocative decisions. As Bartlett says, 'this 
effect on costs could arise both where providers operate to a less stringent set of working 
practices than would be required if effective monitoring, and penalties for poor 
performance, were available, and where unconstrained pursuit of professional excellence 
biases activity towards prestige treatments to the detriment of cheaper, more mundane but 
equally effective ones.' (p.58) 
Lack of competition is thus an important influence on contracting, both because of its 
direct impact on efficiency and costs, and because of its implications for the broader 
problem of imperfect information. Health care is a highly asset-specific market, where the 
buildings, equipment and skills required are not easily transferable to alternative uses. 
Given the high initial outlay and subsequent risk of financial difficulties for new entrants to 
such a market, it is unlikely that the small numbers exchange problem will go away, so 
competition will remain weak. 
Some commentators argue small numbers exchange does not represent a major problem 
for the NHS market. Ham (1996) suggests contestability is the key to ensuring that it 
remains efficient despite the absence of strong competition; contestability relies on 
comparing performance rather than competition and on the threat of moving contracts if 
providers do not respond to unfavourable comparisons by improving their own 
performance. He accepts that, for the threat to remain credible, contracts must actually be 
moved on occasion, but this may be the point at which the theory of contestability falls 
down, if no competitors are available within easy reach and potential new entrants to the 
market face insuperable financial or other barriers. Williamson (1985) is sceptical of the 
claims of contestability theory, as developed originally by Baumol et al. (1982). He argues 
that it 'reduces asset specificity to insignificance, so that hit-and-run entry is easy. 
Transaction cost economics, by contrast, magnifies the condition of asset specificity. The 
existence of durable, firm specific assets is held to be widespread, and accordingly hit-and-
run entry is often infeasible' (p.31, footnote). 
Appleby et al. (1994) agree that the NHS may not exhibit the characteristics of a 
contestable market. However, their research in West Midlands Region has suggested that 
the level of monopoly enjoyed by acute providers was not as great as popularly imagined. 
In general surgery, their sample specialty, only 38% of patients were treated in hospitals 
which they defined as monopolistic. They interpret this finding with caution, firstly because 
38% still represents quite a sizeable element of monopoly and secondly because the degree 
of monopoly would almost certainly be higher at sub-specialty level, in other specialties 
and in a more detailed break-down of market catchment areas. 
They acknowledge Bartlett's points, but say that 'the significance of this for the internal 
market is that it points to the desirability of long term stable contractual relationships 
between purchasers and providers. If long term contracts exist, competition is likely to 
take place for markets at periodic stages of contract negotiation, rather than in markets on 
a day-to-day basis.' (p.26) 
Long term relationships with preferred providers have a well-established place in the 
commercial market-place, so their presence in the NHS need not demonstrate the failure of 
the quasi-market. On the other hand, it could be argued that the language of partnership 
and long term contracts evident in much recent discussion of the NHS, and the interest in 
contestability, were a way of circumventing the imperative of contingent claims contracts 
and were simply proving Williamson and Bartlett right. Failing an active and formal 
decision to return to internal vertical integration as a more efficient model, has the NHS 
been drifting back towards it unofficially, if indeed it ever left it? Management consultant 
Kingsley Manning (1996) stated in a conference speech that 'central direction is still very 
strong. Trusts are more like branches of a franchised operation than independent 
autonomous organisations. There is still a tendency for trusts to reinforce the status quo'. 
If this is true, the expectation that the logic of the internal market would lead to more 
explicit rationing decisions may have been misplaced. 
The Conservative government itself acknowledged the heavy administrative burden 
created by the contracting process, despite the fact that most contracts remain incomplete 
block contracts; in the terms of reference for the NHS efficiency scrutiny, the first task for 
the scrutiny team was to 'consider the scope for simplifying the processes and transaction 
costs associated with contracting and invoicing between purchasers and providers' 
(Department of Health, 1995). This certainly supports Bartlett's predictions. 
The political and ethical costs of contracting 
Bartlett's focus is on the transaction costs of contracting in a quasi-market. In addition, the 
'life and death' nature of health care and the level of popular support for the NHS may give 
rise to political and ethical costs which are as great or greater than the transaction costs. 
Firstly, transaction costs are themselves a political issue for any government committed to 
containing public expenditure and keen to demonstrate that additional investment in the 
NHS is supporting frontline clinical staff. Media reports of large increases in finance, 
administration and information technology staff needed to run the internal market have 
provided opposition parties with plenty of embarrassing ammunition. The new Labour 
Government is now experiencing the same pressure to demonstrate investment in clinical 
care. 
Furthermore, increasing explicitness in purchasing plans and contracts has created tension 
and ambivalence at political level. It is unclear whether the Conservative government 
intended its reforms to increase the explicitness of rationing or even foresaw this is as a 
natural consequence. Glennerster and Le Grand (1994) take the view that the 
government's main aim was to improve consumer responsiveness, an aim distinctly at odds 
with the possibility that consumers might increasingly be refused access to certain services. 
Ham et al. (1990) stress the crucial role of the 1987 NHS funding crisis in triggering the 
review, and concur with Glennerster and Le Grand that the government hoped a market-
based system would squeeze more efficiency out of the same level of resources. This 
would suggest they hoped the market would avoid the need for more explicit rationing 
rather than bringing it up to the surface. 
Alternatively, the openly stated requirement that health authorities should carry out needs 
assessment and priority-setting as a precursor to establishing contracts does suggest some 
degree of rationing was expected, albeit it by another name. Crucially, however, this was 
expected to be done at local level, leaving politicians clear of uncomfortable decisions and 
able to lay the blame on the natural operation of the market or to scapegoat health 
authority managers for making the 'wrong' choices. Glennerster and Le Grand (1994) 
suggest devolution of power and responsibility in priority setting may also be in the 
interests of top Department of Health civil servants, whom one might otherwise expect to 
be reluctant to relinquish control - as they say, 'If there is dirty and unpopular work to do, 
let someone else do it' (p. 15). 
There are strong reasons why the government should be anxious to avoid direct 
involvement in explicit rationing, even if in private it is acknowledged privately. The 
National Health Service Act 1946 was explicitly designed to put an end to the previous 
system of rationing by ability to pay, and established 
'...a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the physical 
and mental health of the people of England and Wales and the prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment of illness, and for that purpose to provide or secure the 
effective provision of services in accordance with the following provisions of this 
Act. 
The services so provided shall be free of charge, except where any provision of this 
Act expressly provides for the making and recovery of charges'. 
The aims of the Act are crucial in understanding the attitude of successive governments to 
rationing. Although it quickly became apparent that the NHS could not meet all the 
demands upon it and charges were introduced around the margins to try to control 
spiralling expenditure, the basic principle of a comprehensive, publicly funded service free 
to all citizens still has a powerful hold over the views of politicians and public alike. In 
opinion surveys, the NHS has consistently been found to be one of the most popular and 
fiercely defended elements of the British welfare state (See, for example, Taylor-Gooby, 
1991). Only the Thatcher government gave any significant consideration to alternative 
methods of funding and in the face of enormous opposition quickly reverted to the 
principle of funding from general taxation, although Mrs Thatcher is believed to have 
insisted personally on including tax relief for health insurance for elderly people in the 
NHS reforms (Ham et al., 1990). 
Loyalty to the concept of a free and comprehensive service makes it difficult to 
countenance explicit rationing. Any attempt by government to specify elements of health 
care for which people are not eligible under the NHS is seen by the public as a 
contravention of their basic rights under the 1946 NHS Act. (In contrast the courts do not 
generally support the idea of an absolute right to be treated and have dismissed cases 
brought by individuals who have been refused care, notably in the recent case of the 10-
year-old 'Child B' with leukaemia. In making such judgements, the courts have relied 
particularly on the wording of the NHS Act 1977, which says: 'The Secretary of State is 
under a duty to provide services to such an extent that he considers necessary to meet all 
reasonable requirements'). 
Whatever the strict legal position, the fact remains that successive governments have been 
reluctant to be seen to restrict access to the NHS for fear of jeopardising their electoral 
position, and any rationing has generally been implicit. 
Unfortunately for politicians, the devolution of priority setting has not shielded them 
entirely. Although theoretically they could allow the market or health authorities to take 
the blame, in practice they have often felt unable to let this happen. There is considerable 
anecdotal evidence of ministerial intervention to reverse health authority decisions to 
refuse to pay for certain referrals. 
By their very nature, these incidents are not well documented, but a verbal account of one 
such case was given at a lecture in 1991. A health authority decided not to allow a patient 
needing a joint replacement to be referred to another provider with a lower waiting time 
than the local hospital, but a significantly higher cost per case. The chief executive's 
argument was that the referral would have been both inequitable and an inefficient use of 
money with an opportunity cost for other patients on the waiting list. The patient 
contacted the local MP, setting off a chain of communication which culminated in a 
minister telephoning the health authority chairman and the chairman vetoing the chief 
executive's decision (Institute of Health Services Management, 1991). 
There were signs of growing acceptance of explicit rationing by the Conservative 
government. The Child В case in 1995 was notable for the lack of political intervention 
and the government's willingness to allow it to go to court. Official documents such as 
'The National Health Service: A Service With Ambitions' (Secretary of State for Health, 
1996) were becoming more forthright in acknowledging the need for priority setting, 
although continuing to emphasise that this should be carried out at local level. The report 
of a working party set up jointly by the NHSE even used the word 'rationing' (Academy 
of Medical Royal Colleges et aL, 1997, p. 6). However, the Labour government is 
evidently uneasy with this, a point discussed in greater detail in the final chapter. 
Political unease is of course influenced by concern about the ethical costs of explicit 
rationing. The managers of Cambridge and Huntingdon Health Commission, who decided 
not to fund a private referral for Child В requested by her family are perhaps unusual for 
the degree of ethical confidence they have displayed in their decision. A significant factor 
in this must be the fact that the child's own doctors advised the health authority against 
further treatment on the grounds that the slim chance of a successful outcome did not 
justify the additional suffering involved in further treatment. This could be regarded as a 
purely clinical decision, with a sound ethical basis of pursuing the patient's best interests -
this may incidentally help account for the government's lack of intervention. 
However, the patient and her family wished to proceed with treatment, and found a 
clinician willing to help them. At this stage, in the words of the judge at the first hearing, 
the health authority began to 'toll the bell of limited resources', arguing that the level of 
suffering and the poor chances of survival did not justify the level of expenditure. This 
changes the ethical picture considerably. This is not to say that a decision which includes 
cost is necessarily unethical, but that it brings a different ethical perspective into play - the 
utilitarian perspective. Utilitarianism sets the individual patient's wishes and rights against 
the interests of other existing and potential patients who could benefit more from the 
resources, with the ultimate aim of maximising the total benefit. One could argue that the 
child was wrong; that her real interests were in not being treated and were therefore not in 
conflict with the interests of other people; and that the health authority purchasing on her 
behalf was simply correcting her own imperfect information. However, not only does this 
challenge her autonomous judgement of where her interests lay, but the introduction of 
cost into the equation does suggest that at least to some extent her interests were being set 
against the opportunity costs for other patients. 
If the case of Child В poses major ethical dilemmas, despite agreement between local 
clinicians and managers, it may be imagined that ethical debate will be much stronger 
where no consensus exists between them, and where the evidence about ability to benefit 
from treatment is less clear-cut. All forms of rationing essentially trade off some people's 
interests against others, but this may be achieved in covert or random ways; the problem 
with more explicit forms of rationing is that they involve a deliberate and overt trade-off 
and lay bare the tragic choices being made. Collective purchasing by an agency, which 
aims to maximise benefit for whole groups of people, is likely to end up taking a utilitarian 
position. Detailed contracts would make this position abundantly clear. 
Ethical dilemmas of this kind bear an emotional cost for individuals making the decisions, a 
cost to politicians in terms of electoral popularity, a cost to society in confronting the 
conflict of values and not least a cost to individuals harmed by the decisions made. These 
ethical costs may be high enough to threaten the development of explicit rationing through 
the quasi-market. 
Other pressures in favour of explicit rationing 
So far two possible scenarios have been considered: firstly, that the contracting processes 
of the quasi-market will make rationing decisions more explicit, or secondly, that 
contracting will fail to realise this expectation as a result of the high transactional, political 
and ethical costs of greater explicitness. 
Is there a third possibility? The first two hypotheses assume that the successful or 
unsuccessful functioning of the contracting process is the dominant factor in determining 
whether rationing decisions will become more explicit. However, there are other factors 
which may influence events more strongly than contracting, especially rising expenditure, 
improved understanding of outcomes and the Patient's Charter. 
Rising expenditure 
It is often taken as indisputable fact that demand for health care is infinite, and that 
therefore health care expenditure has infinite potential for growth. There are those who 
disagree with this position, and their views will be discussed later. Whatever the truth of 
the matter, there is a demonstrable trend of rising health expenditure in many Western 
countries, accompanied by a widespread perception that the cost of meeting all demands 
for health care is unaffordable and that expenditure must be brought under control. 
Total health care expenditure in all OECD countries more than doubled as a share of GDP 
over the period 1960 to 1992, from 3.9% to 8.4 %. Much of this increase took place up to 
1980, when the average reached 7.2%, with a slower rate of increase between 1980 and 
1990 up to 7.9%. The OECD expresses some caution about the apparent increase between 
1990 and 1992, as it is affected by the recession and resulting weak position of GDP. The 
rate of growth varies between countries; for example, the US has continued to have a 
faster growth rate than others (from 9.2% in 1980, to 12.4% in 1990 and 14% in 1992), 
whilst the slow-down in expenditure has become ever sharper in Europe. The European 
average rose from 7.1% in 1980 to only 7.6% in 1990 and 8.0% in 1992 (OECD, 1995). 
The interrelation between demand, cost and expenditure is not straightforward. Rising 
demand may lead to higher expenditure, either because more people want what has always 
been on offer, or because people want new, more sophisticated or better quality services. 
However, greater efficiencies may enable rising demand to be accommodated within 
existing expenditure. Rising costs may result from inflation, or from the development of 
more expensive techniques, which is in turn closely related to rising demand. However, 
higher costs may simply result in more stringent rationing rather than higher expenditure, if 
this is what society chooses. Rising expenditure may also have a circular effect of 
increasing previously suppressed demand, and perhaps encouraging providers to increase 
their costs. 
The recent deceleration in the growth of health's share of GDP may be as significant for 
explicit rationing as the continued growth in expenditure itself. Health care providers 
accustomed to relatively generous increases in funding will have raised expectations of 
development and technological achievement. As governments seek to rein in this level of 
growth, providers' perception of the gap between desirable and actual levels of funding 
will be all the sharper, even though funding is still increasing. As a result, they may feel 
more inclined to make very clear statements of what can no longer be afforded. 
Three factors in particular play a role in this complex equation: the development of 
expensive high technology, demographic change and rising consumer expectations. These 
pressures are found internationally, regardless of the structure of health care provision in 
each country. 
Technological innovation has the potential to reduce costs in some areas - for example, 
the introduction of less invasive forms of surgery results in quicker recovery and discharge 
from hospital. However, it often requires high capital investment, and earlier discharge 
results in increased capacity, so more patients can be treated and expenditure rises even if 
the cost per patient may be slightly lower. 
New technology often enables conditions to be treated for which no treatment was 
previously available, greatly extending the scope for medical intervention and thereby 
increasing demand. In vitro fertilisation is a good example - couples whose infertility 
would previously have been regarded as a sad fact of life can now do something about it. 
Even though the rates of success may be statistically low, at an individual level it is 
difficult to forego the chance. Health care professionals will also find it hard to resist 
applying new technology, not only on the principle that they should do the best they can 
for every patient but also because it is only by experiment and experience that success 
rates will be improved. 
The impact of demographic change on health care demand has been extensively 
documented. The most important element is the increased number of elderly people, who 
tend to have more serious conditions and longer and more frequent stays in hospital than 
younger people, all of which increases expenditure (Ermisch, 1990; Johnson and 
Falkingham, 1992). Of particular concern is the proportion of very elderly people, whose 
health needs are even greater. The percentage of those aged 80 and over rose from 1.9% 
in 1961 to 3.7% in 1991, and is projected to be 5.2% by 2021 (Central Statistical Office, 
1994). Increased survival partly accounts for the emergence of different types of health 
needs, such as the growing incidence of Alzheimer's Disease. 
Recent increases in joint replacements illustrate the combined impact of technological 
development and rising numbers of elderly people, increasing the demand both in terms of 
volume and in terms of the sophistication of treatment. In this case, the growing number of 
elderly people suffering from serious joint problems has also acted as a stimulus to 
technological development. The growth in expenditure has been partly contained by 
lengthening waiting lists. 
Care for elderly people has always been at the forefront of disputes between local 
authorities and the health service (see, for example, the Boucher Report, 1957); as strain 
on their limited budgets increases, each agency has sought to define more clearly the 
limitations of its own responsibilities and the extent of the other agency's duties. 
Increasingly the NHS has withdrawn from long term care, so that many people who would 
have expected to obtain free NHS care have been faced with means tested local authority 
care as the only alternative. Local authorities are beginning to respond that they cannot 
afford the costs of community care for elderly people. The national requirement to 
establish jointly agreed eligibility criteria for continuing care in each health and local 
authority has so far done little to clarify responsibilities. 
However, some analysts question the assumption that elderly people will inevitably impose 
a burden on health services. Thane (1989) argues that much ill health and dependency is 
shaped by society's expectations and that there is little value in transposing the existing 
health of elderly people onto a very different future population. This may be one area 
where new technologies may reduce dependency and therefore costs; preventive health 
care and better social conditions mean successive generations of elderly people are staying 
healthier for longer. Taylor-Gooby (1991) supports this argument by pointing out that the 
number of elderly people has in fact been growing since the 1940s and that the 'burden' 
has so far successfully been absorbed. On the other hand, research in the US has found 
mean Medicare payments in the last year of life are seven times as high as the average 
yearly payment for all Medicare payments; payments in the last month of life make up 40% 
of the total in the last year (Lubitz and Riley, 1993). Staying healthier for longer cannot 
prevent final fatal illness. 
Rising consumer expectations operate at a number of levels, sometimes with conflicting 
effects. Patients increasingly expect improved standards of accommodation and other 
services when in hospital, and demand shorter waiting times. They may seek more 
domiciliary or community care (e.g. for maternity care and terminal illness) and expect 
professionals to come to them; on the other hand, there is continuing public support for 
high technology care and expensive interventions for a few emotive cases. People expect 
better quality of clinical care, believing modern medicine should be able to cure everything; 
simultaneously, they are more sceptical about doctors' status as infallible experts, and more 
likely to begin costly legal proceedings against them. They also demand access to a greater 
range of services, as new technologies develop. People in this country born since the 
introduction of the NHS have come to regard free and universal access to health care as 
their right, unlike previous generations (Blaxter and Paterson, 1982). 
Some of these changing demands may be cost neutral or even reduce costs, but evidence 
(where it exists) is often conflicting. Community care, for example, generates great 
controversy as to whether it will prove cheaper or more expensive than institutional care. 
Improvements in efficiency may offset some of the effect of rising demand. Overall, 
however, it is likely that rising demand will cause expenditure to rise unless it is countered 
by more stringent rationing. 
In addition to the pressure of consumer expectations on expenditure, greater consumer 
involvement in purchasing decisions may exercise a more direct effect on the likelihood of 
rationing becoming more explicit. Firstly, there is some evidence that public opinion is in 
favour of rationing health care to some groups perceived as self-harming. A 1994 Gallup 
survey of 1,000 people found that 32% favoured discrimination against heavy drinkers on 
hospital waiting lists, 25% supported discrimination against smokers and 11% against 
people who were overweight (Health Service Journal, 1994a). 
Whilst there may be some public pressure in favour of rationing care to certain self-
harming groups, consumers within such groups have expressed concern that they are 
already discriminated against. Paradoxically their complaints may add to the momentum 
behind more explicit rationing, as hitherto covert policies are forced out into the open and 
debated. 
Although, as noted earlier, the quasi-market was at least partly intended to improve 
consumer responsiveness, pressure for greater consumer involvement pre-dates the NHS 
reforms and has its own international momentum outside any particular structure of 
provision. The Patient's Charter is an illustration of this, and will be discussed shortly. 
Development of outcomes research 
The rapid development of outcomes research is also linked to the development of explicit 
rationing. This includes research into effectiveness, measures of cost-benefit in health, and 
consumer satisfaction measures. Outcomes research offers tools to those carrying out 
rationing, whether or not this is the intention of the researchers. 
In some cases it clearly is the intention of researchers, an example being the economists at 
the University of York who advocate the use of their QALY system to develop cost-
benefit league tables of different treatments to assist managers and doctors in deciding 
priorities (Williams, 1985; Maynard, 1994). (QALYs are Quality Adjusted Life Years, a 
combined measure of survival and quality of life resulting from a given treatment). At the 
other end of the spectrum, research identifying effective and ineffective treatments may be 
intended to prevent patients undergoing unnecessary trauma and finding the best way of 
making them better, regardless of costs and without trying to rank the benefits gained 
against other types of treatment for completely different conditions. Many would argue 
that ceasing ineffective treatments is not in fact rationing, a question which is explored in 
the next chapter. In practice, however, most research does not uncover absolute 
ineffectiveness, but rather identifies relative levels of effectiveness. It may demonstrate that 
treatment X is better for some people than treatment Y, but not that Y is therefore 
pointless. 
Analysing outcomes is also an important factor in researching variation in treatment rates 
between different areas of one country and between different countries. If outcomes are 
not significantly different between groups with high or low intervention rates, this raises 
the question of whether higher rates are justified and challenges the assumption that more 
is always better. 
The explosion of information about outcomes and improved understanding of effectiveness 
offers decision-makers a new and apparently powerful tool with which to adjudicate 
competing demands for limited resources. It holds out the tempting prospect of a more 
rational, neutral and scientifically based decision-making process. However, the complexity 
of comparisons between different treatments for different conditions in individual patients 
is immense, and there are still vast areas of health care which have not yet been properly 
evaluated. There is a danger that formulae such as QALYs or any other kind of ranking 
mechanism will be used over-simplistically by decision-makers desperate to bring some 
order into priority-setting. 
Carr-Hill (1991) suggests QALYs are potentially dangerous because they appear to offer a 
straightforward technical solution to what is in fact a political problem. Hunter, whilst 
recognising the value of greater understanding of effectiveness, has also argued that it 
becomes 'corrupted or problematic...where it becomes entangled with the current 
preoccupation with the rationing of health services' (Hunter, 1993 a, p.29). He notes that 
'numbers have a curiously mesmerising effect on managers with unfounded assumptions of 
certainty and precision underpinning their very hardness', and suggests 'we should resist 
abandoning an admittedly imperfect though workable irrationality in favour of a quite 
spurious rationality which is probably unattainable and certainly undesirable'(p.31-2). 
Despite these reservations, managers are under pressure to find ways to improve the 
allocation of resources, and some academics are keen to encourage them to use outcomes-
based techniques. The availability of information on outcomes gives additional momentum 
to the development of more explicit rationing mechanisms. 
Patient's Charter 
In this country, the role of the Patient's Charter (Department of Health, 1991) in forcing 
some rationing decisions has been crucial and evidence for this will be presented in later 
chapters. The Patient's Charter was launched by the government independently of the NHS 
reforms in October 1991. Although its emphasis on empowering the consumer does give it 
clear links with quasi-market ideology, it tries to achieve this through the imposition of 
central directives to create a set of patient 'rights' (of a non-legal kind). This is distinctly at 
odds with market assumptions that consumers are empowered by their ability to choose or 
ultimately to exit from the market. The fact that the government feels additional regulation 
is necessary to empower consumers serves to confirm the idea that the quasi-market is not 
in itself a very good vehicle for consumer choice. 
The Patient's Charter sets out several rights for patients, including maximum waiting times 
for admission to hospital. Since its introduction, the maximum waiting time target has been 
steadily lowered, with some regions (notably West Midlands) choosing to impose even 
stricter standards on health authorities. 
In elective surgery long waiting times have traditionally been used as an implicit rationing 
mechanism based on an assessment of clinical need, for instance giving people requesting 
cosmetic surgery lower priority than others. The Patient's Charter had two effects. Firstly, 
it brought to light the availability on the NHS of operations such as tattoo removal which 
managers were not necessarily aware of and which they now thought should be challenged. 
Secondly, by changing the criterion for admission from clinical need to length of wait, it 
closed off the possibility of using very long waiting times as a way of rationing access to 
these procedures, and meant that some alternative, more explicit rationing mechanism had 
to be found. It is also possible that the earmarking of funding for waiting list initiatives 
diverted funds that could have been used for other things; this may have resulted in more 
rationing in other, non-elective areas, although if so this has probably been implicit. 
(There have been reports of some clinicians rejecting the distortion of clinical priorities 
caused by the Patient's Charter (Health Service Journal, 1996). At St. George's, doctors 
insisted on admitting patients according to the urgency of their condition, rather than the 
length of time they had been waiting, and 27 clinical directors from South Thames wrote 
to the Secretary of State to express their concerns). 
All of the above additional pressures in favour of explicit rationing - rising expenditure, 
outcomes research and the Patient's Charter - may be so strong that they will prove 
irresistible, whatever structural form the NHS takes. If this hypothesis is correct, one 
would predict that explicit rationing will continue to increase, either through the quasi-
market contracting system, regardless of its high transactional, political and ethical costs, 
or through some other mechanism if contracting fails to provide an adequate means of 
achieving it or is abandoned altogether. This scenario has particular relevance given 
Labour's stated commitment to abolishing the NHS market (Secretary of State for Health, 
1997). 
Statement of hypotheses 
To summarise, the research carried out in support of this thesis aimed to test three 
different hypotheses: 
i. Markets are one possible system for allocating scarce resources. The process of 
contract specification inherent in a complex quasi-market system constitutes a form 
of rationing, which formalises resource allocation decisions and makes them more 
explicit than they would be in a hierarchical system. The theory that lies behind the 
move from hierarchy to quasi-market in health care would thus predict that rationing 
in the NHS will become more explicit as a result of the introduction of the internal 
market. 
ii. However, in the complex context of the NHS the quasi-market may fail to produce 
clear contracts and unambiguous allocations. There are several reasons why this may 
happen: 
- Williamson's 'organisational failures' thesis suggests that the transaction costs of 
contracting will be too high because the knowledge base is too low, and that a drift 
back to hierarchy may occur to enable the system to cope more efficiently; 
- it is likely that politicians will be reluctant to accept the consequences of their 
creation (although they may perhaps be evolving towards acceptance);working 
without political support creates difficulty for others; 
- there may be ethical unwillingness to bring tragic choices out into the open. 
This view predicts either that contracting will be conducted in form only, with a 
continuation of more implicit rationing mechanisms, or that it will be abandoned 
altogether. 
iii. Alternatively, other pressures in favour of explicit rationing - particularly rising 
expenditure, outcomes research and the Patient's Charter - may be irresistible, 
whatever structural form the NHS takes. This hypothesis would predict that explicit 
rationing will continue to increase, whether through the quasi-market contracting 
system, regardless of its high transactional, political and ethical costs, or through 
some other mechanism if contracting fails to provide an adequate means of achieving 
it or is abandoned altogether. 
Chapter Three 
The history of health care rationing and the current debate 
What does rationing mean? 
Whilst the previous chapter dealt with the general theory of resource allocation, this 
chapter looks in more detail at the history of real resource allocation decisions in health 
care and at the current debate about rationing. 
The starting point remains the assumption that, like any resource, the amount of health 
care available is limited, and therefore choices must be made about its allocation, whether 
implicitly or explicitly. However, the use of the word 'rationing' to describe this process is 
politically sensitive, and does not go unchallenged; furthermore, there are those who 
question the need to make choices at all. These debates will be examined in depth later in 
this chapter. 
Even the meaning of 'explicit' and 'implicit' in the context of rationing is subject to 
individual interpretation, and it is therefore necessary to clarify the interpretation which 
will be used in this chapter. Implicit rationing is sometimes taken to mean rationing by 
clinicians. Whilst this is one very important component of implicit rationing, it is not a 
comprehensive definition. Building on the 'explicit-unrecognised' and 'open-closed' 
continua proposed by Glennerster (1975) (see below), I suggest that explicitness consists 
in a decision being planned and evaluated (or at least measured), with a clear attempt to 
distinguish who will receive what, and in being understood and agreed by a group of 
people, not just the individual clinician. (This does not necessarily include the public or the 
patient, however). Mechanic (1995) describes it as 'trying to establish all the rules 
beforehand' (p. 1659). Implicit rationing is a process in which the reasoning involved is not 
clearly stated to anyone except (or possibly including) the person making the decisions, or 
in which active decision-making is avoided altogether. Thus waiting lists are an implicit 
mechanism not because they embody decisions made by individual clinicians, but because 
their reasoning remains private; the distinguishing feature is not who makes the decision 
but how they do it. It is perfectly possible for an individual doctor to make an explicit 
rationing decision and share the criteria used with colleagues and the patient. Random 
rationing, perhaps a lottery or a waiting list run purely on a first-come, first-served basis, is 
also implicit because it avoids deliberate decision-making about who will receive what. 
In fact much of the current disagreement about rationing focuses on explicit forms of 
rationing; there is a considerable degree of consensus that implicit rationing has always 
gone on in health care, even if this has been unintended. 
The existence of various kinds of rationing has been consistently acknowledged in social 
policy analysis (e.g. Parker, 1967; Glennerster, 1975; Cooper, 1975), and different 
analytical frameworks abound. 
Glennerster (1975) emphasises that the two questions 'how much and for whom?' are 
fundamental to all social administration and that 'all of those concerned with the delivery of 
social services, whether at the centre or the periphery, are caught up in the rationing 
process' (p. 11-12) 
In Chapter Two of this thesis, three questions were in fact identified, starting with what, as 
well as how much and for whom. This may reflect the fact that explicit total exclusion of 
some services, albeit at the margins, is now a reality in the NHS, whereas previously it 
would not have been contemplated so starkly. 
Glennerster identifies four dimensions or continua by which the 'locus and nature' of 
allocation decisions can be analysed (p.38): 
Central - peripheral: rationing decisions can be made at any level from the Cabinet down 
to local service providers. 
Explicit - unrecognised (implicit): an explicit decision is one which has been planned, 
where there is some attempt to distinguish who is receiving what and to evaluate the 
outcome. An unrecognised decision emerges without such awareness and deliberate 
action. 
Open - closed, this concerns the degree to which the knowledge on which decisions are 
based is openly known and debated. An allocation can be made explicitly but on the basis 
of information to which access is restricted. 
Technical - political: decisions may be made on technical or professional grounds, or they 
may be taken in response to political pressures. Taking political in its broadest sense, this 
continuum could also include bureaucratic self-interest. 
The last three categories have much in common with the components of'rational rationing' 
identified by New and Le Grand (1996): expiicitness, democratic participation and 
systematic decision-making processes (p.23). 
To this could be added the following continuum: 
Population - individual: this to some extent parallels the central - peripheral continuum, 
but concerns the people affected by the rationing decisions rather than those making them. 
In theory, central decisions could affect quite small groups of people - if, for example, the 
government implemented a national ban on tattoo removal - although in practice it is more 
likely that central decisions will affect larger groups of the population and peripheral 
decisions smaller groups or individuals. 
Different rationing mechanisms can take place at points along all these continua. Building 
on work by Parker (1975), Harrison and Hunter (1994) identify the following mechanisms: 
deterrence, delay, deflection, dilution and denial (p.25-30). 
Deterrence includes introducing charges (price rationing), making access inconvenient and 
creating psychological or social barriers to using the service - the higher utilisation rates 
amongst the middle classes noted by Le Grand (1982) may for instance be partly 
accounted for by the fact that most health care providers are themselves middle class and 
may subconsciously make it more difficult for people from lower socio-economic groups 
to approach the service. The ability to manipulate one's GP to obtain the level of service 
desired is a rationing device which favours the better off and better educated. 
Delay operates most obviously through waiting lists (time rationing), while deflection is 
illustrated by GPs choosing not to refer a patient to secondary care services or diverting 
them to an alternative agency such as social services. Harrison and Hunter also explore the 
idea of deflecting demand by giving patients more information, the assumption being that if 
patients knew more about the effectiveness (or otherwise) and side-effects of particular 
treatments, they might more often choose not to seek care. 
Responses to health care demand can be diluted by a reduction in quality, which could 
mean giving an individual less treatment or fewer drugs, for example, or permitting a 
whole area such as mental health services to remain at a lower quality level than, say, acute 
services. A less obvious means of dilution explored by Harrison and Hunter is the use of 
doctors' clinical freedom to ration care at an individual level. 
Denial generally takes the form of explicitly refusing care, either to certain groups in the 
population or to the population as a whole. It can sometimes also be implicit, for example 
when waiting lists are so long that the person never in fact gets treatment. 
Harrison and Hunter do not discuss how quantity rationing - explicitly limited amounts 
of treatment - would fit into their framework. In a more general context this would be best 
exemplified by the ration book, allowing each person a fixed quantity of certain goods. 
Some health authorities which pay for IVF allow each woman only a limited number of 
attempts. Cervical and breast cancer screening are offered at fixed intervals. It is possible 
to view this kind of rationing as a form of denial; although this may appear paradoxical, 
the corollary of giving someone a fixed quantity of care is that they are explicitly denied 
any further amounts. Quantity rationing can also operate in combination with delay: a 
certain number of treatments are allowed for the financial year and allocated either on the 
basis of clinical priority or on a first-come first-served basis, with a waiting list for those 
denied care that year. 
Klein et al (1996) also identify a list of rationing mechanisms; this is similar to Harrison 
and Hunter's, but adds rationing by selection or by termination. Rationing by selection, 
they argue, 'is the converse of rationing by denial but can have the same outcome' (p. 11) 
Providers select those clients most likely to benefit, or those who are most deserving, or 
those least likely to cause any problems. Rationing by termination is when someone is 
discharged from care and treatment is terminated. 
The authors explore the levels of decision-making, identifying a macro, meso and micro 
level on Glennerster's central-peripheral continuum, and argue that only micro level 
decisions should be described as rationing in the strict sense. This is the service delivery 
level, where decisions are made about which individuals will receive treatment. At the 
other levels, decisions are about collective priority-setting, determining largely 'what' and 
'how much' will be provided. They may begin to address the 'for whom' question, but only 
by setting out general entitlements or eligibility criteria; the interpretation of this in 
individual cases remains a micro decision. 
In addition to the above dimensions and mechanisms of rationing, three further analytical 
categories may be useful: 
Who rations? Are decisions made by doctors (consultants or GPs), managers, politicians, 
the courts, or the public? This links back to the macro-meso-micro distinction. 
What is rationed? Is it capital (buildings and equipment), revenue, staff time or particular 
treatments or services? This has implications for how visible the decision is. 
Which criteria are used to make rationing decisions? Harrison and Hunter identify equity, 
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness/cost-utility, individual rights, need and random selection 
(such as a lottery). New and Le Grand (1996) describe two headings of 'need-related 
characteristics, such as illness or health deficit, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, and 
characteristics unrelated to need, such as age, gender, race, socio-economic status, 
waiting time, number of dependants, and desert' (p. 63). This category gets to the heart of 
the ethical debate. 
Finally, one may look at rationing decisions in terms of whose interests they serve, 
although this is by no means a simple question to answer in many cases. This question is 
explored further in Chapter Nine. 
The history of health care rationing 
It is important to set out the history of rationing for two main reasons: firstly, it is relevant 
to understanding whether there are forces independent of contracting and the quasi-market 
which are making explicit rationing more likely. Secondly, it helps to establish a baseline 
against which new developments in rationing can be assessed. 
Rationing in Britain before the introduction of the NHS 
In Victorian Britain, health care was rationed both implicitly and explicitly. Firstly, access 
was controlled implicitly by ability to pay; those who could afford private doctors had 
better access to care. The poor were left to fall back on what voluntary, municipal or Poor 
Law services were available in their area. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, they 
were also subjected to a more explicit form of rationing by being categorised as 
'deserving' or 'undeserving' poor. Care provided to the undeserving poor was limited both 
in quantity and quality; they faced additional deterrents in the form of harsh and 
unsympathetic treatment even if they did gain access to health care, to discourage abuse of 
the system. Whereas those who could afford private doctors were usually treated at home, 
those reliant on public or voluntary services were more likely to end up in hospital; 
hospital mortality was high and people feared being admitted. 
Whether those involved in such allocation decisions perceived what they were doing as 
rationing is another matter; Glennerster (1975) suggests that the quite deliberate 
application of the principle of less eligibility (which ensured those receiving benefits were 
left worse off than those in employment) was indeed 'a classic example of a rationing 
device' (p.39), but was probably not perceived as such at the time. The principle could 
have been applied even if there had been no financial need to ration - and probably would 
have been - since its primary aim was to counter immorality and dependence rather than to 
control expenditure. On the other hand, it did reflect a sense that there was a moral need 
to ration benefits, to which end a situation of artificial scarcity was created. The prevailing 
views on personal responsibility and desert were not conducive to the idea of publicly 
funded services, beyond philanthropic giving. 
The Lloyd George National Insurance Act of 1911, building on the model of contributory 
health insurance schemes set up by Friendly Societies in the nineteenth century, was 
intended amongst other things to improve access to medical care. However, even this left 
more than half the population uninsured, notably the dependants of contributing working 
men, as well as higher earners and self-employed people. The Act also did nothing to 
tackle the uneven distribution and quality of services in different parts of the country, as 
the emphasis was still firmly on personal responsibility. However, it was an important 
turning point in the development of health services and the increase in coverage which it 
brought about must have helped create stronger expectations amongst the public that they 
should have access to health care. 
Rationing since the introduction of the NHS 
Charges and budget capping 
As noted in the previous chapter, the National Health Service Act of 1946 was supposed 
to put an end to rationing by ability to pay. Indeed, Beveridge's famous assumption that 
the NHS would get rid of a 'backlog of ill health' suggests he believed it would do away 
with the need for any kind of rationing. The dream of a free, comprehensive service was in 
fact under threat from the start by the inclusion in the Act of the words 'except where any 
provision of this Act expressly provides for the making and recovery of charges.1 
Originally, charges were only to be made if the patient wished to have an appliance more 
expensive than the standard one, or to have the privacy of a single room in hospital, known 
as an 'amenity bed'. This did not involve any extra nursing or medical care. Even so, this is 
an example of dilution through inability to pay. 
However, it very quickly became apparent that the NHS could not meet the demands made 
upon it and that charges would need to be introduced. In 1949 a one shilling prescription 
charge was established, followed in 1951 by charges for specific dental and optical 
services. The aim was both to raise additional revenue and to control expenditure by 
deterrence; expenditure control was further aided by the introduction in 1950 of a 
budgetary ceiling for NHS, which had previously been limited only by demand (Klein, 
1995). 
The introduction of charges inevitably began to threaten the principle of equity on which 
the NHS was meant to be founded. Although charges have remained marginal, and have 
never raised enough revenue to cover the whole cost of the services involved, they can 
exercise a real deterrent effect on individuals. Research into the effect of introducing 
charges for eye-testing in 1991 demonstrated a reduction of up to 19% in both referrals to 
ophthalmologists and identified cases of glaucoma (Laidlaw et al., 1994). 
Waiting lists 
In parallel with charges, probably the single most important implicit rationing mechanism 
in the history of the NHS began to take effect - the waiting list. As Klein (1995) points 
out, waiting lists have been a remarkably stable feature of the NHS, and have commanded 
surprising levels of support or at least tolerance until recently. He suggests the reason lies 
in the atmosphere of the post-war socialist era in which the NHS was born, when 
'rationing and queuing were symbols not of inadequacy but of fairness in the distribution of 
scarce resources' (p. 133). 
Waiting lists do not involve an outright denial of care, but rely on delay and tacit 
judgements by clinicians about individual patients, the criteria for which are never 
articulated openly. Even though someone may have to wait so long that in practice they 
are never treated, the system offers some hope that finally their turn will come. Because it 
is aimed at non-urgent conditions, it does not pose any apparent threat to access to life-
saving treatment. (In reality, however, having to wait too long for what was originally a 
non-urgent problem may result in deterioration of the condition to the point of urgency -
delays in elective heart surgery are a case in point). 
Waiting lists may also encourage deflection, by making people seek the alternative of the 
private sector - evidence that this is in fact the case is presented by Besley et al (1996) -
or they may deter people from seeking care altogether. Anecdotal accounts suggest long 
waiting times even to be seen at out-patients for varicose veins have suppressed demand 
for referral from GPs and from individual patients. 
Increasingly, the use of long waiting times has been closed off by the Patient's Charter, as 
discussed in Chapter Two. This does not mean that waiting lists have been abandoned 
altogether as a mechanism; indeed, the government's own figures demonstrate that the 
total number of people waiting for an operation rose substantially during the period of 
most intense activity to reduce long waiting times (Health Service Journal, 1994b). 
Independent research has shown that patients in several specialties who would previously 
have been treated in less than one month were having to wait one to three months as a 
result of the focus on long waiters (Harley, 1995). 
Rationing by specialty/care group 
The inequality of distribution of resources between specialties and care groups is given by 
Harrison and Hunter (1994) as an example of rationing by dilution. Despite successive 
attempts by central government to give priority to the so-called 'Cinderella' services such 
as mental health care and services for elderly people or people with learning disabilities, it 
has proved a hard struggle to actually implement the policies and improve the quality of 
care. As Ham (1992) notes, 'the claims of non-priority groups, particularly in the acute 
hospital sector, may be pressed strongly at the local level, and may push service 
development in a different direction from that desired by central government' (p.210). The 
fact that people with chronic illness are often more vulnerable and less able to complain 
about the effects of rationing by dilution must also be significant. The failure to invest 
adequately in alternative community services and a number of highly publicised murders 
involving people with a history of psychiatric problems have served only to strengthen 
public opinion against innovation in these areas. 
Levenson (1996) notes that the lack of funding for mental health care results in only the 
most severely ill people receiving any care at all. She adds, 'It is a curious fact, and no 
doubt a reflection of the lack of public awareness about mental health, that such extreme 
rationing of preventive and non-emergency services can take place in mental healthcare 
while rationing elsewhere in the NHS generally provokes indignation' (p.29). 
NHS withdrawal from long term care for elderly people has already been mentioned as an 
illustration of rationing arising from demographic pressures. To some extent it is in line 
with community care principles supported by the government that people should be 
enabled to lead as independent and non-institutionalised a life as possible, but it also 
provides evidence of deflection of responsibility to another agency, generally without an 
accompanying transfer of resources. The Government has tried to reduce the amount of 
rationing in this field by requiring health authorities to specify a set of explicit eligibility 
criteria for continuing care. It should be noted, however, that eligibility criteria are in 
themselves an explicit rationing mechanism; their intention in this case may be to make 
services available to more people, but one cannot logically define eligibility without at the 
same time creating an explicit category of ineligibility. 
Geographical rationing 
The creation of the NHS did not in itself do anything to redistribute resources around the 
country; financial stringency during the 1950s left inherited inequalities in the distribution 
of hospital beds virtually untouched, by default targeting rationing at poorer areas of the 
country. This, too, is a form of implicit dilution, in that services of inferior quality and 
quantity are allowed to remain through lack of positive action to alter the situation. It is 
also a form of deterrence; there is evidence that proximity to hospitals explains some of the 
variation in utilisation rates (Clarke et al., 1993). Over the years, various attempts have 
been made to intervene more explicitly and target rationing at better off areas. 
The Hospital Plan of 1962 was an early effort to inject capital into a national hospital 
building programme, to cope with deteriorating building stock and ensure all parts of the 
country had access to a standard district general hospital or DGH, although in the event 
implementation was slow and patchy (Klein, 1995). 
Even if hospitals are spread more evenly around the country, they tend to be sited in 
middle class districts. This means higher travel costs for people from lower socio-
economic groups, who are also more likely than middle class people to have to take unpaid 
leave from work to attend appointments, an additional financial deterrent (Le Grand, 
1982). 
From the inception of the NHS, the Medical Practices Committee had power to restrict the 
number of GPs setting up practice in areas already well supplied with doctors and 
designate special areas in need of more doctors. In 1966, the designated area allowance 
was introduced as a financial inducement to encourage more doctors to set up in 
designated areas, which appeared to reduce inequalities of distribution (Ham, 1992). 
A major exercise in revenue redistribution was initiated in 1970, when a new weighted 
population formula was introduced for the allocation of resources to regions. This was 
subsequently refined following the report of the Resource Allocation Working Party 
(RAWP) (Department of Health and Social Security, 1976). RAWP softened its rationing 
effect on the better off areas of the country in two significant ways. Firstly, it was 
committed to achieving redistribution not by taking resources away from any regions over 
target, but only by ensuring growth money was aimed primarily at under target regions, a 
strategy which seemed promising in times of economic growth. Secondly, it gave some 
protection to the major teaching hospitals (the majority of which were in London and the 
South East) by means of SIFT, the service increment for teaching. This calculation of the 
surplus costs incurred by hospitals with teaching responsibilities was removed from the 
weighted allocation formula. 
Efforts to find an improved allocation formula based on levels of need in the population 
have been underway for several years; as part of this process, the NHS Executive 
commissioned a report from the Centre for Health Economics at York University (Carr-
Hill et al, 1994). The report proposed two separate weightings for acute and psychiatric 
service needs, which would have had the effect of moving more resources to inner cities 
and the north of the country, where standardised mortality ratios and other health 
indicators from the 1991 census indicate health needs are greatest. The government 
decided to weaken the proposals by applying no weighting at all to community and 
administrative services (24% of the total hospital and community health services budget), 
on the basis that there was no evidence this expenditure was affected by different levels of 
deprivation. The York health economists responded by demonstrating that the result of 
this alteration of their work switched resources back to London and the South, incidentally 
benefiting the then Secretary of State for Health's constituency (Smith and Peacock, 
1995). 
The government also introduced a market forces factor which allows for higher rates of 
staff pay in London and the South East than are currently found expected as a result of 
local pay negotiation. This also resulted in financial losses to northern health authorities. 
RAWP and its successors are explicit, centralised rationing mechanisms in one sense, 
whether they aim genuinely to improve equity of resource distribution, or to preserve 
existing distributions for political reasons. However, the fact that they set only global 
expenditure targets means that the implications of the financial losses for certain regions or 
districts continue to be decided at local level, often on an implicit, clinician-led basis. 
Clinical freedom 
Similarly, although the total limited budget for the NHS is an explicit rationing mechanism 
at macro level, it does not address the micro rationing decisions about which individuals 
will get the limited resources available. This has traditionally been done by doctors 
exercising their clinical freedom by making judgements about need in individual cases or in 
groups of patients. 
The description by Harrison and Hunter (1994) of clinical freedom as a means of rationing 
by dilution may at first sight appear paradoxical; doctors in the UK defend clinical freedom 
on the grounds that it enables them to act purely in the best interests of individual patients. 
Patients also tend to view it as a protection - hence the public anxiety that GP fund-
holding, by introducing budgetary responsibility into the traditional doctor-patient 
relationship, could result in treatment decisions made on the grounds of cost rather than 
individual benefit. 
However, the intricate relationship between clinical freedom and rationing has been 
examined by a number of commentators. Cooper (1975) states that 'the NHS attempts to 
ration ... scarce resources ... not in accordance with the individual's ability and willingness 
to pay but in accordance with each individual's relative need' (p. 50). However, he 
continues, 'need is not an absolute state but a matter of judgement and opinion' (p.51) and 
the very existence of clinical freedom means that it is doctors who have to make this 
judgement. 'Although the medical and allied professions have never seen their function as 
anything other than aiding the sick, they are nonetheless implicitly or explicitly daily 
involved in rationing decisions' (p.52). 'Rationing in the NHS has never been explicitly 
organised but has hidden behind each doctor's clinical freedom to act solely in the interests 
of his individual patient. Any conflict of interest between patients competing for scarce 
resources has been implicitly resolved by the doctor's judgements as to their relative need 
for care and attention' (p. 59). 
Aaron and Schwartz (1984) agree that doctors in Britain use their individual clinical 
judgement to make rationing decisions. They believe the majority justify this to themselves 
and their patients by recasting what are essentially questions of resource scarcity as clinical 
decisions about patients' ability to benefit from treatment. Aaron and Schwartz also 
believe, however, that there are a few doctors who recognise their role as rationing agents 
more explicitly. (It should also be noted that others have disagreed with their assessment; 
Miller and Miller (1986) argue that British reluctance to use technology so liberally may 
reflect genuine concerns about clinical inappropriateness, regardless of affordability). 
Klein (1989) states that 'rationing by consultants had always been a fact of life in the 
NHS', as a way of'disguising political decisions about resource allocation as professional 
decisions about clinical policy' (p.235). He argues that the medical profession entered an 
implicit concordat with the government and accepted the task of implicit rationing within a 
fixed budget in return for continued professional autonomy. The increasing reluctance of 
doctors to maintain this role in the late 1980s and early 1990s he ascribes at least in part to 
the Thatcher government's challenge to clinical freedom and demands for more managerial 
control, which they perceived as the Government reneging on its half of the bargain. It is 
arguable that, in turn, the politicians perceived doctors' persistent demands for more 
funding as reneging on their half of the bargain. 
The role of clinicians in rationing remains a significant element of the current debate, and is 
examined later in this chapter. 
Explicit denial 
It is possible for denial of treatment to take place implicitly, for example when waiting lists 
are so long that the person never receives treatment. 
In most cases, however, denial takes the form of explicitly refusing care, either to certain 
groups or to the population as a whole. Harrison and Hunter (1994) maintain that 
rationing through the exercise of clinical freedom does not constitute full denial, since 
some treatment is usually provided, albeit at a reduced level. They go on to say that 'the 
possibility of complete denial of treatment has arrived on the policy agenda with the 
creation of the "purchaser/provider split" in the NHS' (p.29). This conclusion can be 
questioned on two counts: firstly, the exercise of clinical judgement has led to denial of 
care and secondly, this was happening before the introduction of the NHS market. The 
example of renal dialysis provides an illustration of both points. 
As early as the 1970s renal dialysis was being explicitly rationed in this country; some 
treatment centres developed strict eligibility criteria, which resulted in some groups - such 
as blind diabetics - being turned away altogether, even though they would have benefited 
from dialysis and in many other countries would have been treated without question 
(Wing, 1983). 
Denial of access to renal dialysis for people with kidney failure has a stark result: death. 
Klein (1995) notes, 'The remarkable fact that the NHS can get away with this politically -
that a refusal to save lives does not raise a storm of political protest - demonstrates the 
positive advantages that central policy-makers can derive from the doctrine of clinical 
autonomy. For, of course, it is not ministers or civil servants who decide who shall be 
treated. It is the clinicians concerned' (p. 78). Crucially, however, this is not the kind of 
hidden, individually based kind of rationing described as dilution by Harrison and Hunter; 
it is rationing by an organised set of criteria, aimed at whole groups of the population, still 
within the confines of medical judgement but jointly agreed by groups of doctors rather 
than individual professionals. Although renal specialists may have hoped to operate these 
criteria without the public becoming too aware of them, they were certainly explicit within 
the NHS and became explicit outside it as knowledge of the existence of such internal 
policies spread and individual cases were highlighted in the media. 
A further example of explicit rationing before the NHS market is the lack of availability of 
in vitro fertilisation (IVF), which also happens to be one of the most often-cited examples 
of rationing since the market came into effect. Many health authorities took a definite 
decision not to provide IVF in the hospitals which they managed, because it was felt to be 
an expensive and experimental new technology of unproven effectiveness and/or because 
they did not regard the treatment of infertility as a high enough priority in which to invest 
new resources. 
Although IVF was thus not available in many health authorities, it was still possible for a 
woman living within such a health authority to be referred to an NHS facility in another 
district which did provide free IVF. If the hospital accepted the referral, she could thus by-
pass the lack of provision in her local health authority and obtain treatment elsewhere. 
Once the market was introduced, she had to obtain the agreement of her health authority 
of residence to pay for her NHS treatment, wherever it was provided; thus if a district had 
an explicit policy not to fund IVF care, all residents were bound by it and there were no 
geographical loopholes. Nonetheless, pre-market decisions not to fund NHS IVF 
treatment are still a clear example of explicit rationing, even if some people managed to 
evade their effects. 
Finally, limited list prescribing - preventing GPs from prescribing certain remedies - has 
been in place for several years now. This differs from the previous examples in that it 
defines the boundary of NHS provision on a national basis, although the criteria for 
exclusion appear somewhat confused (New and Le Grand, 1996). 
Age-limited screening programmes. 
The screening programmes for cervical and breast cancer are available routinely to women 
within specified age groups. In the case of cervical cancer, the age group is broadly 
defined (16-64), although there is still a clear decision not to provide screening to more 
elderly women. This is presented as a clinical, technical decision on the basis of 
effectiveness, in that 16-64 is the age group in which cervical cancer is most likely to 
occur. However, this is not to say that women over the age of 65 never get cervical cancer 
- it may be less common but it is certainly possible. Thus concealed beneath the explicit 
technical reasoning is a less explicit (at least to the public) concern with cost-effectiveness. 
At a population level, the cost of screening women over 65 is judged to outweigh the 
clinical benefits to a few individuals. 
Breast screening is offered to a much more restricted age group. A comment in the 
Minerva column of the British Medical Journal says, 'Minerva has been following with 
interest the dispute about agist discrimination in the NHS. What about mammography, 
currently offered to women aged 50-65? Why not to the over 65s, given that all cancers 
become more common with age? The lack of research evidence showing a benefit is simply 
the result of no research having been done' (British Medical Journal, 1994, p. 1178) The 
argument usually given is that in the 50-65 age group breast cancer is more aggressive and 
therefore early detection is more important than in the over 65 age group. It might be 
argued in response, however, that early detection of slower growing cancers might achieve 
better survival rates than the current programme - indeed, there remains considerable 
technical controversy as to whether earlier detection improves survival at all for the 
screened age group and concern about the anxiety caused by its high level of false positive 
results. The political need to be seen to be doing something to counter deaths from breast 
cancer has an important bearing on the decision to set up a screening programme. 
Women under 50 also suffer from aggressive forms of breast cancer, but less commonly 
than in the 50-65 age group. As with cervical cancer, a decision has been made that it is 
not cost-effective to screen people with a lower chance of getting the disease in question, 
even though the outcome for an individual is just as devastating. 
Screening intervals are also an illustration of rationing on the basis of cost-effectiveness. 
The decision to screen for cervical cancer every three years in the former Oxford Regional 
Health Authority rather than at the national interval of five years reflects a judgement that 
the national interval rations too much. Yet even a three-yearly interval rations; it simply 
puts the trade-off between cost and saving lives at a different point. 
OALYs 
QALYs were being advocated as a systematic rationing method some years before the 
introduction of the market (e.g. Williams, 1985), although their practical application to 
real decision-making has lagged far behind the amount of theoretical discussion devoted to 
them. In 1992, the King's Fund Institute carried out a survey of English health authorities 
to assess whether the use of QALYs had increased following the reforms (Robinson and 
New, 1992). This found that 21% of the health authorities which responded had already 
used QALYs and a further 17% planned to do so. Whether there is any causal link 
between this finding and the reforms is open to question - it is possible that the use of 
QALYs reflected purchasers' concern to find tools to help them with their new role of 
needs assessment. Alternatively, it might have happened anyway as other pressures in 
favour of explicit rationing built up. New and Le Grand (1996) also note that the analysis 
of purchasing plans carried out for NAHAT over the same period (see Klein et al, 1996) 
failed to find significant use of QALYs, although this might have been due to reluctance to 
acknowledge their use in public. 
The current debate 
'Talking about rationing has become fashionable again; it's the healthcare equivalent of 
politicians talking about the Spice Girls. It's contemporary, tough, sassy. But like the 
Spice Girls, talking about rationing has become the latest chic largely because everyone 
is talking about it. There is no longer a debate about rationing; it's inevitable - that's a 
fact. If enough people say it, then it must be true... We are already in danger of creating a 
whole industry or writers, academics and commentators involved in the science of 
rationing.' (Hancock, 1997, p.24) 
Attempting to summarise the current debate on rationing (let alone contributing to it) is a 
daunting undertaking. The number of publications has increased dramatically over the past 
four years, and this section cannot hope to do justice to the quality and complexity of the 
arguments put forward. However, it is important to understand the main strands of the 
debate. Much of it is focused on either confirming or challenging the view that rationing is 
essential, and if it is essential whether it should be explicit or not. Increasingly a view is 
emerging that there is a role for both explicit and implicit approaches alongside each other, 
and there is considerable interest in the idea of procedural explicitness. A number of 
practical proposals for rationing mechanisms have been put forward, although the 
emphasis of the academic debate is still largely on establishing the theoretical position and 
the principles on which more rational explicit rationing could be undertaken. 
Is rationing essential? 
'The doomsday scenario touted by rationing fans cannot be left unchallenged. If we are 
not careful, we will end up believing the hype - we will be victims of a political rhetoric 
which says we cannot afford the NHS. We will accept healthcare rationing without any 
rational arguments.' (Hancock, 1997, p.24) 
Although there is widespread agreement that the rationing of health care is essential and 
inevitable, it is possible to find a few dissenting voices. Those who believe rationing is 
avoidable do so for two main reasons - firstly that too much money is wasted on 
ineffective care and secondly that not enough money is spent on health care. 
Ine ffective care 
The first of these arguments is that if only effective treatments were offered, there would 
be no need to ration at all. (Etzioni, 1991; Roberts et al., 1995) It is argued, on the basis 
that a need for health care only exists when there is an effective treatment available, that 
the NHS has ample resources to meet all needs in the population; it has to ration at present 
only because it wastes so much money on ineffective or unproven therapies for which 
there is no need. 
This argument relies on two fundamental assumptions: firstly, that ceasing to provide 
ineffective care would not constitute rationing, and secondly, that it would release 
substantial resources. These are points of such fundamental and entrenched disagreement 
that they warrant detailed consideration. 
With regard to the first assumption, it has already been argued in this thesis that all 
methods of allocating scarce resources constitute rationing. Not providing treatments 
which are ineffective could be seen simply as using a sensible criterion for making 
necessaiy rationing decisions - Cooper, for example, puts forward an early case for 
evidence-based care as a way of doing unavoidable rationing 'more rationally, consistently 
and efficiently' (Cooper, 1975, p. 109). The proponents of evidence-based care, however, 
would argue that we are not here talking about scarce resources at all - something which is 
of no benefit whatsoever cannot be needed and cannot therefore be a scarce good. As 
Klein and colleagues put it, 'We would not describe the NHS's refusal to allow snake oil 
to be prescribed as rationing' (Klein et aly 1996, p. 75). However, the economic definition 
of scarcity is couched in terms of demand\ rather than need - it is perfectly possible that a 
treatment could be pronounced ineffective and yet still be demanded or desired by 
consumers. Their reasons could include disbelief that it is ineffective, superstition, or a 
feeling that every possible avenue must be tried, however unlikely to work. The 
prescription of antibiotics for viral sore throats is one common example - anecdotal reports 
from GPs suggest many patients believe the true reason for denying them antibiotics is to 
save money, rather than that they are useless against a viral infection. Furthermore, as New 
and Le Grand (1996) point out, even need and the ability to benefit can be problematic 
areas: 'Undertaking a procedure which does not improve health may improve well-being in 
other ways....being "cared for" is valued by a patient even if the treatment is not improving 
health' (p.36). The placebo effect of technically ineffective treatments is a well-observed 
phenomenon. 
These are perhaps minor objections; if there is genuine consensus that a service is neither 
needed nor demanded by anyone, it would be fair to argue that its exclusion does not 
constitute rationing. However, a much more substantial challenge can be mounted to the 
second assumption, namely that ineffective practice is so widespread and costly that its 
elimination will put an end to the scarcity of resources. This challenge involves four 
questions: Do we know for certain? Who? How much? When? 
Do we know for certain? Whilst there is good evidence that some routinely performed 
interventions are worthless (see, for example, Enkin et al., 1989), the number proved 
beyond doubt to have no value is fairly small. Cooper, even though a strong supporter of 
the principle of eradicating ineffective practice, reports that the New Zealand government 
has found no justification for the complete exclusion of any interventions currently funded 
publicly on the grounds of ineffectiveness (Cooper, 1995). The effectiveness of the great 
bulk of clinical care is neither proven nor disproven and relies on such factors as custom 
and practice, accumulated experience, and trial and error. 
It is argued by the more ruthless proponents of evidence-based care (e.g. Roberts et al., 
1995) that only 10-20% of current practice has been proved positively to be effective, and 
that the rest should be regarded as ineffective until proven otherwise. In fact a greater 
proportion of interventions may be of proven benefit than this argument suggests. In a 
retrospective review of all the patients they had diagnosed and treated in one month, Ellis 
et al. (1995) found that '82% were evidence-based (i.e. there was RCT support [53%] or 
unanimity on the team about the existence of convincing non-experimental evidence 
[29%])' (p.407). Even if such evidence is lacking, ceasing to provide any kind of care other 
than that approved by a randomised controlled trial (RCT) would no doubt result in the 
loss of many effective but formally unproven treatments, in turn resulting in unmet need. 
More often than not, evidence about effectiveness is conflicting, studies are poorly 
designed and there is professional dispute about what the results really mean. Moreover, 
even the scientific certainties of one generation can give way to doubt in another. Cooper 
(1975, p. 59) cites as evidence of irrational practice the fact that 'the leech bottle managed 
to survive the First World War in some British hospitals', unaware of future research 
which would demonstrate leeches' value in reducing blood clotting and swelling, especially 
in skin grafting. 
Who? Even when the evidence commands widespread agreement, it is usually complex 
and rarely concludes that a particular procedure is of no benefit to anyone. The same 
Department of Health Effective Health Care Bulletins have ted some purchasers to exclude 
IVF altogether and others to introduce a new IVF service, both in the name of the 
effectiveness. As Dworkin (1994) points out, there is a world of difference between 
excluding low effectiveness or low yield' treatments and 'no yield' treatments; he argues 
that those who support the former are in fact accepting a need for rationing. Furthermore, 
he does not feel there are adequate methods for making such decisions in practice. 
Trying to predict likely individual outcomes on the basis of statistical averages is a difficult 
task (McKee and Clarke, 1995; Bion, 1995; New and Le Grand, 1996). An assessment of 
effectiveness must also take account of the aim for each individual - Weijer and Elliott 
(1995) point out that the same intervention may be regarded as ineffective 'if the aim is to 
cure an underlying disease, but effective if the aim is to keep the patient alive' (p.684). 
Interpretation of the evidence in the light of individual patient characteristics is 
contentious, and may include surreptitious social judgements. Smoking and obesity are 
both used to justify denying people certain treatments (e.g. heart surgery) on the grounds 
that the presence of one of these factors would make the treatment less effective than for 
other people. Equally, treatment for respiratory problems is not very effective if the person 
lives in damp housing, but denying treatment for this reason would be seen by many as 
unfair discrimination against people from lower socio-economic groups. There is a danger 
that we may find ourselves reacting differently according to the degree to which the 
condition is self-inflicted: the smoker may seem to be a less deserving recipient of 
respiratory treatment than the resident of damp housing. It may be no coincidence that two 
of the most common explicitly rationed procedures in this country - sterilisation reversal 
and tattoo removal - combine low effectiveness or low health gain with the possibility of 
blaming the patient for their own condition. 
Calabresi and Bobbitt (1978) use dialysis as an illustration of this potential for 
effectiveness and social judgements to interact. 'It does not appear to be tragic in the 
United States to fail to provide dialysis for a person in whom such treatment is unlikely to 
work...[this decision determines] who is given a greater chance to live. Yet [it does not 
seem] to implicate a conflict in American values; it would be otherwise if the kidney were 
given to a wealthy recipient rather than to a poorer patient on the ground that the kidney 
was more likely to work in a wealthier man because he could afford to rest, have private 
nurses, and so forth...It seemed as if the value accorded efficiency would give us a neutral 
criterion whose application would not direct attention to any inadequate first-order or 
improper second-order determinations, but would rouse no more than pity and sorrow for 
those who would suffer. Yet the criterion failed and the ameliorative quality ceased with it, 
when efficiency-guided distributions correlated with wealth difference' (p.22-4) 
How much? Given that there are very few treatments which never work, how much 
benefit will be gained is another difficult question. Do we say something that has only a 
1% chance of success is ineffective? or 10%? or 25%? How do we trade off these chances 
of benefit with the unpleasantness of treatment that is often involved in such cases? The 
Child В case is a good illustration of these dilemmas, and of the fact that a success rate of 
1% is still 100% success for one lucky individual. 
When? To a lesser extent, the question of when benefit will be obtained can be significant. 
The insertion of grommets for glue ear is often criticised as unnecessary because glue ear 
will usually get better on its own after a few months. But a few months of poor hearing, 
falling behind at school and being teased can seem a very long time to a child and his or 
her parents. 
The upshot of these difficulties in establishing conclusively the effectiveness of different 
interventions is that eliminating ineffective practices does not offer an easy route to 
avoiding hard allocative choices. Indeed, there is some persuasive argument that pursuing 
evidence-based care may result in increased expenditure rather than savings, as clinicians 
realise there are more people they could help (McKee and Clarke, 1995; Sackett et al, 
1996). Alan Maynard, himself an ardent proponent of rooting out 'useless interventions', is 
critical of those who attempt to assess effectiveness without consideration of cost-
effectiveness - for him, using effectiveness as a criterion for allocating resources is 
certainly a means of achieving rationing, not of avoiding it. (Maynard, 1996a, p.21) 
An inadequate budget 
A second argument is that rationing would be unnecessary if we spent more on health care 
- society has created a situation of artificial scarcity which it could eliminate. John Harris 
suggests: 'Any rubric for resource allocation should examine the national budget afresh to 
see whether there are any headings of expenditure that are more important to the 
community than rescuing citizens in mortal danger. For only if all other claims on funding 
are plausibly more important than that, is it true that resources for life-saving are limited.' 
(Harris, 1987, p.22) This suggests the need for survival should trump every other kind of 
social need, including education, poverty relief and housing. Harris is clear that his 
argument refers to life or death situations; when it comes to life-enhancing treatments, he 
does allow that nations may not be able to afford everything they would like and that some 
hard choices will therefore have to be made (see below for further discussion). Rawles 
extends the approach to all kinds of treatments, saying, The ethical problem of how to 
apportion limited resources amongst the needy has been forced on us by arbitrary 
limitation of health expenditure. Its solution would not be required if health expenditure 
were higher.' (Rawles, 1989, p. 143). 
Mullen (1995) argues that a more generous budget would at least 'involve fewer hard 
choices', and that 'the unquestioning acceptance of the necessity of rationing...is leading to 
a climate of defeatism' (p.26). 
Although it may seem attractive to suggest that extra spending would solve all the 
problems, given the UK's relatively low expenditure on health, other countries with much 
higher expenditure are also embarking on rationing. The US is a case in point, with double 
the UK's share of a much higher GDP devoted to health. This suggests that more money 
alone is not the answer; it might defer the need to ration for a while, but the mismatch 
between demand and supply would probably resurface later. 
There are those who believe the inevitability of demand outstripping supply is exaggerated. 
Williams and Frankel (1993) describe 'the myth of infinite demand' (p. 13) and suggest that 
'the pessimistic belief that the satisfaction of demand is in truth an unrealistic goal' should 
be 'questioned and abandoned in favour of a more rational determination of health care 
requirements with the assumption that there may be no need to ration those interventions 
of undoubted efficacy' (p. 17). 
Even if demand were finite, this would not necessarily mean all problems of a mismatch 
with supply could be solved. At one level, the problem is illustrated by kidney 
transplantation, where rationing is necessitated at least partly by the shortage of supply of 
donor organs. The utilitarian solution proposed by Harris (1986) that we could at random 
kill one healthy person in order to save two people who need a kidney transplant, is 
unlikely to be morally acceptable to most people, as he acknowledges. At a more general 
level, the necessary provision to meet even finite demands might still not be affordable by 
the nation. This kind of shortfall in supply would also lead to rationing. 
Wordsworth et al. (1996) do believe rationing of scarce resources is inevitable, but they 
argue that the conventional belief that demographic trends and new technology are 
increasing the pressure on resources is not as well founded as is often assumed. Even if 
resource pressures are increasing, this is not necessarily an argument for spending more on 
the NHS. The decision to spend more on health depends both on the benefits which would 
be gained and the opportunity cost of not spending that money on other public services, 
such as housing or education. If the benefits are less than the opportunity costs, 'then 
resources may generate greater benefit overall if invested elsewhere' (p . 32). 
Rationing is essential 
Finding commentators who do believe rationing is essential is much easier than finding 
those who do not. The majority of books published on rationing in recent years take as a 
given the scarcity of resources and the inevitability of rationing. Many take the standard 
line, criticised by Wordsworth et al. (1996), that demographic trends, new technology and 
rising consumer expectations are making the scarcity of resources worse, but the basic 
argument that society will never be able to afford all possible health care needs and wants 
is independent of this point. A selection of comments will suffice to illustrate. 
'The assertion that "costs and benefits are irrelevant where human life is 
concerned" reflects an irresponsible approach to health policy. Such an attitude 
lacks merit in the real world because choices must be made .... Because resources 
are scarce relative to wants, we do not have the option of evaluating or not 
evaluating. The only option is whether to evaluate explicitly, systematically and 
openly, as economics forces us to do, or whether to evaluate implicitly, 
haphazardly and secretly, as has been done so often in the past.' (Fuchs, 1983, 
p.48) 
'Increasing demands on health services, coupled with limited resources, have 
created the need to make choices on which services should be developed and 
which held back. Essentially, this entails the rationing of scarce resources 
between different geographical areas, types of service and client groups.' (Ham, 
1982, p. 58) 
'There are two certainties in life: the scarcity of resources and death. In the health 
care industry, the issue is not whether to prioritise but how, i.e. what criteria 
should be used to decide who will be treated, who will live in pain and discomfort, 
and who will be left to die.' (Maynard, 1994, p. 1) 
'There is now a growing awareness that the rationing of health care is 
unavoidable. With the advance of medical technology, rising incomes and a 
general growth in health awareness, the demandfor health care is growing faster 
than the resources allocated to it.' (New and Le Grand, 1996, p. I) 
'Rationing is a characteristic of all those publicly funded or provided 
services...where constrained budgets meet unconstrained demands for services.' 
(Klein at el, 1996, p.9) 
'Some claim that the gap between demand and supply will grow ever wider... There 
is insufficient evidence to support this view. But while there may not be a "crisis" 
looming, there will always be a need to ensure the fair distribution of finite 
resources.' (Lenaghan, 1996, p.i) 
Is explicit rationing essential? 
We should resist abandoning an admittedly imperfect though workable irrationality in 
favour of a quite spurious rationality which is probably unattainable and certainly 
undesirable.' (Hunter, 1993a, p. 31-2) 
The case for implicit rationing 
To accept that rationing is unavoidable is not in itself to argue that greater explicitness is 
desirable, although in practice the two positions often go together. Some arguments in 
favour of leaving it to more implicit means are considered below. 
At a general level, the views of Calabresi and Bobbitt (1978) that society simply cannot 
live with explicit decision-making have already been discussed. Within a health care 
context, Appleyard (1992) has adopted a similar view: 'The moral choices of rationing 
health care are too brutal for society to contemplate* (p. 14). These comments do not 
explore which approach to rationing might produce the best outcome in terms of justice or 
overall utility; they focus rather on the process itself and question society's ability to live 
with the ethics of explicit choices. 
Coast (1997) has recently argued that society's unease with the consequences of rationing 
means that utility may be maximised more effectively through continued implicit decision-
making. She identifies two sources of'disutility' associated with explicit rationing: denial 
disutility and deprivation disutility. Denial disutility may be experienced by citizens taking 
part in the process of denying care to others; we feel uncomfortable with the choices we 
are being forced to make out in the open. Secondly, if we ourselves are in need of 
treatment, we may suffer more if we know a treatment is being withheld from which we 
could have benefited, than if we remained in ignorance of its availability. Thus we would 
be happier to be told by a doctor that treatment was not appropriate in our case. This 
deprivation disutility may extend beyond the individual patient to others who feel 
altruistically on our behalf, especially close family and friends. Coast argues that, 
particularly at the micro level, 'greater total utility may therefore result from the 
equivocation associated with implicit rationing than from the openness and honesty of 
explicitness' (p. 1121) 
Harris (1988) explores the outcome of different approaches with specific reference to 
distributive justice. Should the case arise where no more of the national budget can be 
allocated to health care and rationing of access to life-saving treatments therefore becomes 
necessary, he proposes the drawing of lots as a possible way to avoid unjust 
discrimination. Although this is explicit in the sense that it results in an open decision about 
who shall be saved, it is implicit in that it relies on chance as the deciding mechanism, 
rather than a written set of criteria against which a person's claim to health care is judged. 
When it comes to treatments which are life-enhancing rather than life-saving, Harris 
accepts that prioritising on the basis of quality of life may be morally defensible. Whilst he 
does not commit himself to any one solution for rationing life-enhancing treatments, he 
continues to reject the QALY approach as inherently ageist and sexist, and therefore 
unjust. He argues that some people may have a strong claim on resources simply because 
they have suffered accumulated disadvantage and neglect by society. Justice may dictate 
that someone who has endured years of remediable pain and immobility should take 
priority, even though their life expectancy may be low. Harris remains reluctant, however, 
to make positive practical recommendations for how rationing should be carried out, 
perhaps indicating the difficulties of reconciling his emphasis on the supremacy of 
individual rights with acknowledging a need to rank individual claims in some sort of 
priority order. (It should be noted that his emphasis on the value of each individual life 
paradoxically leads him to endorse a utilitarian policy of maximising lives - saving two 
lives must always be better than saving one, even if this involves actively killing one person 
(Harris, 1985, 1986). His views on the value of life and its dependence on conscious 
awareness in the person concerned are challenged by the anti-utilitarian Ann Maclean 
(1993)). 
Bagust (1994) defends waiting lists as an acceptable rationing mechanism; they 'could only 
be eliminated in a service that was heavily over-resourced and therefore inefficient', and the 
current political obsession with eradicating them is short-sighted and unrealistic. 
Purchasers and providers need to work together to 'establish realistic expectations of what 
can be delivered within the limited resources available. Of course, this leads to some 
difficult and unpleasant choices between competing needs and between groups of needy 
patients. Attempts to restrict the health service's obligation to treat certain conditions has 
proved politically indigestible, but the alternative is to continue to rely on our traditional 
waiting-line system of rationing and to accept extended waiting lists for some conditions as 
a fact of life. This is indeed a practical and proven approach but needs a determined 
change of political culture at both local and national level to allow the waiting list to be 
rehabilitated as a rationing device' (p. 17). 
Doyal (1993) sees waiting lists in themselves as a form of drawing lots. He says 'patients 
who possess morally similar prognoses and ages should be randomised. In other words, 
those who are deemed to be morally equal from the perspective of medical need should 
also have an equal chance of not receiving treatment for reasons of resource scarcity. If 
properly administered within a national health service like the one in the UK, waiting lists 
provide a rational and effective way for this to occur. Here the randomisation is created, so 
to speak, by the lottery of life' (p.52-3). It could be argued in response that the operation 
of waiting lists may not always be fair and random, and runs the same risk of systematic 
discrimination identified for the NHS as a whole by the Black Report (Townsend and 
Davidson, 1982) and Le Grand (1982). 
Doyal continues, 'there will obviously come a point when prognosis and age are so 
different that randomisation through the administration of fair waiting lists will itself be 
seen by almost everyone as unfair' (p.53). In these circumstances, the 'fair innings' 
argument may need to be applied, whereby those who have already lived beyond average 
life expectancy may be given a lower priority than those who have not. Equally, those 
who are beyond the reaches of curative care should give way to those who could still 
benefit from it, although they should still be given appropriate palliative care. 
The 'fair innings' approach is also considered by Harris, although he is concerned about 
where to draw the line - would one argue, for example, that a 30-year-old had more right 
to treatment than a 35-year-old? (Harris, 1988). It should be noted that in considering the 
fair innings approach, both Doyal and Harris are in effect contemplating explicit rationing 
in some circumstances. Indeed, Doyal has more recently been advocating explicit rationing 
at all levels of NHS decision-making (Doyal, 1997). 
Both Mechanic and Hunter challenge the assumption that explicit rationing mechanisms 
will be more equitable than implicit mechanisms. Mechanic (1995) argues implicit 
decision-making at clinical level is more sensitive to the complexity of real medical 
decisions and the needs and preferences of individual patients. He also argues that explicit 
decisions may prove unsustainable in practice, because they will be resented and 
challenged by those affected. Hunter is well-known for defending what he describes as 
'muddling through elegantly1 (Hunter 1993b, p.28) - in other words allowing the current 
situation of implicit and incremental decision-making to continue. He suggests it would be 
preferable to leave things as they are until we have developed processes which can capture 
the complexity identified by Mechanic (Hunter, 1995), and both writers agree that explicit 
mechanisms are just as vulnerable to subversion by particular interest groups as current 
methods, if not more so. They therefore reject the claim that explicit methods will by 
definition be more equitable. 
The case for explicit rationing 
Arguments in favour of explicitness are commoner than those against. Many of the authors 
quoted earlier as arguing that rationing is inevitable also take the position that implicit 
methods are largely unjust and unacceptable; some focus more on their potential 
inefficiency. However, over the last five years, the debate has developed in range and 
complexity. As noted earlier, there is a growing body of opinion that some combination of 
implicit and explicit approaches may represent the best way forward, depending on the 
level at which rationing is being conducted. There is also increasing interest in making a 
distinction between explicit rationing decisions and an explicit decision-making process. 
The extent to which the public should be involved is another recurring issue. Some key 
examples of these arguments are summarised here, drawing particularly on a recent series 
of articles in the British Medical Journal. 
The philosophical position of those who advocate explicit rationing is not always clear, a 
source of some confusion and failures in communication. Some generalisations can be 
attempted: as Harvey (1996) puts it, 'the most likely groups to promote explicit rationing 
are those holding consequentialist views: in practice the most active in this field have been 
health economists. Groups with such ethical principles are not only likely to promote 
explicit rationing, but also technical methodologies upon which to base this rationing. For 
example, health economists tend to promote technical methods based on efficiency. Those 
holding deontological views are the least likely to accept that choices about health care 
must be made' (p. 106). 
Proponents of QALYs are clear examples of this utilitarian advocacy of technical cost-
effectiveness methodologies (e.g. Maynard 1994, 1996a, 1996b; Williams 1985, 1997) 
Maynard argues that criticisms levelled at QALYs, such as inherent ageism or a lack of 
concern for distributive equity, can be dealt with by making an equity adjustment to the 
formula as an explicit political decision (Maynard 1996a, 1996b). Philosophically, this 
attaches negative utility to the inequitable distribution of health care, and thus elaborates 
utilitarianism to incorporate distributive concerns. However, the presentational emphasis 
on efficiency can sometimes give the impression that QALYs themselves are a 
philosophically neutral technical device, which can be adjusted to take into account 
specific moral perspectives. 
One of the more provocative manifestations of Maynard's conviction has been to argue 
that if doctors continue to provide treatment to patients which is not cost-effective (on his 
terms), this 'inefficient treatment' is 'unethical and should be construed by employers as 
prima facie evidence for dismissal.' (Maynard, 1996a, p.21) 
Far from trying to modify QALYs to avoid the charge of ageism, Williams has recently 
proposed that age should be an explicit factor in making rationing decisions (Williams, 
1997). This is both because age affects people's capacity to benefit from treatment, and 
also because older people are more likely to have had a 'fair innings', which might justify 
giving resources to younger people not yet in this position. He states clearly the belief that 
'the values of the citizenry as a whole must override the values of a particular interest 
group within it' (p. 822) He is not alone in proposing age as a rationing criterion; Callahan 
(1987) has also argued for limiting treatment for elderly people, and Menzel (1990) 
discusses our 'duty to die cheaply' (p. 190). 
(It is worth noting at this point that not all utilitarians support a QALY-based approach, 
precisely because it Violates the principle that utilitarianism seeks to maximise the 
autonomous preferences of individuals... and substitutes rather the vicarious preferences of 
unaffected individuals' (Harvey, 1996, p.99). This difference of opinion is illustrated in the 
debate between Culyer (1997) and Harris (1997) as to whether the purpose of the NHS is 
to maximise the health of the whole community). 
Many commentators who favour explicit decision-making are sceptical that some purely 
rational formula can be found which will make decisions painlessly on our behalf. Fuchs 
(1983, p.48) makes this point clearly: 'neither scientific data nor economic analyses are 
sufficient for resolving these policy dilemmas'; they can 'make explicit the distributional 
implications of any policy' but they cannot say what the policy should be. Klein et al 
(1996), New and Le Grand (1996) and Lenaghan (1996), to name but a few, all argue that 
rationing health care is ultimately a series of political, moral and clinical judgements, for 
which no technical 'quick fix' can substitute. 
This conclusion leads different writers in different directions. Doyal (1997) argues that 
explicit rationing at both macro and micro levels within the NHS is the only way to ensure 
that the main principle of the NHS (namely equal access to health care based on equal 
need) is adhered to. He suggests that 'there is too much secrecy in British public life 
already' (p. 1118). 
New (1997) and New and Le Grand (1996) favour national determination of the full range 
of NHS responsibilities; although some services might be excluded altogether, health 
authorities would be required to make available at least some of every service agreed to be 
an NHS responsibility. This addresses the 'what?' question, and ensures there is some 
degree of geographical equity; the issue of'how much?', argue New and Le Grand, should 
be decided at health authority level, whilst the 'for whom?' question is a matter for 
individual clinical decision-making, because of the complexity and heterogeneity of 
medicine. Although doctors are recognised as 'the ultimate rationers' (p.71), their 
accountability can be strengthened; society can agree the principles which doctors should 
use in making their decisions (for example, extent of ill health and cost-effectiveness) and 
can institute improved monitoring of medical decision-making. 
Klein (1997) rejects the idea of any national determination of NHS responsibilities, partly 
on the basis that if local health authorities still have discretion in how much of a service 
they will purchase, inconsistency and arbitrariness will remain and the problem of inequity 
will therefore not have been solved. However, his proposals are similar to those of New 
and Le Grand. He, too, recommends that micro rationing should be carried out implicitly 
by doctors, but with more explicit criteria for them to apply and improved collective 
professional accountability (Klein et al, 1996). The final sentence of this text is important: 
'The best we can hope for is to strive to improve the process by which we reach the 
decisions' (p.139). 
This reflects the growing interest in procedural fairness, a theme which is examined 
particularly by Lenaghan (1996, 1997a) but which also runs through many current 
contributions to the debate, particularly those seeking to reconcile some elements of 
implicit and explicit decision-making at different levels of the organisation. Lenaghan 
(1996) argues that we need to consider developing fairer mechanisms for rationing because 
it is already becoming more explicit but in an ad hoc fashion. A rights-based approach 
would establish a national set of procedures and criteria (especially health care on the basis 
of need) to inform local decisions about how much to purchase and clinical decision-
making between individuals. Patients would have 'rights to be heard, to consistent, relevant 
and unbiased decision-making, to be given reasons for decisions and to have a refusal of a 
service or a complaint independently reviewed' (p.94). There might also be national 
guidance on services which should normally be excluded from NHS provision (although 
this should not be a blanket exclusion). 
An alternative way of describing this approach is to say that it would be explicit a) that 
rationing was taking place and b) by what criteria, even if individual decisions themselves 
were taken implicitly. If challenged, providers would be required to demonstrate that their 
decision had been taken in a correct and fair way, placing the emphasis on the process 
rather than directly on the content of the decision. 
The procedural fairness approach lays some stress on the role of national government in 
both acknowledging and supporting explicit rationing, and taking a lead in defining the 
responsibilities of the NHS and the criteria by which decisions will be judged to be fair or 
otherwise. Lenaghan (1997b) and New (1997) both argue that this is essential to legitimise 
the process of rationing and to ensure that it takes place as equitably as possible. 
Hunter (1997b) has been critical of this approach, on the grounds that rationing is too 
complex to be dealt with at national level, and that asking the government simply to take a 
lead without doing any rationing is a fruitless exercise. It would not help address the real 
problem of how to do it locally. 
However, the approach suggested by Harrison and Hunter (1994) bears surprising 
similarities to the procedural fairness approach - another example of how people on 
apparently opposing sides of the rationing debate in fact use many of the same arguments. 
Unsurprisingly, given Hunter's views on the potential injustice of explicit rationing, they 
propose a very cautious approach, offering different 'scenarios' to help policy makers think 
about the way forward for rationing. One of these proposes local authorities as purchasers 
of health care, with freedom to choose their methods of rationing. 'Some might choose to 
establish specific local health care rights for individuals resident in the District, whereas 
others might prefer to establish broader objectives, within which waiting lists and clinical 
freedom would dispense rough justice' (p.67). However, they do add two explicit 
constraints to local authority freedoms under this scenario - there would be a prohibition 
on the use of purely social judgements (e.g. on the basis of lifestyle) in deciding entitlement 
to services, and there would be a requirement to pursue equity of outcome. The other 
scenario proposes an explicit, nationally defined minimum package of health care rights. 
More recently, Harrison (1997) has proposed local government as an alternative to 
centralised rationing; purchasing responsibility would be transferred to local authorities, 
'underpinned by strategic, centrally determined rules', which he anticipates would enable 
'the logics of democracy and equity to be reconciled' (p.973). This, too, springs from a 
concern with procedural fairness, to be realised through democratic control. 
Both Harrison and commentators on the ostensibly opposing side of the debate (Lenaghan, 
1997b; New, 1997; Doyal, 1997) favour greater public involvement in decision-making, 
especially through citizens'juries, as an integral part of improving procedural fairness. 
Some legal writers, such as Newdick (1995) and Teff (1994), also favour greater public 
and patient participation, although Teff prefers the idea of a therapeutic alliance based on 
trust and honesty rather than the more adversarial formulation of'patients' rights'. 
Heginbotham (1992) and Klein (1992) both express caution about opening the floodgates 
of public debate about detailed priority-setting. Both suggest public involvement should be 
confined to decision-making at the broader policy level, with micro rationing remaining a 
matter primarily for clinical judgement, based on evidence of effectiveness and carried out 
within the constraints imposed by public policy decisions. 
A more theoretical consideration of public involvement is offered by Dworkin (1994). He 
has proposed a 'prudent insurance' principle for trying to arrive at an equitable and 
affordable package of health care. He imagines a quasi-Rawlsian world in which five 
conditions hold: wealth is justly distributed; information on the costs and effectiveness of 
medical care is available to all; people make decisions rationally; parents place their 
children's interests on an equal footing with their own; and no-one has any information 
about social or genetic factors on which to predict their future health care needs. In this 
ideal insurance world, people would make rational decisions about which conditions or 
interventions they would insure themselves for - for example, most would probably not 
take out insurance to cover keeping them alive in a persistent vegetative state, or they 
might choose not to insure for further life-saving treatments when they are known to be in 
the last four months of life. The things which people would regard it as prudent to insure 
for are the things which should be covered by a basic comprehensive package of health 
care. He suggests the model could be used both by policy-makers seeking to define 
essential health care provision and for stimulating public discussion. 
Daniels (1985) has also elaborated a concept of'prudential or rational savings' (p. 103), 
whereby it is assumed that 'prudent deliberators...would seek a health care and long term 
care system that protected their normal opportunity range at each stage of their lives' 
(p.99). Menzel (1990) formulates a rather harsher model of'presumed prior consent' 
(p.23), which makes some controversial assumptions about the rights of newborns. The 
fact that they have no ability to consent to trade-offs between future risk against current 
savings brings into question their status as persons and gives others the right to make 
trade-offs on their behalf. Menzel's blunt approach highlights the danger of theoretical 
assumptions about what the public and individual people would choose - a danger which, it 
should be said, most of these authors themselves recognise. 
The Government response 
The government's response to the explicit rationing debate has consistently been evasive, 
because of the undoubted political sensitivities involved. The word 'rationing' has been 
avoided and replaced by 'priority-setting'; even 'priority-setting' has been firmly declared to 
be a local health authority responsibility or a matter for clinical judgement. However, the 
NHS Executive has shown signs of publicly accepting the need to make explicit choices. It 
has given some very broad national guidance, for instance in an Executive Letter which 
makes clear that health authorities will be set targets for reducing ineffective care and 
shifting investment into more effective treatments (NHSE, 1995). The White Paper 'The 
National Health Service: A Service with Ambitions' (Secretary of State for Health, 1996) 
reaffirmed the view that resources are limited and choices must be made, but that the 
assessment of need and the setting of priorities for resource allocation were primarily the 
responsibility of purchasers, within a broad framework established by central government. 
At provider level, clinicians should retain responsibility for deciding priorities between 
individual patients, but their decisions should be based on evidence of effectiveness. 
Although the emphasis is on local responsibility, the White Paper does ask the NHS 
Executive to work with health authorities, NHS Trusts and the health care professions to 
establish a more systematic means of setting priorities at every level of the service. It states 
that no clinically effective treatments should be totally excluded from health authority 
funded services as a matter of principle. The availability of such treatments may be limited, 
but there should always be the possibility of making an exception in cases where clinical 
need can be demonstrated. Clinically ineffective treatments may, by implication, be totally 
excluded. 
Although there is nationally funded and supported work to produce research evidence, 
such as the Effective Care Bulletins, the task of interpreting the evidence to decide what is 
effective or ineffective is still largely left to local decision-making. Indeed, if 
commissioners are not allowed to ban any treatments which carry some remote possibility 
of being effective, their only options may be rationing by limited numbers of cases or by 
allowing only 'exceptional' cases, both of which will place the burden back on clinicians 
facing individual patients (Harrison and Wistow, 1992; Klein et al., 1996). 
Perhaps the most significant recent development has been the production of the discussion 
document 'Priority Setting in the NHS' (Academy of Royal Colleges et al, 1997). This is a 
report by the Priority Setting Working Party established following a workshop on priority 
setting in 1995. The Working Party was set up under the joint auspices of the Academy of 
Medical Royal Colleges, the British Medical Association, the National Association of 
Health Authorities and Trusts and (significantly) the NHS Executive, and all four bodies 
gave unanimous support to the report. The NHSE's support is significant because the 
report makes clear that it sees 'priority setting as a synonym for rationing' (p.6), a 
departure from the NHS Executive's normal preference for the term priority setting. It also 
recommends that the need to ration and to make trade-offs between values should be more 
explicitly acknowledged by all parties, including central government. 
The Working Party does not recommend a national priority setting forum, although it 
suggests that this should be considered as an option as part of the public debate. It does 
argue for greater national consistency in the process of priority setting, if not the content, 
suggesting support for the idea of procedural fairness. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the Labour Government has so far shown clear 
reluctance to get involved in the rationing debate. This is explored further in the final 
chapter. 
The explicit rationing debate and the market 
It should be noted that arguments supporting explicit rationing are generally not based on 
the idea that explicitness is inevitable, even if rationing is inevitable. Rather they are based 
on concerns about democracy, efficiency and equity, and the belief that we ought to be 
explicit in order to address these concerns. In other words, the assumption is that we have 
a choice about whether or not to be explicit. This has important consequences for the 
question of whether explicitness is a logical consequence of the market. 
Having said this, there is also a widely held view (amongst many of the same authors) that 
the market is making rationing more explicit but in an unplanned way, and that this is one 
reason why we need to address it more systematically. For example, Lenaghan (1996) 
argues 'whereas inequity may have been an unwanted occurrence in the NHS of the past, it 
is now actually built into the system. The logic of the internal market, the purchaser-
provider split, the freeing of trusts, the devolving of powers to individual health authorities 
all have led to geographical variations in access and provision of health care services' 
(p. 11). The choice is thus to some extent made for us. 
New and Le Grand (1996) suggest that 'developing new forms of rationing was not a 
specific government objective of the 1991 reforms. However, such forms did develop, 
largely as ad hoc responses to the reforms.' They describe the reforms as 'the catalyst for 
more significant change' in approaches to rationing (p. 10). 
Klein et al. (1996) imply that the greater explicitness inherent in the purchasing role was 
indeed intentional: 'decisions about resource allocation would therefore have to become 
more explicit as health authorities chose what package of health care to buy and what not 
to buy. ..That, at any rate, was the assumption.' They then go on to explore the 'apparent 
failure to follow the logic of the 1991 reforms', and analyse why it was never a realistic 
expectation (p. 50). 
The very nature of the disagreement about what rationing is and whether and how to be 
explicit provides some evidence of its high political and ethical costs, and suggests there is 
no easy logic between the establishment of a market and greater explicitness. The 
Conservative government's failure to acknowledge explicit rationing fully as an integral 
component of the system it put in place may have contributed to market failure -
intervention in decisions supposedly devolved to purchasers when they became too 
awkward is a clear example of non-market decision-making running in parallel with the 
formal system. 
On the other hand, there is a very strong movement in support of explicitness in priority 
setting, despite the reluctance in some quarters to call this rationing. It is important to note 
that this movement was underway before the market was established and is being 
experienced in other countries with different systems of funding and provision (see the 
following chapter). This suggests that it cannot be ascribed wholly to the creation of the 
market. 
It is undoubtedly true, however, that the movement towards greater explicitness has 
gathered momentum since the advent of the purchaser provider split in this country. The 
volume of publications and conferences has increased, media reports of cases of explicit 
rationing continually hit the headlines, and discussion of explicit rationing has moved from 
being a minority interest to a mainstream preoccupation. Is this pure coincidence - a 
continuation of an independent trend? Do the media and health care professionals 
inaccurately blame the market as a convenient scapegoat, as part of wider criticism of 
Conservative reforms of the 1980s and 1990s? Or is there some genuine causal 
relationship at work? Has the market led to developments in explicit rationing which 
would not have happened before, or made them happen faster than they would otherwise 
have done? These questions are addressed in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter Four 
International experience of markets and explicit rationing 
Before examining the evidence emerging from the case study health authorities, it is helpful 
to set UK experience within the wider international context. The introduction of a quasi-
market in the NHS took place relatively recently, and there may be lessons to be learnt 
from other countries undertaking similar reforms. This chapter will therefore summarise 
the available evidence from other countries on the structure of healthcare systems and on 
the extent of different forms of rationing, and look for any evidence of interaction between 
them. Different possible combinations can be sought: 
- countries which have explicit rationing but no market or quasi-market; 
- countries which have a market-based system but no explicit rationing; 
- countries which have both; 
- countries which have neither. 
Ham (1995) identifies three groups of policies which emerged internationally during the 
1980s as responses to financial pressure: 
- budgetary incentives for efficiency (e.g. co-payments and charges, fixed payments to 
providers) 
- strengthening management (including doctors in management, audit, guidelines, quality 
management) 
- convergence between markets and centralised planning and regulation - traditionally tax-
funded systems have sought to import market forces, whilst market systems such as the 
US are experimenting with more regulation. 
Alongside these three policy areas, he notes that continuing commitment to public funding 
has led to a fourth group of reforms, namely attempts to define the range of services. 
These can take the form of a list of core services, a list of excluded services, or the use of 
clinical guidelines to target services at particular groups and individuals. 
For the purposes of this chapter, this typology is reorganised as follows: 
1) Rationing of demand - e.g. by imposition of charges and co-payments (ability to pay) 
2) Global rationing of supply - e.g. capping the budget (cash) or limiting facilities (in kind) 
3) Explicit selective rationing of services - e.g. service exclusions. This can take place at 
three levels: 
National level, by politicians 
Local level, by politicians 
Local level, by managers with political mandate 
4) Structure of system - especially whether adopting quasi-market reforms 
5) Nature of funding - especially whether tax-funded or not 
This will enable a table to drawn up, showing the extent to which different kinds of 
rationing are related to different kinds of structure and funding. (The mechanisms of 
rationing demand and supply are many and complex - for instance, the World Health 
Organisation (1996) identifies 8 different forms of cost-sharing by patients, including extra 
billing, deductibles, co-payments, co-insurance and benefit maximums. For present 
purposes, a simplified approach is sufficient to point up differences in national strategy). 
For comparison to be meaningful, it is sensible to look mainly at countries which are 
similar to the UK - in other words, industrialised western democracies. This is not to say 
developing countries or countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, for 
example, have nothing in common with developed nations as far as health policy is 
concerned. The World Bank has commented that developing countries need to improve 
the targeting of scarce health care resources, particularly at cost-effective interventions, 
and should establish at least a minimum package of services available to all, including 
maternity care, family planning, control of tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases, 
and treatment for common diseases of childhood (World Bank, 1993). Defining a 
minimum package, should they choose to take the World Bank's advice, would be very 
much an explicit rationing activity, even though the context of the level of resources 
available may be radically different. On the other hand, it is precisely this different resource 
context which makes comparison invidious; the intricacies of rationing in a sophisticated 
quasi-market are worlds away from the struggle to establish even the most basic level of 
service in developing countries. 
The former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are still 
in a state of transition. The chaotic nature of emerging market forces and of priority-
setting mechanisms make comparison with western health services difficult, even though 
there may be distant parallels with the move in the UK from central planning to market 
processes. 
If the search is confined to OECD nations, a problem emerges straight away in trying to 
find countries which do not have some form of market system, whether on the purchaser 
or the provider side, or both. Distinguishing a regulated but real market from a quasi-
market is not always straightforward, especially under circumstances of convergence. The 
problem is complicated by the fact that different commentators may offer varying 
interpretations of how each system is organised - what one describes as compulsory social 
insurance another may describe as a system funded out of general taxation, for example. It 
is also difficult sometimes to define exactly what is public or private - social insurance 
schemes may be run by private companies, but may be so constrained by government 
regulations that they become 'quasi public agencies' (de Roo, 1995, p.46). For current 
purposes, only those social insurance schemes which are virtually universal and which are 
run by government, local or national, will be counted as tax-funded. 
To try to establish the relevant facts, the situation in a number of EU/OECD countries has 
been analysed1. A summary is presented in the table below. This is followed by a more in-
depth look at four countries particularly well-known to be experimenting with competition 
and/or explicit rationing. In each case, the information is linked back to the numbered 
typology already discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the significance of 
these findings. 
1 A number of sources have been used to provide general descriptive data about the countries analysed. 
These are listed at the end of each section on the four countries analysed in depth; where a particularly 
significant point is raised, the reference is also given at the relevant point in the text. The sources used in 
compiling the summary table are: 
Arvidsson, 1995; Bach, 1996; Bloor and Freemantle, 1996; Brommels, 1995; Cabases, 1995, 1997; de 
Roo, 1995; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 1993-7; Gallo, 1997; Ham et al., 1990; Health Services 
Management Centre, 1997; Iglehart, 1986, 1991; Klein et al., 1996; Lonning, 1997; Nestman, 1996; 
NLN, 1990; NOU, 1987; OECD, 1994; Parston, 1994; Pfeiffer, 1996; Richard and Schönbach, 1996; 
Rosleff and Lister, 1995; Schwartz and Busse, 1996; Working Group on Prioritisation in Health Care, 
1995; World Health Organisation, 1996. 











Australia Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Austria Yes No No No No 
Belgium Yes Yes No No No 
Canada Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Denmark Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Eire Yes Yes No No Yes 
Finland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
France Yes Yes No No No 
Germany Yes Yes No No No 
Greece Yes No No No No 
Iceland Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Japan Yes Yes No No No 
Luxembourg Yes No No No No 
Norway Yes Yes Yes No? Yes 
Portugal Yes Yes No No Yes 
Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Switzerland Yes Yes No No No 
US private 
insurance 
Yes Yes No No No 
US, Oregon -
Medicaid 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes? Yes? 
New Zealand Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sweden Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Oregon, US 
The State of Oregon is one of the best-known pioneers of explicit rationing, and the results 
have been extensively documented elsewhere. It remains the only place where a systematic 
policy of explicit rationing has actually been implemented. (For an up-to-date summary, 
see Klein et al, 1996; Ganiats and Kaplan, 1996). 
The US is one of the few examples of a largely free market healthcare system, with a 
minimum safety net for the very poor and social insurance for the elderly. Although most 
purchasing is in fact done by third party payers (insurance companies, or Medicaid/ 
Medicare), these do not function in the same way as agency purchasers in a quasi-market, 
the main reason being that insurance companies are independent and have not traditionally 
had fixed budgets. The ability to pass costs back to the consumer (especially employers 
who pay premiums for their workers) in the form of increased premiums and higher co-
payments has meant that there has been little incentive to carry out explicit rationing. 
Only in more recent years, as employers have begun to resist price increases, has there 
been any move to impose fixed budgets on providers (for instance through the Health 
Maintenance Organisation system). This has been managed largely through efficiency 
savings and implicit rationing rather than the development of a list of excluded treatments 
or groups of patients, although it is worth noting that prior approval mechanisms operated 
by the insurance companies to vet each proposed admission may in practice have the same 
effect. The growth of arrangements in the US such as HMOs and preferred provider 
organisations is often taken as evidence of convergence between market-based systems 
and centrally planned and regulated systems. (Ham, 1995). There is now substantial 
pressure within the market towards cost control, which is in turn leading to demands for 
greater regulation and more planned rationing of services. 
An already well-established rationing mechanism in the US is the exclusion of groups of 
patients from care - those who cannot afford insurance but who are not poor enough to 
qualify for Medicaid, as well as the substantial population of illegal immigrants. Although 
this is a recognised phenomenon, it has never been an intentional decision, but is seen 
merely as the outcome of market forces; it would be difficult therefore to define it as an 
explicit rationing mechanism, even though there may be those who offer an after-the-event 
rationalisation of it as a just outcome. 
It was this gap in coverage, coupled with spiralling Medicaid costs, which prompted the 
State of Oregon to review its system. In early, crude attempts to limit Medicaid 
expenditure, a child was refused a bone-marrow transplant operation, and died as a result. 
The shock caused by this incident led to a fundamental re-examination of the principles of 
priority-setting, with the aim of defining a basic package of services to which all uninsured 
people would be entitled. A specially appointed commission was set up to undertake this 
work; after consulting as widely as possible with the local community about their values, 
and taking expert clinical and economic advice, the commission came up with a ranked list 
of treatment/condition pairings. The first list, drawn up in 1990, was never published and 
contained many errors and counter-intuitive results, such as ranking treatment for thumb-
sucking above treatment for AIDS. A revised list, placing greater emphasis on the 
subjective judgements of members of the Commission and less emphasis on cost, was 
published in 1991 and contained 709 treatment/condition pairings. Federal approval for 
implementing the list was originally withheld on the grounds that it discriminated against 
people with disabilities. Two further revisions were undertaken, and the fourth list (with 
688 pairings) was accepted in April 1993, and implemented in February 1994. 
Although in 1991 the Oregon legislature decided to fund only 587 of the 709 pairings then 
on the list, it in fact had to vote extra resources to enable it to purchase this level of 
service, and the kinds of procedures excluded were similar to those excluded by some UK 
health authorities (i.e. treatment for very minor conditions, or treatments with little or no 
chance of a successful outcome). For instance, numbers 708 and 709 on the 1991 list are 
life support for extremely low birth weight babies (under 500g) of less than 23 weeks' 
gestation, and for anencephalic babies. 
Oregon's pioneering work on rationing has clearly not resulted from the existence of a 
quasi-market, since the US does not have one; it results from the inflationary pressures 
arising from a free market in healthcare, where even state-funded elements of the service 
have offered unlimited coverage paid for at the going market rate. However, this is in itself 
instructive when trying to assess the likely outcome of trying to introduce more 'real 
market' forces into previously planned systems. Healthcare authorities in the US are 
seeking to control costs precisely by moving away from market forces towards greater 
intervention and regulation. This could therefore support the thesis that a move in the 
opposite direction could make resource pressures worse and thereby increase the 
likelihood of explicit rationing, as in Oregon. The Oregon example also demonstrates that 
actually implementing explicit rationing requires planned state intervention - it is significant 
that the only element of the system where such explicit rationing is happening is the tax-
funded element. 
Restricting the package available for Medicaid recipients has enabled previously uninsured 
people to be given coverage. Oregon is therefore trading off existing comprehensiveness in 
return for new universality. In other countries considered below, the question is somewhat 
different - universality and comprehensiveness are both already established, but can they be 
maintained? In practice, they may reach the same answer as Oregon - if they want to keep 
universal access, they may have to sacrifice comprehensive provision. 
US private system as a whole Oregon Medicaid 
1) Demand rationing - yes, co-payments, 
exclusion by ability to pay 
2) Supply rationing - yes, fixed budgets 
3) Selective rationing - no 
4) Quasi-market - no 
5) Tax-funded - no 
1) Demand rationing - yes, co-
payments 
2) Supply rationing - yes, fixed budgets 
3) Selective rationing - yes 
4) Quasi-market - no 
5) Tax funded - yes 
(Ganiats and Kaplan, 1996; Klein et al., 1996; Ham, 1995) 
Netherlands 
Social insurance is compulsory in the Netherlands for employees below a certain income 
and for people dependent on social insurance. Others rely on private insurance or 
voluntary participation in a sick fund. There has been little in the way of co-payments for 
people insured with a sick fund, apart from having to pay the difference between the cost 
of a drug and its generic equivalent. Those privately insured have varying co-payment 
arrangements. 
Rising premiums became a problem in the 1980s and led to increasing requirements for 
public subsidy, so the government began to investigate ways of containing costs more 
effectively. It has in the past attempted to impose some central planning and budgeting on 
the healthcare system, but the fact that most providers were private and independent made 
it difficult to enforce. The government-commissioned Dekker Report (Commissie 
Structuur en Financiering Gezondheidszorg, 1987) recommended that structural reform 
should focus on funding rather than provision, and that there should be greater reliance on 
market forces for effective cost-containment. (It is interesting to note that the Dekker 
report preceded 'Working for Patients' by some time). 
A major aim of the report was to enable sick funds to compete with each other and with 
private insurers. This focus on competition amongst purchasers is unusual, although it is 
being tested in some social insurance systems such as Germany and Belgium and has 
similarities with the potential competition between health authorities and GP fiindholders if 
the UK. The proposals were: 
- to give everyone mandatory insurance rights, ending socio-economic differentiation of 
entitlements; 
- to make this mandatory insurance cover all long term care and about 80% of existing 
sick fimd coverage for acute care. The remainder would be funded by either voluntary 
additional insurance or by direct payments, whichever individuals prefer; 
- to split premiums into two parts - one income-dependent, and the other a flat-rate 
('nominal premium'). The income-related element would be collected by the central 
government revenue department into a central fund and then disbursed to insurers. This 
funding would deliberately fall short of total health care costs, so that insurers would 
have to meet the rest from the nominal premium, raised directly from subscribers. 
Allowing insurers the freedom to determine the level of the nominal premium would 
encourage them to be efficient and compete with each other by offering a lower 
premium; 
- to alter the legal status of sick funds so that they could operate outside their previous 
geographical areas, offer private insurance, undercut officially fixed tariffs and withdraw 
contracts from providers they did not feel were offering acceptable quality or value for 
money. At the moment, they are legally obliged to offer contracts to all licensed 
providers. 
In practice, several elements of the report have not been implemented. By the end of 1994, 
a Central Fund for income-dependent premiums had been established and the nominal 
premium had been introduced. However, the idea of a split between mandatory and 
voluntary insurance components is subject to continuing controversies, and all political 
parties have abandoned the idea of a single comprehensive mandatory scheme. Instead, the 
current government proposes a mandatory scheme for long term care (with fully income-
dependent premium), another mandatory scheme for acute care, including a direct annual 
payment for the use of health services, and voluntary insurance for the rest. 
Legal barriers to competition between insurers have been removed and regional 
monopolies abolished. Regulations to allow insurers to withdraw funding from 
unsatisfactory providers are being introduced gradually, but the system of funding 
providers through budgets has crucially not yet been replaced by competitive contract 
negotiations. 
Dutch involvement in explicit rationing is at least partially connected with the structural 
reforms of the Dekker Report. The report of the Dunning Committee (Government 
Committee on Choices in Health Care, 1992) was intended to advise on which aspects of 
health services should form part of mandatory social insurance arrangements, given the 
government's aim of controlling the costs of public expenditure on insurance for dependent 
groups. 
Van de Ven (1996) examines the complexity of trying to combine regulated competition 
and fixed budgets in healthcare; if the budget is exceeded, government intervention will be 
required to fix prices and volume, which he argues 'strongly reduces pf even eliminates 
(the potential for) regulated competition.' However, the problem with allowing even a 
regulated market greater freedom to determine total expenditure is that this may interfere 
with the government's responsibility (in a comprehensive service) to ensure access for 
everyone. 'Access to care for sick and low-income people implies cross-subsidies from the 
healthy and high-income people... If more care becomes available to the rich, then also the 
decent minimum that has to be available for everyone, probably will be set at a higher 
level. Therefore the subsidies and also the income-related contributions for the compulsory 
health insurance will go up' (p.67). Thus the government's concern to ensure equitable 
access may require it to put an upper limit on public health care expenditure. 
It is in this cost-limited context that the Dunning Committee recommended that treatments 
of low effectiveness and high cost should be excluded from the basic minimum package for 
compulsory health insurance. In order to be included in the basic package, treatments 
would have to pass through four 'sieves': 1) Is the care necessary to enhance participation 
in social life? 2) Is it effective? 3) Is it efficient? and 4) Is it something which could be left 
to individual responsibility? Only treatments which pass through all these filters would be 
provided. On the strength of this approach, some marginal services have already been 
excluded, including homeopathy, adult dental care and new technology until it has been 
properly evaluated. However, van de Ven (1995) reports that 'the Committee has applied 
its criteria to several forms of health services and concluded that it is not a simple matter, 
on the basis of these criteria, to leave complete services or parts of them out of the basic 
benefits package. The major reason for this is that effectiveness of care has to be 
considered in relation to the medical indication and the condition of the patient' (p.789) 
The upshot of this is that the Committee has not in fact come up with a clearly defined 
basic package, and has instead chosen to focus its efforts on the development and 
application of guidelines to ensure appropriateness of care at the individual level. 
This summary poses two questions. Firstly, to what extent does the new system in the 
Netherlands really constitute a quasi-market? The failure to implement some substantial 
parts of the proposals, coupled with the problem identified by van de Ven of trying to 
maintain a fixed budget, suggest that the reforms are fairly limited. There is also the fact 
that the sick funds remain independent, rather than being state agencies as one would 
expect in a true quasi-market. However, the change in funding arrangements means they 
are now dependent on government for a substantial proportion of their budget and are 
subject to much more universal regulation than before. On balance, therefore, the Dutch 
system could be described as an evolving quasi-market that is not yet fully functional. 
Secondly, to what extent have the recommendations of the Dunning Committee really 
resulted in explicit rationing? Again, the answer is that its scope is very limited. 
The relationship between the market proposals and the explicit rationing proposals is 
complex. In one sense, the Dunning Committee has clearly been part of the market 
reforms, in trying to ensure the market does not result in inequitable access and coverage. 
However, it is important that the spirit of its enquiry was to make sure people were 
included in coverage, given a fixed budget, rather than deliberately to exclude. 
Furthermore, it was a planned central government initiative, rather than a natural outcome 
of market processes, and has been pursued in parallel with the market reforms. 
1) Demand rationing - yes, co-payments and annual payment 
2) Supply rationing - yes, fixed budgets and central planning, but limited success 
3) Selective rationing - yes, but limited success at national level 
4) Quasi-market - a qualified yes 
5) Tax-funded - yes, mainly, but administered by sick funds 
(Commissie Structuur en Financiering Gezondheidszorg, 1987; Government Committee on 
Choices in Health Care, 1992; de Roo, 1995; van de Ven, 1995, 1996; Klein etai, 1996; 
WHO, 1996) 
New Zealand 
The election of the right-wing National Party to power in 1990 heralded a dramatic change 
in the structure of New Zealand's tax-funded national health service. Until that point, the 
main mechanisms for cost containment had been the use of fixed budgets, public sector pay 
freezes and extensive user co-payments, especially for drugs and for GP services, which 
are fee-for-service with partial reimbursement. (Co-payments were extended in 1992 to 
out-patient and in-patient services, although subsequently withdrawn again for the latter). 
In line with its ideological preferences, the government decided upon rapid restructuring 
along market lines. From July 1993, the service had a purchaser/provider split extending to 
cabinet level, with the health minister overseeing the four regional health authorities 
(purchasers) and the minister of crown health enterprises overseeing providers. The crown 
health enterprises (CHEs) were amalgams of the former hospital boards and community 
services, and were limited liability companies. Their contracts were therefore commercially 
secret and legally binding, in marked contrast to the UK. 
Ashton (1996) has been evaluating these reforms within Williamson's 'organisational 
failures' framework, and concludes that there is some evidence to support his thesis. She 
notes that the legally binding nature of contracts has meant every effort has been made to 
make them as complete as possible. 'As transaction cost theory predicts, this has clearly 
been a prolonged and costly process' (p.21). (The British Medical Journal (1996) has 
reported an estimate of a 40% increase in administration costs arising from the reforms). 
The amount of detail in service specifications depends partly on the kind of service being 
purchased; primary health services, for example, were described in much broader terms 
than surgical services. Although the surgical contracts were still effectively block contracts 
in 1994/95, they contained considerable detail on casemix and prices, and contract 
negotiations were protracted. Ashton suggests that purchasers are dissatisfied with the 
competitive structure and would prefer to move towards a more collaborative approach. 
However, providers may resist this as they feel vulnerable against monopsony purchasers 
and fear collaborative arrangements would perhaps give disproportionate advantage to 
purchasers. 
Ashton does not report any evidence of explicit rationing resulting from the process of 
drawing up contracts within New Zealand's quasi-market. However, there has been 
nationally led exploration of the idea. As in the case of the Netherlands, this was 
undertaken in parallel with the market reforms by a national commission, and its original 
intention was to draw up a list of core services to be included in public health coverage. 
Hunter suggests that, unlike the Netherlands, the motivation was to promote private 
insurance and restrict public expenditure by finding services which could be excluded, 
rather than making sure the population had protected access to comprehensive basic 
coverage, despite limited public expenditure. The net effect may be the same, but the 
difference in perspective could be important. 
It is not absolutely clear whether Hunter's assessment of the motivation is correct; the 
government's own white paper says 'in the past, rationing has been done informally and 
often without public scrutiny or control. Defining a set of "core health services" more 
explicitly will help ensure that the services the public believe to be the most important will 
be provided. It will also acknowledge more honestly that there are limits to the health 
services we can afford' (New Zealand Minister of Health, 1991, p. 80) This would suggest 
that the government did see more positive reasons for identifying core services, although 
of course the reasoning given in public documents does not always reflect underlying 
political aims, if these may be unpopular. Cooper (1995) summarises the ambiguity thus: 
'The core, in short, was to be both a statement of entitlement to the electorate and a way 
of capping the risk to the State' (p. 804). In fact he also points out that the risk to the State 
could be increased, as 'rationing by means of a clearly defined core could make pressure 
for increased expenditure more difficult to resist' (p. 804). 
The Core Services Committee (now renamed the National Health Committee) quickly 
decided that its task was impossible. The Committee 'has not found any treatment or area 
of service within the current range of publicly funded services which can be completely 
excluded. The challenge is to determine the circumstances when people should have access 
to these services' (National Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support 
Services, 1994, p.67). The Committee has therefore thrown its efforts into the 
development of detailed protocols for certain areas, and has also identified a list of broad 
purchasing priorities (services for children, mental health and substance abuse, integrated 
community care services, hospice care, emergency ambulance services and habilitation 
services). An example of the effect of protocols is given by Hadorn and Holmes (1997); a 
scoring system has been introduced for coronary by-pass operations, and patients whose 
score does not reach a certain level will not be booked for an operation. Clinicians have 
agreed to work with this threshold, although they regard it as too high, and believe it 
excludes many people they think would benefit from treatment. 
The New Zealand experience suggests that quasi market reforms may prompt governments 
to pursue explicit rationing at national level, but that their chances of success are limited, 
at least as far as total exclusions are concerned. The potential for rationing by protocols, 
however, may be more far-reaching. It offers no proof either way whether the operation of 
the quasi-market will itself produce more explicit allocation decisions between purchaser 
and provider; it is still too early to draw firm conclusions. Furthermore, the election of a 
coalition government in Autumn 1996 has resulted in some significant changes to the 
quasi-market reforms: although the separation of provider responsibilities is being retained, 
the four regional health authorities are to be replaced by a single central funding body. At 
the same time, the crown health enterprises will be superseded by regional hospital and 
community services agencies. The emphasis is on replacing competition with collaboration 
and reducing transaction costs. It remains to be seen whether, under these circumstances, 
the purchaser provider split will have any continuing impact, or whether it will in fact 
represent a de facto return to hierarchical central planning. (Ham, 1997) 
1) Demand rationing - yes, co-payments. 
2) Supply rationing - yes, fixed budgets 
3) Selective rationing - yes; no success in defining exclusions; growing rationing 
by protocol 
4) Quasi-market - yes, but with significant changes recently announced. 
5) Tax-funded - yes 
(Hunter, 1996; Ashton, 1996; British Medical Journal, 1996; Cooper, 1995; Kleine^/ . , 
1996; OECD, 1994; New Zealand Minister of Health, 1991; Core Services, 1995/96; 
Ham, 1997; Hadorn and Holmes, 1997) 
Sweden 
The Swedish health system is a comprehensive, tax-funded service. There has been 
extensive use of fixed budgets and planned levels of hospital capacity and clinical staffing 
to control costs, alongside patient co-payments for most services, including per diem in-
patient care contributions. 
During the 1980s, Swedish politics began to swing from their traditional social democratic 
position towards a more right-wing approach, which placed greater faith in competition 
and an already extant trend towards decentralisation to solve problems of rising public 
expenditure. Health care was already managed and financed at county level rather than by 
national government, but individual counties began to experiment with a purchaser 
provider split. About half now have some form of internal market. The locally-led nature 
of reform in Sweden makes generalisation difficult, but in both the case studies cited by 
Brommels (1995) the counties have set up several local health boards (comprised of local 
politicians, with support staff) to act as purchasers at sub-county level. In both cases, 
however, the local boards also manage primary care and in one case geriatric and 
psychiatric care, although hospital providers report directly to the county level. 
Calltorp (1996) reports that Stockholm has made the most extensive developments of the 
purchaser role, but even here there have been practical problems of implementation. In 
particular, politicians, despite a real interest in purchasing, have allowed patient choice to 
override contracts, and as a result find themselves unable to tackle the pressing problem of 
hospital overcapacity. Brommels (1995) notes that it is in fact at county level where 
provider restructuring is being tackled, suggesting both that 'the internal market itself 
cannot do those "dirty jobs'" (P. 104) and that it is at county level provider management 
that the real political power lies. Brommels is also sceptical about the extent to which 
purchasing has actually been implemented; in addition to the problem of controlling patient 
flows, he cites lack of information support as a major difficulty. Both of these problems 
have made it hard to link volume to price effectively. He concludes that 'the purchasing 
task is only gradually materialising, and the contracting process is thus far technical in 
nature and dominated by administrators' (P. 101) 
More recently, Whitehead et al. (1997) have noted that Stockholm County Council has 
begun to rethink its approach; as in New Zealand, the emphasis on competition is giving 
way to cooperation, with renewed interest in issues of equity and how to restore trust 
between purchasers and providers. In January 1996, the County Council set up a hospital 
board to oversee provision. This board reports directly to the central political board for 
health, which now co-ordinates all purchasing of hospital care over the nine district 
purchasers. The authors suggest this represents 'a considerable blurring of the boundary 
between purchaser and provider and an emphasis on setting up mechanisms for 
cooperation and priority setting' (p.938). 
Calltorp (1995) notes that the introduction of the internal market in so many Swedish 
counties was a direct response to growing resource pressures, including bed overcapacity, 
technological advance, rising consumer expectations and numbers of elderly people. 
(Sweden has the highest percentage of people over 80 in the world). Interestingly he also 
says 'at the same time, public discussion on limits to health care also came to the surface' 
(p. 793). This is perhaps the clearest example of explicit rationing emerging as an issue 
simultaneously with the introduction of a quasi-market, but in no way resulting from the 
quasi-market. This contrasts with the experience in New Zealand and the Netherlands 
where national work on core services was seen almost as part of regulating the new 
market reforms. This is particularly clear in Sweden because the market reforms have been 
developed and implemented by counties, whereas the work on rationing has been the 
initiative of central government, and both seem to stem independently from concern about 
lack of resources. 
A National Priorities Commission was established and produced its final report in 1995 
(Swedish Parliamentary Priorities Commission, 1995). It identifies three principles for 
setting priorities: human dignity, allocating resources on the basis of need (including 
solidarity with those vulnerable groups who may not be able to express their needs) and 
cost efficiency. Cost efficiency is only deemed to be an appropriate basis for comparing 
different treatments for the same disease; 'where different diseases are involved, fair 
comparison of the effects is impossible' (p . 21). Defined age limits are deemed 
inappropriate, although judging whether the effects of old age in individuals reduce their 
ability to benefit is a legitimate part of clinical decision-making. Similarly, decisions about 
the care of premature babies should not be made according to inflexible weight limits, but 
should be taken according to the individual circumstances. The fact that a condition is self-
inflicted, such as smoking, should not lead to negative discrimination, although again it 
may influence clinical decision-making. As Klein et al (1996) point out, this leaves ample 
scope for implicit clinician-led rationing within the explicit national framework. It also 
allows scope for local priority-setting by purchasers. 
The Commission also identified the following ranked list of priority areas to guide 
decision-making, and argued that currently insufficient priority is given to IB compared to 
categories II and III. 
IA Acute care for life/permanent disability threatening conditions 
IB Care for severe chronic conditions, palliative care and care for persons of 
reduced autonomy 
II Prevention, rehabilitation 
III Less severe acute or chronic conditions 
IV Borderline cases 
V Care for reasons other than disease or injury 
The Commission's recommendations have yet to be implemented, so it is too early to tell 
what the outcome will be in practice. As in the Netherlands and New Zealand, the 
Commission's approach is likely to lead to the development of guidelines rather than 
lengthy lists of total exclusions. This would sit more easily with Sweden's firm 
commitment to equity; Calltorp (1995) argues that it is this commitment which requires a 
public debate about the issue, even if the outcome of the debate is to acknowledge that 
clinicians must make most of the decisions. Perhaps the most important feature is the 
political willingness to acknowledge that the welfare state has limits and that rationing in 
some form has to be countenanced. 
1) Demand rationing - yes, co-payments 
2) Supply rationing - yes, fixed budgets and planned capacity 
3) Selective rationing - yes, in principle 
4) Quasi-market - yes, but with significant changes underway 
5) Tax-funded - yes 
(Calltorp, 1995; Calltorp, 1996; McKee and Figueras, 1996; Brommels, 1995; Klein et al, 
1996; Swedish Parliamentaiy Priorities Commission, 1995; WHO, 1996; OECD, 1994; 
Whitehead et al, 1997) 
Discussion 
International comparison cannot provide conclusive evidence about the relationship 
between explicit rationing and markets in healthcare, for a number of reasons: 
- those countries which are experimenting with quasi-markets are at too early a stage to be 
certain about the effects of the change; 
- those countries which are experimenting with explicit rationing are also at an early stage; 
- in many cases, the rhetoric of both market experimentation and explicit rationing has not 
in fact been translated into reality - and, again, it is too soon to tell whether this state of 
affairs will persist or whether the proposals will finally be implemented; 
- in some cases, notably New Zealand and Sweden, there is a degree of retreat from the 
quasi-market approach; 
- it is impossible to determine whether countries which are at present not discussing 
explicit rationing will end up having to do so at a later date, regardless of organisational 
structure. 
With these caveats in mind, international comparisons do give some clues which can be 
useful in analysing evidence emerging so far in the UK. 
The summary table presented earlier produces some interesting results. All countries listed 
are operating some form of demand rationing, and virtually all ration supply as well. This is 
most often fixed budgeting, but also sometimes limits on capacity or staffing levels. 
Austria and Luxembourg are now experimenting with new activity-related budgets for 
hospitals using standardised costings for specific diagnostic groups, which should have 
some impact on supply. Greece has yet to tackle the issue. 
More variation between countries emerges when explicit selective rationing, quasi-markets 
and tax funding are explored. Twelve countries are experimenting with selective rationing, 
either at national or local level, and all of them have a tax-funded health system. This 
applies even to Oregon, given that explicit rationing there is focused on the publicly funded 
Medicaid system only. It also applies to the new income-dependent health premium 
collected by the Dutch government. Only two countries with tax-funded systems are not 
yet looking at explicit rationing. Eire's tax-funded system only applies to 30-40% of the 
population, so has greater potential for rationing by ability to pay than universal systems. 
Portugal too seems to be following the route of encouraging private insurance to deal with 
the public funding problem. Australia has very limited explicit rationing, in the form of 
economic evaluation of new drugs before they are accepted for reimbursement - it is also 
pursuing the option of higher health taxes or mandatory private insurance for high earners. 
Despite these exceptions, there does seem to be a very strong relation between tax funding 
and explicit rationing. What about quasi-market experimentation? Again, the five countries 
experimenting with quasi-market reforms (Finland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand and 
Sweden) are all tax-funded systems, and they are all examining explicit rationing, even 
though actual progress with both market reforms and rationing has been limited. In 
addition, Norway has some elements of a quasi-market in place, and Denmark and Spain 
are experimenting with a purchaser provider split in some local areas. However, there are 
countries with a tax-funded system, including Canada and Iceland, which are pursuing 
explicit rationing without any accompanying quasi-market reforms, and New Zealand and 
Sweden are rethinking their current approaches. 
It could be argued that it is only tax-funded countries which can move towards quasi-
market systems, because countries with insurance-based systems already have a real, if 
regulated, market. In fact the Netherlands does seems to provide an example of a 
previously insurance-based market system moving towards a more tax-based, quasi-market 
system. A trend of convergence towards planned, regulated markets in health care has 
been observed by a number of commentators, including Ham (1995) and Arvidsson 
(1995). It may be that other insurance-based systems will ultimately go as far as the 
Netherlands. 
Common cause or coincidence? 
It is noticeable that in all countries which are pursuing an active quasi-market 
reorganisation and also taking a serious interest in explicit rationing, the two strands have 
emerged more or less simultaneously, generally with a strong national lead. Superficially, 
therefore, it does not appear to be the case that the quasi-market experiment has been the 
cause of this interest in explicit rationing - although it is too early to say whether the quasi-
market in each case will create additional pressure for more explicit rationing. 
It is theoretically possible that it is pure coincidence the two strands have come together; 
however, this is not borne out by the way in which both have been openly characterised as 
responses to resource pressures. It seems more likely, therefore, that ultimately there is a 
common cause - namely the urgent need to control rising expenditure - which has given 
rise to both quasi-market and explicit rationing experiments. 
The strong relationship between explicit rationing, quasi-market reforms and tax funding is 
surely significant. Countries which run social or private insurance schemes rely mainly on 
increasing premiums, or, if that fails, demand and supply rationing to cope with resource 
pressures. Increasing tax is a much more serious political step than increasing insurance 
premiums, because of greater public unwillingness to pay higher tax and because of the 
resulting electoral unpopularity. Thus tax-funded systems may run into deeper financial 
problems at an earlier stage than insurance-based systems. The fact that in Oregon the tax-
funded service is not universal and is therefore not a source of social solidarity, may 
explain why it has got furthest with explicit rationing. The difficulty of persuading tax-
payers to pay more for a service they themselves never use, such as Medicaid, is even 
greater than persuading people to pay more tax for a universal NHS. 
Ham (1995) points out that continued commitment to public funding is a crucial factor in 
pursuing policies which seek to define a range of services; once this commitment is 
weakened and private funding assumes greater importance, as in Eire and Portugal, the 
pressure for explicit selective rationing is weakened too. 
The actual level of healthcare expenditure does not seem to be as relevant as the source of 
funding. Klein et al. (1996) point out that countries which have set up special commissions 
on priority setting, such as New Zealand, Norway, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
all spend more on health than the UK, and furthermore vary substantially from each other 
as to how much they spend. The one thing these countries do have in common is that the 
level of health care spending is determined collectively. 
The collective decision-making of a tax-funded system not only constrains expenditure; it 
also offers a ready mechanism for making national decisions about healthcare and ensuring 
they are implemented which more diffuse systems lack. Thus it both creates resource 
pressures but at the same time offers a clear chain of command for managing them through 
national priority-setting exercises which would be harder to contemplate in a system based 
on individual insurance. 
This is not to say insurance-based systems will not also eventually get to a point where 
financial pressure is so great that they have to move towards explicit rationing, but it does 
help to explain why tax-based systems may get there first. 
Independence or causation? 
The suggestion that both quasi-markets and explicit rationing are the independent products 
of financial stringency could help to explain the position of other countries where one or 
other is taking place but not both. It is a perfectly reasonable response to financial pressure 
to try to improve structural efficiency and introduce competition, but to leave rationing to 
implicit mechanisms (at least for the time being) - it is also reasonable to opt for explicit 
rationing whilst leaving the structure untouched. What determines the choice may be a 
function of how serious the financial problem is perceived to be, what scope there is left in 
the system for simply increasing efficiency, political and public attitudes and historic 
differences in the current structure. 
It was suggested earlier that the fact that quasi-markets and explicit rationing have so far 
usually emerged simultaneously gave superficial support to the view that they were 
independent. Certainly there is evidence of countries without quasi-markets turning to 
explicit rationing - but what are we to make of the fact that there is no country with a 
quasi-market which is not also investigating explicit rationing? Is this just chance, or does 
it indicate there is some additional relationship? 
The relationship may not be causative in terms of quasi-markets happening and then 
explicit rationing in chronological sequence, but may be causative in the sense that 
governments experimenting with quasi-markets want to protect against possible inequities 
and therefore seek to define a basic minimum package. Even though this is intended to be 
inclusive rather than exclusive, the outcome may be to exclude services. The important 
distinction to make is that this is a political choice, rather than an inevitable logical 
process. It may also be important that most countries which have tried this approach have 
ended up backing away from hard and fast definitions of core services - perhaps just 
because it is too difficult, but perhaps also because they become aware of the irony that a 
measure intended to protect citizens' rights to equitable treatment ends up excluding them 
from some healthcare. It is significant that the only place which has not backed away from 
firm and detailed definitions is Oregon, where it was always clearly understood that the 
purpose was to exclude some treatments in return for universal coverage. 
The above arguments do not necessarily refute the theory that quasi-markets will 
themselves increase the pressure for explicit rationing at a later date. Countries which have 
produced a strategy for explicit rationing may be merely pre-empting a need that will 
emerge anyway as their new quasi-markets take effect; their foresight may make it easier 
for them to cope with the extra pressure towards explicitness. There are two possible 
routes by which quasi-markets could make explicitness more likely: 
1. They may force existing implicit rationing out into the open as the increased availability 
of information and the need to specify detailed contracts between purchaser and 
provider formalise allocation decisions. Once in existence, contracts may provide a 
vehicle for the more explicit expression of new rationing decisions. 
2. They may increase the total amount of rationing needed by ironically increasing the 
very costs they are supposed to control, because of the transaction cost problem, thus 
creating a cyclical link back to the ultimate common cause of resource pressures. 
Unfortunately, it is still too early to be able to demonstrate this element of the equation; 
indeed, given the retreat from market reforms now happening in a number of places, it may 
never be possible to follow through the flill effect of those reforms. However, it is worth 
noting a comment from Whitehead et al. (1997) in relation to Sweden that some aspects of 
the quasi-market reforms, notably fee for service payments, 'seemed the wrong incentives 
when cost control and structural changes in supply became political priorities in the 1990s' 
(p 938). 
Summary 
The following diagram shows how these different theories might link together, 
explicit rationing 
Resource explicit rationing through contracts 
pressures ^ 
quasi-market reform •=> defining core services •=> explicit rationing 
resource pressures «=> explicit rationing 
Tax-funded systems are especially prone to the resource pressures which give rise to both 
explicit rationing and quasi-markets. Given the hierarchical nature of tax-funded systems, 
experimentation with market-style mechanisms is a natural development in the search for 
alternative ways of improving efficiency. Tax-based systems also offer a national 
collective decision-making framework which enables explicit rationing to be planned and 
implemented. 
Quasi-markets are not a necessary condition for the emergence of explicit rationing, but 
may create additional impetus towards it, through some or all of the mechanisms described 
earlier. 
Where does the UK sit within this framework? As a tax-funded system facing intense 
resource pressures, it is not surprising that there should have been experimentation with 
market reforms to improve efficiency. Klein et al. (1996) suggest these reforms stem from 
an interpretation that collective decision-making and lack of individual responsibility for 
paying for services inevitably lead to rationing (whatever the level of expenditure), so the 
only way to avoid it is to introduce a market system instead. Although they go on to 
expose the fallacy of assuming this would avoid rationing, their analysis of the 
government's motives sheds an interesting light on the absence of a national lead on 
explicit rationing unique amongst quasi-market experiments to date. It suggests the 
government was trying to avoid the tension between universality and comprehensiveness, 
rather than confronting it as other nations have tried to do. 
In fact the original White paper 'Working for Patients* (Secretaries of State, 1989) stated 
that health authorities as purchasers would be required to define a list of core services to 
which it was essential that local access for their local population should be maintained. 
Initially this was to cover both self-governing trusts and directly managed units, and was 
intended to be a way of ensuring that providers could not make a unilateral decision to 
withdraw from providing some services. As such it was never really meant to be a 
rationing mechanism so much as a means of regulating the market; non-core services might 
not be available locally but it was never intended they should be excluded altogether, 
unlike in other countries. Very early on in implementing the reforms, however, the 
government retreated from this position, first of all (November 1989) by applying the core 
services definition only to self-governing trusts, then eventually abandoning the term 
altogether. The reasons why it did so were not made entirely clear, although one factor 
was the technical problem of one health authority trying to impose core service 
requirements for its residents on a unit directly managed by another district. One can only 
speculate whether ministers also thought it would constrict purchasers and providers too 
much, or whether they feared it might become a rationing mechanism against their original 
intentions. 
What is clear is that there has been no national government lead on explicit rationing, 
either simultaneous with or after the introduction of the quasi-market. There is some 
national pressure towards explicit rationing emanating from academic and professional 
quarters, but this has been pursued largely in parallel with analysis of the internal market. 
In any case, the Conservative government deliberately declined to sanction such debate in 
the White Paper 'The National Health Service: A Service with Ambitions' (Secretary of 
State for Health, 1996). Although the Secretary of State made important steps towards 
acknowledging the need for priority setting, he stressed that this must be at local, not 
national level, and must not countenance total exclusion of any service that may be of 
clinical benefit. Since most treatments could benefit some patients, however remote their 
chances, this meant that in practice total exclusions are not allowed. There are no signs to 
date that the Labour government will take a different line, although it remains to be seen 
how the proposed National Institute for Clinical Effectiveness will work in practice. 
Given the lack of a national government lead on rationing so far, the UK offers the best 
opportunity internationally to analyse what impact the quasi-market has had on rationing; 
even so, the existence of other initiatives on explicit rationing at national level may be 





Secondary analysis of evidence presented to Health Select Committee 
During 1994, the Parliamentary Health Select Committee undertook an investigation of 
purchasing and priority setting. Evidence was submitted by all fourteen regional health 
authorities and 49 district health authorities, amongst others (House of Commons, 1994a, 
1994b). These responses have been analysed with particular reference to explicit rationing 
and the use of contracts in priority setting, and are then compared with the findings of the 
pilot fieldwork survey. 
Pilot fieldwork survey 
Also in 1994, a pilot fieldwork survey of 13 purchasers (8 health authorities and 5 GP 
fundholders) was carried out. The origins of this survey were that in 19941 was asked to 
supervise a research project into 'purchasing levers' for Anglia and Oxford Regional Health 
Authority; as part of this broader project I was able to include my own specific questions 
on rationing, which participants knew were for my own research. The methods used were 
an initial questionnaire, followed by a semi-structured interview of about an hour's length. 
Those interviewed as representatives of the eight authorities comprised seven directors (of 
purchasing, commissioning, contracting or planning) and one contracts manager. The 
questionnaire and interview schedule were designed by me; the interviews were carried out 
by my assistant on the project, David Welsh, and I analysed the results. The results of the 
survey have been published separately by Anglia and Oxford (Locock, 1995a), but this did 
not include the questions on rationing. These have been published previously only in my M 
Phil thesis (see note at the end of this chapter). 
Participants were asked the following questions: 
1. Do you think the introduction of the purchasing function in the NHS has made it 
easier to establish new priorities for change and development? 
2. If so, please describe how you have used your position as purchasers to establish 
new priorities. 
3. Have you established a formal list of services you have decided not to purchase or to 
purchase only on an exceptional basis? 
4. If so, what are they? 
5. If there is no formal list, have you in practice refused to purchase certain services? 
6. If so, what are they? 
7. Have you made any decisions as purchasers to limit access to services for certain 
groups of people? (e.g. those over a certain age limit, smokers) 
8. If so, please describe 
9. If you have made any decisions not to purchase certain services or to limit access to 
them, do you think you would have been able to make such decisions before 
purchasing was introduced? 
10. Has the development of the purchaser role made the rationing of services more 
explicit in your view? 
Although the pilot survey included GP fundholders, it was decided to exclude them from 
subsequent fieldwork. The purpose of the research was to compare resource allocation 
decisions before and after the introduction of the quasi-market, and disentangle how much 
the market is responsible for greater explicitness. GPs did not have responsibility for 
financial resource allocation decisions before the market, so they cannot compare their 
position as fundholders with their previous position as ordinaiy GPs. Unlike health 
authorities, they have no point of reference against which to make such comparisons, and 
therefore cannot by definition say whether the market makes them ration more explicitly. 
Of course GPs did previously have to live within the general budgetary constraints of the 
NHS, and they did make implicit rationing decisions in acting as gate-keepers to the 
service. The question of how or whether GP fundholders have rationed more explicitly is 
an appropriate topic for study but does not shed light on the hypotheses under 
investigation in this thesis. It is therefore only the findings related to health authority 
purchasers which are reported here. 
Selection and design of the three new case studies 
The approach adopted was that of purposive sampling. Time and resources available 
limited the choice of sites to three within reasonable reach of the author's home town. At 
the same time, the intention was to select authorities that fell within a middle range of 
population mix, with both urban and rural areas and without high concentrations of socio-
economic deprivation. 
Given the pressures under which health authorities are working, it was anticipated that 
there would be some difficulty in recruiting participants prepared to offer sufficient time 
and effort. An initial group of three chief executives was identified through personal 
contacts who might be willing to take part, as well as one whose authority had recently 
been involved in very high-profile rationing decisions. It was hoped that this authority 
could be compared with at least one other authority which did not have such a high 
national profile on the issue. In fact three authorities agreed to take part, including the high 
profile one. 
All three had moderate to large urban areas within them, as well as rural areas. None were 
highly deprived, although all had pockets of deprivation within them. Two of the 
authorities included a university town with associated teaching hospitals; these were Avon 
in South and West Region, and Cambridge and Huntingdon in Anglia and Oxford Region. 
The third (which has requested anonymity) was in the home counties, in a Thames Region. 
Although the diversity of the NHS is such that it would be difficult to identify a 
'representative' district, the three participating districts had no particularly unusual features, 
except for the fact that one had so recently hit the headlines with a very personalised case 
of explicit rationing. However, in terms of purchasing it is worth noting that there was a 
difference between them in the concentration of fundholding - in District Three, over three 
quarters of the population was covered by fundholding practices, whereas in Avon it was 
just over half the population and in Cambridge and Huntingdon just over a quarter. 
Some basic characteristics of each district are as follows: 














The aim of the case studies was both to obtain the views of senior NHS managers about 
the factors affecting explicit rationing and to follow the negotiations for a complete 
contracting cycle carried out during 1996/97 (for contracts for 1997/98). The first round 
of interviews was conducted from July to September 1996. All interviews were taped and 
fully transcribed before analysis. In each district, interviews were arranged with the chief 
executive and the directors of finance, public health and commissioning/contracting, as 
well as a senior registrar in public health and the deputy director of commissioning in 
Cambridge and Huntingdon. In Avon, the deputy director of contracting was interviewed, 
as the director was ill. In District Three, the director of public health had not yet taken up 
post, so the acting director was interviewed. In the same district, there were two directors 
of commissioning, each with responsibility for a geographical patch. Both were 
interviewed. 
The purpose of this round of interviews was to establish the current position in each 
district and to elicit interviewees' views of the factors affecting explicitness. Interviews 
were semi-structured, lasted between sixty and ninety minutes, and covered the following 
topics, which were notified to participants in advance: 
- Work done locally on articulating values and defining the methods to be used in 
priority-setting decisions, and how useful this had been in practice 
- Use made of research findings such as the Effectiveness Bulletins and mechanisms such 
as QALYs 
- Who was involved in the priority-setting process 
- Whether any treatments were limited or excluded, and if so on what grounds 
- Whether interviewees themselves acknowledged this as rationing 
- How explicit their rationing decisions were (e.g. explicit between managers or between 
managers and doctors, but still opaque to public) 
- Whether their rationing decisions were included in contracts, or put in writing in some 
other form 
- Whether they involved the public in their decision-making 
- To what extent advice was taken from providers 
- In whose interests interviewees thought it was to be more explicit, or to remain implicit 
- What they perceived as the driving forces in favour of greater explicitness 
Prompts: lack of money 
patient's charter 
market structure itself contracting process 
outcomes and effectiveness research 
need for democratic involvement 
- What constraints/obstacles had been encountered, and what the pressures were in 
favour of remaining implicit 
Prompts: lack of information/research evidence 
public and political opposition 
inter-professional disagreement 
ethical doubts 
- The extent to which rationing decisions were put into practice and monitored 
effectively, either through the routine contracting process or separately 
- Whether they had been able to identify any savings as a result; if so, whether it was 
worth the effort 
The interviews concluded with a forward look at their expectations for the forthcoming 
contracting cycle, and more general views about the future of explicit rationing. 
After this first round, it was concluded that directors of finance were not closely enough 
involved in the detail of rationing decisions to warrant interviewing them again, although 
this in itself was an interesting finding. 
The second round of interviews took place in January and February 1997, with the 
directors of public health and commissioning in two districts, and one director of 
commissioning only in District Three (owing to scheduling difficulties). The main aim was 
to find out how contracting negotiations were progressing and whether any further explicit 
rationing proposals were being considered, and it was felt that at this stage public health 
and commissioning would be closest to the details of the process. In addition, interviewees 
were asked to compare current practice in allocating scarce resources with practice before 
the quasi-market was established and with the early years of the market. In two districts, 
this discussion was supplemented by comparing strategic and annual planning documents 
from previous years, to see if interviewees' recollections were supported by the written 
evidence. (There were some problems in obtaining appropriate comparable documentation, 
as all three districts had undergone several boundary changes in the last ten years. This 
meant the documents supplied referred to different geographical areas to the current health 
authorities. The changes had also resulted in office moves and changes in document 
storage, and one district, Cambridge and Huntingdon, was unable to supply anything). 
The third round of interviews took place in June to July 1997. The original plan had been 
to interview the chief executive in each case, as well as the directors of public health and 
commissioning. In the event, however, one chief executive had to cancel. The third 
interviews had two main themes: firstly, to discover the final outcome of contracting 
negotiations for 1997/98, and secondly to elicit interviewees' understanding so far of the 
new Labour Government's proposals for abolishing the market, and their views on what 
effect they might have on explicit rationing. 
Throughout the research, the participating health authorities have been very helpful in 
making available as many relevant documents as possible for analysis alongside the 
interviews. These have included papers concerning the values of the health authority, 
purchasing strategies and service reviews, draft and final annual purchasing plans for 
1996/97 and 1997/98, resource assumptions and corporate contracts, as well as relevant 
samples of contracts drawn up with providers. A more detailed list is provided in the 
annexe to this chapter. 
Inclusion of material from M Phil 
The thesis incorporates material from an M Phil thesis already submitted at the University 
of Oxford, entitled 'Is the NHS market making health care rationing more explicit?' 
(Locock, 1995b). This material includes part of the literature reviews for the current 
thesis, although they have been substantially extended and updated, and the theoretical 
component has been considerably strengthened. It also includes the results of the pilot 
fieldwork survey and the analysis of evidence presented to the Health Select Committee. 
The LSE calendar [p.854] for 1995/6 states that '...a candidate shall not be precluded from 
incorporating work already submitted for a degree in this or any other university or 
institution in a thesis covering a wider field, provided that the candidate shall indicate on 
the entry form and also on the thesis any work which has been so incorporated'. I believe 
my work is consistent with this statement. 
Annexe to Chapter Five - documents made available by case study health authorities 
Avon 
Proposals for change 97/8 (consultation document) 
Budgets 97/8 
Draft proposals for managing ECRs in 97/8 
List of restricted treatments 97/8 (prepared in response to a regional office request for 
evidence to the minister of health) 
Policy seminar paper on commissioning drug interventions 1997 
Summary of service agreements 97/8 
Extracts of service specifications 97/8 
96/7 corporate contract 
Budgets 96/7 
Briefing paper for executive team on oncology, 1996 
Service specs 96/7 (including list of restricted treatments) 
Two draft statements of values, 1996 
96/7 policy for management of ECRs 
Contracts portfolio for 92/3 
Contracts portfolio for 95/6 
1986 Acute services review 
Working for a healthier future (5-year plan, 1995-2000) 
Cambridge and Huntingdon 
Draft annual plan 97/8 
Response to consultation on annual plan 97/8 
Summary of service agreements 97/8 
97/8 budget allocation summary 
97/8 contracting brief 
Acute trust contract offer, 97/8 
Acute contract exclusions, 96/7 
Indicative service levels, clinical effectiveness, part of 96/7 acute contracts 
ECR policy 96/7 
Involving the public in developing selection criteria for assisted conception treatments, 
1995 
Paper to board on citizens' juries, 1996 
Final annual plan, 96/7 
Corporate contract 96/7 
Strategic framework for acute services, 95/96 to 2001/02 
Public focus on rationing in the NHS: report on findings from focus groups, 1996 
Purpose, roles, value, working practice and strategy, 1996 
District Three 
Funding plan and proposals for service developments 97/8 
Health and healthcare plan 97/8 
Purchasing plan 96/7 
Contract stocktake 97/8 
Contracts portfolio 96/7 (including contract exclusions, ECR referral policy, low priority 
treatments list, subfertility treatment policy) 
Corporate contract and workplan, 96/7 
Principles for making choices, 1995 
Strategy for acute services 1989 
County-wide acute services review 1993 
Hospital closure consultation document 1993 
Annual report and public health report 1991/2 
Developing a strategy for involving local people in purchasing health care 1991 
Chapter Six 
Early experience of explicit rationing and the NHS quasi-market 
This chapter summarises early experiences of explicit rationing and the internal market, as 
viewed by local actors. It begins with an analysis of regional health authorities* perceptions 
of experiences within their constituent district health authorities, and then examines district 
health authorities' own accounts. This draws on a secondary analysis of evidence presented 
by regional and district health authorities to the health select committee investigation of 
purchasing and priority setting in 1994 (House of Commons, 1994a, 1994b), and on the 
results of a pilot fieldwork survey of eight health authority purchasers, also carried out in 
1994. The chapter concludes by comparing these findings with the findings of the NAHAT 
analyses of purchasing plans carried out over several years by Klein et al. at the University 
of Bath (Klein and Redmayne, 1992; Redmayne, Klein and Day, 1993; Redmayne, 1995; 
Redmayne, 1996). 
Regional health authority perceptions - evidence to the health select committee 
The questionnaire sent to regional health authorities by the health select committee asked a 
total of 23 questions about the experiences of their constituent districts, of which two were 
particularly relevant to the subject of explicit rationing and the market. These were : 
Question 7 - What examples are there within your region of explicit policies by local 
purchasers to exclude certain services from NHS provision, or to discourage the provision 
of certain services? 
Question 11 - What examples are there of contracts placed by local purchasers in your 
region which seek to ensure the purchase of effective care and discourage ineffective 
procedures? 
Some of the evidence from regional health authorities inevitably overlaps with the district 
responses, and the districts they refer to are not always identified. This should be borne in 
mind when reading this analysis. Mersey region did not address either question directly and 
responded to the questionnaire in a different format than that used by the select committee. 
The other thirteen all gave direct answers, which are summarised in Table 6.1. 
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The question of whether ceasing to provide ineffective care does or does not constitute 
rationing is an immediate problem in trying to analyse these regional responses. NW 
Thames clearly felt that ceasing ineffective care was an alternative to rationing; SW 
Thames, on the other hand, regarded using clinical appropriateness to limit access to 
services as acceptable rationing, but rationing nonetheless. 
Further confusion arises from different interpretations of the term 'exclude certain 
services'. SE and SW Thames both took the Department of Health line that total 
exclusions of procedures that might have some clinical benefit was unacceptable; they 
argued that limiting access to certain procedures or to certain groups of people on clinical 
criteria was acceptable and did not constitute exclusion. Other regions took a less 
politically sensitive line, and described policies virtually identical to those in SE and SW 
Thames as exclusions, even if a limited number of people were in fact treated. 
Whatever the intricacies of the language used to present what they were doing in an 
acceptable light, it is clear from this survey of regional health authorities that all over the 
country attempts were being made to draw up explicit specifications of what care would or 
would not be available. Several regions also stated that they believed more districts would 
soon be taking this approach and that it would be extended to a wider range of services, 
although it was currently fairly limited in scope. This was supported by the fact that, 
although most of the procedures listed as being rationed were the common targets such as 
fertility treatment, cosmetic procedures and sex change operations, there were already a 
few interesting additions to the list, including: 
- non-clinical circumcision, or circumcision for children under 5 years of age 
- treatment for clumsy children [sic] 
- surgical treatment for impotence in men over 50 
- antenatal triple test for Down's syndrome 
- care at the interface between health and social services. 
It is also possible that regions were not fully aware of the extent of rationing within their 
districts. For example, one named district was said by its regional health authority to have 
no policy of exclusions, yet this district was also one of the participants in my own survey 
and reported several exclusions. 
Some other points of interest arise from the regional responses. Several regions mentioned 
the use of low volume contracts or fixed amounts of money to limit access to certain 
services such as IVF or cosmetic surgery. This is perhaps best described as a more explicit 
form of rationing by waiting list; it relies on a first come, first served principle, with no 
selection criteria applied to patients, but is targeted much more explicitly on single 
procedures than pre-market waiting lists and is determined by purchasers rather than 
clinicians. One district was reportedly operating a 'secondary waiting list' within its overall 
plastic surgery list, so that people wanting cosmetic surgery had to wait longer than 
anyone else, although they were still treated within the maximum times set out in the 
Patient's Charter. Another district which was said to exclude surgery for varicose veins 
either for cosmetic reasons or for discomfort nonetheless allowed GPs to continue to refer 
some patients at their discretion, a situation which sounds very similar to the traditional 
role of the GP as gate-keeper. 
District health authority perceptions - evidence to the health select committee 
Of the 49 district health authorities which gave evidence to the select committee, 5 were 
also participants in my own survey (see below). Their responses are included in the 
following analysis, as in some cases the information supplied is different or more detailed, 
but they will not be identified in order to preserve the confidentiality of their answers to 
my survey. 
The relevant questions from the questionnaire for districts were: 
Question 10 - Has your authority decided to exclude specific services from its contracts, 
e.g. tattoo removal, reversal of sterilisation? If so, which services have been excluded and 
why? 
Question 11 - Has the authority made use of clinical guidelines or protocols designed to 
limit the provision of services to particular patients? If so, please give examples and 
reasons. 
Question 14 - What contracts has your authority placed to ensure the purchase of effective 
care and to discourage ineffective procedures? 
Question 15 - Has your authority made use of the Effective Care Bulletins produced by the 
Department of Health? If so, please give examples of which ones have been used and how 
this has changed the provision of services. 
The sheer number of responses from districts makes presentation of each one individually 
unwieldy; the summary in Table 6.2 therefore takes the form of counting how many 
authorities fell into certain categories identified from the responses. 
TABLE 6.2 
DISTRICT HEALTH AUTHORITY RESPONSES TO HEALTH SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
Arrangements operating Number of Districts 
Districts claiming no exclusions 21 
Of these, the number in fact operating 
some form of exclusions 16 
Districts reporting exclusions 28 
Of these, the number which in fact 
mentioned that they allow some exceptions 19 
Districts stating purpose of clinical 
guidelines should not be to limit access 27 
Of these, the number in fact limiting access to services 23 
Districts agreeing that purpose of guidelines 
may be to limit access 22 
These categories require some explanation. It will be seen from the table that a high 
proportion of those claiming not to operate exclusions in their district did in fact operate 
some (according to their own evidence), and conversely that a high proportion of those 
stating they did operate exclusions in fact allowed exceptions to be made. In practice, what 
this means is that most of the districts did exercise some form of rationing or limitation of 
access to services, and that most of them also allowed exceptions to be made for a variety 
of reasons. 
Only 5 of the districts claiming no exclusions at all did not go on to qualify this in some 
way. Of the districts which did report exclusions, 3 made no mention of exceptions being 
allowed for any of the procedures excluded, using expressions such as 'from 1st April 
1993, the DHA has not funded IVF or 'Gloucestershire Health does not make funds 
available for tattoo removal', with no qualifications. A further 6 reported that they allowed 
exceptions for some excluded procedures but not all. 2 districts which were currently 
operating a total ban on IVF treatments were reconsidering their position on the grounds 
that IVF was potentially effective for some women. 
What made one district describe itself as having no exclusions whilst another with identical 
policies was ready to state that it did have exclusions seemed to be almost entirely a 
question of semantic emphasis, rather than substantial difference. Some districts chose to 
take the word 'exclusion' at face value, as meaning that absolutely no-one had access to a 
specific treatment, whereas others defined it more liberally as meaning that the treatment 
was normally excluded unless there were overriding reasons why an exception should be 
made, or that it was only available to selected groups of people. (These groups were 
usually those who would derive the greatest clinical benefit from it, but in some cases 
access was restricted purely by a fixed number of treatments being provided, on a first-
come, first-served basis). 
As with the regional evidence to the select committee, the question of whether excluding 
supposedly ineffective treatments amounted to rationing was not easily resolved. When 
asked about the use of clinical guidelines or protocols to limit the provision of services to 
particular patients, most districts stressed that their primary aim was to improve 
effectiveness and appropriateness, rather than to limit services. Even amongst those who 
did acknowledge that limiting services might be an acceptable aim, most emphasised that 
this was not the sole purpose, and that it was a by-product of more appropriate targeting 
of services on those who would derive the greatest benefit. 
Only a few gave open recognition to the use of protocols to exclude treatments which 
might be effective but do not have high priority in the competition for limited resources. 
For example, Blackpool, Wyre and Fylde's evidence stated that: 
'Clinical protocols apply to Preston residents for the provision of certain plastic 
surgery work. This is on the basis that demand far outstrips supply, and it is 
therefore considered inappropriate for social medicine to be undertaken from NHS 
funding.' 
United Health (Grimsby and Scunthorpe Health Authority) said it had excluded services 
'which are of a cosmetic nature or where a procedure is desirable but not necessary'. A 
few others made the distinction between excluding procedures on the grounds of'low 
priority' (such as cosmetic operations) and excluding them because of poor effectiveness 
(such as sterilisation reversal). 
Other authorities tended to couch all exclusions in terms of the lack of health gain they 
would bring. Gloucestershire Health Authority, for instance, stated that it did not make 
funds available for certain services 'on the basis that the inability to secure these services 
does not constitute a threat to the health of the individual or the population of 
Gloucestershire.' 
The list of procedures being excluded (whether partially or totally) was in the main the 
familiar territory of cosmetic surgery, infertility treatments of various kinds, sex change 
and alternative/complementary therapies. In addition, a few districts mentioned the 
exclusion of radial keratomy (an operation for treating short sight), cochlear implants to 
correct deafness, dental implants and extraction of asymptomatic wisdom teeth. One 
authority had introduced eligibility criteria for a number of orthopaedic operations, 
including the provision of total joint replacement only for restriction of activity or 
persistent pain interfering with sleep and work. Another had decided that lower back pain 
was best treated by physiotherapy and psychological counselling, and had therefore 
restricted the availability of surgery for this condition. A third had excluded 'non-orthodox 
obstetrics', although no explanation of this was given. 
The use of clinical guidelines and the Effectiveness Bulletins issued by the Department of 
Health had also led to a number of districts restricting the availability of operations for 
glue ear in children, dilatation and curettage in women under 40, and routine screening for 
osteoporosis and cholesterol levels. Although information on clinical effectiveness was 
frequently mentioned as the reason for restricting infertility services, several districts had 
also included social criteria in their protocols, such as whether the woman had a partner, 
and whether both partners were childless. 
There is little further information to be added from the discussions that took place at select 
committee hearings attended by eleven of the participating districts. There was uncertainty 
and disagreement about the role of the public in helping to make rationing decisions, and 
about the potential for central government to issue national guidelines on what care should 
or should not be excluded. Some felt this would be helpful, particularly to overcome the 
dilemma of inequity between different districts, whereas others felt strongly that local 
needs and circumstances should be the deciding factor. 
Several expressed concern that the information on effectiveness on which many of their 
rationing decisions relied was in fact weak and available only for a very few areas. In the 
words of North Cumbria's representative, 'a problem is that we may be trying to make 
objective decisions about things that simply cannot, with our present knowledge, be made 
into objective decisions.' The disagreement evident from the questionnaires as to whether 
restricting services on the basis of lack of effectiveness constituted rationing found no 
resolution in the Committee's discussions. 
The select committee evidence is not very informative on the relation between the market 
and explicit rationing. Respondents were asked some questions about their purchasing 
practice, including those noted above concerning the use of effectiveness evidence in 
contracts, as well as questions about contract monitoring, performance monitoring and 
strategic shifts being achieved by purchasing. The underlying assumption of the entire 
review seems to have been that purchasing must be having some effect on the style of 
priority setting, and that this needed to be investigated. However, or perhaps precisely 
because of this underlying assumption, the questions were not structured in such a way as 
to explore how any causal relationship between purchasing and rationing might be 
working, and to what extent other causal factors might be involved. The answers given 
were correspondingly unenlightening, and tended to focus on good intentions and success 
stories. Blackpool, Wyre and Fylde's assessment of the impact of purchasing is typical: it 
has resulted in 'a shift towards primary care, the greater development of mental health 
services, a shift towards GP support and the furtherance of Health of the Nation targets, 
including changes in practice agreed with providers.' 
District health authority perceptions - pilot fieldwork survey results 
The following section contains an analysis of responses to part of a survey on approaches 
to purchasing carried out on behalf of the Anglia and Oxford Regional Health Authority in 
1994. Eight health authorities and five GP fundholders took part. Only that part of the 
fieldwork which related to rationing by health authorities is analysed here. (See Chapter 
Five for further details on methodology). 
Every health authority which participated in the survey was operating some kind of explicit 
rationing. The most common targets of explicit rationing were similar to those identified in 
the evidence to the select committee, namely assisted conception, cosmetic surgery and 
reversal of sterilisation, and less commonly gender reassignment, psychotherapy, insertion 
of grommets and surgery for obesity. 
A summary of participants' responses is given in Table 6.3 for ease of reference, and a 
more detailed analysis follows, based on the questions used in the survey. 
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Only one authority had no formal list of services which it would not purchase, although it 
did limit access to certain groups of people (see later discussion). All the others had formal 
lists. 
District 1 did not purchase assisted conception services, a decision taken on financial 
grounds. Since taking the decision, the authority had merged with another to form a new 
health commission; the second authority did purchase assisted conception, and it was 
unclear how this discrepancy would be resolved. District 1 had experienced some cases of 
GPs trying to by-pass the ban by referring direct to specialist centres, and was therefore 
tightening up its procedures for monitoring such referrals. A further difficulty was that 
some patients had been referred privately for assisted conception and started treatment, 
and then applied to transfer to the NHS for continuation of the treatment, which was 
proving difficult to refuse. 
Apart from assisted conception there were no other absolute exclusions in District 1, 
although certain treatments such as insertion of grommets were designated for exceptional 
use only, on the grounds that they were of limited clinical value. 
District 3 was formed by the merger of two smaller authorities and was still trying to 
reconcile the different policies it had inherited. In one of the previous authorities, a 
comparatively extensive list of excluded procedures had been developed, including some 
psychotherapy services, surgery for obesity and service costs of unapproved research 
projects and clinical trials, as well as the more usual fertility and cosmetic surgery services. 
The list was adopted by the new merged authority, but there remained differences in 
implementation in the two halves of the authority. For example, exceptional requests for 
cosmetic surgery are decided through an informal discussion between clinicians and public 
health in one part of the authority, but in the other a scoring system operates. 
District 4 reported an outright ban on cosmetic surgery procedures and also explicitly 
restricted purchasing of IVF and D&C (see section on limited access). It also operated a 
scoring system for oral/dental referrals; any cases falling below a certain score were 
referred back to a community dentist. 
In District 5, explicit rationing was directed at cosmetic surgery and IVF. 
District 6 had a formal protocol limiting access to IVF (see section on limited access 
below). Cosmetic surgery would only be approved if supported by an independent 
psychiatric report. Laparoscopic hernia repair was restricted in certain circumstances; the 
reason given was that one particular surgeon was 'clogging up his list' by attracting extra 
referrals for it, but 'there were not adequate clinical reasons to make it the only way of 
doing hernia repair.' This is an interesting example of intervention in an individual doctor's 
clinical practice. 
In District 7, explicit rationing was aimed at 'the easy stuff, namely the insertion of 
grommets, IVF and cosmetic surgery. The fact that the authority had been receiving 
growth funding was recognised as a factor affecting its approach to rationing, in that it had 
not had to make many difficult choices so far. 'We can engineer change by targeting 
growth money to a large extent.' 
District 8's interview was affected by poor taping quality, and there is therefore less 
information than for some of the other authorities. It had a formal list of treatments not 
purchased, covering gender assignment, sterilisation reversal and cosmetic surgery (which 
the respondent said constituted 60% of all plastic surgery activity nationally before the 
reforms). 
Rationing in practice 
The respondents in Districts 3 and 4 reported that on rare occasions extra contractual 
referrals had been refused on the basis of the clinical judgement of the director of public 
health and other clinical advice, but without any kind of formal rationing policy to back up 
the decision. The fact that other respondents did not mention this cannot necessarily be 
taken as proof that it was not happening in their authorities too, however. 
Limiting access to certain groups 
Three respondents reported formal policies limiting access to certain groups of people, and 
others felt it was a likely future development in their areas or suggested it was already 
happening at a clinical level. 
Looking first at those which did have formal policies, District 2 described fairly complex 
restrictions on certain contentious areas, including IVF and cosmetic plastic surgery. On 
the subject of IVF, the respondent said: 
'we have got a set of criteria about how long the couple have to have been 
together, indeed do they have to be a couple at all, about whether they have got 
any previous children on either side and all the rest of it. But if you fulfil the criteria 
then you join the waiting list and we fund about 30-40 treatments a year .... To my 
surprise in some ways, given we have a number of social criteria, the medical 
profession as a whole seems to recognise that it is as fair and equitable a way as we 
are going to come up with and we don't get the policy challenged any more.' 
This represents a mixture of explicit rationing to certain groups of people who do not meet 
the criteria for eligibility and rationing by the traditional waiting list mechanism. 
The respondent stressed that although he was comfortable with the idea of protocols 
defining who should be eligible for treatment he felt there should be an appeal or some sort 
of discretionary mechanism. He used the example of laser treatment for port wine stain 
birthmarks. The authority's protocol gave priority to children between the ages of two and 
eighteen with birthmarks on their face or neck, within a fixed budget for the procedure. 
This had been overridden to allow treatment of a teenage girl with a port wine stain on her 
thigh because she was suffering psychological damage from taunting at school. 
He expressed concern at the idea that in some authorities 'essentially a couple of officers 
are deciding somewhere that a patient won't get treatment, and I do not think that is 
ethical, to be quite honest.' This represented to him a continuing kind of implicit rationing, 
but with managers rather than doctors making decisions, on financial grounds. It was for 
this reason that he preferred an overt policy. He did not appear to acknowledge that using 
managerial discretion to override that overt policy amounted to the very approach he was 
criticising; this may have been because he felt it was more evident in his case where 
responsibility for the decision lay, but he did accept that some of his colleagues saw him as 
'slightly heretic' and were uncomfortable with the lack of clarity about how appeals should 
be made. 
His defence of the need for overt, 'rational' policies was still set very clearly within a 
framework of human judgement and value-based decision-making. He felt using computer 
packages to draw up a quasi-scientific ranked list of priorities was 'retreating behind 
methodologies'; the question of whether the NHS should be comprehensive must remain 
primarily a moral debate, and part of his job as a public servant was to ensure the debate 
took place. In many cases, he felt a national decision-making process would have been 
better than local variation. 
He felt more comfortable with more subjective judgements about rationing made by GPs in 
the light of their working experience. He described an occasion when GPs met with a local 
cardiologist and said in effect, 'will you please stop scraping up senile 75 year-old people 
off the pavements and bunging pacemakers in? It's a bloody nonsense. What I want is more 
district nursing.' The respondent felt this was a sensible stance, but not one that could have 
been built into a rational view of priorities. 
However, he was uncertain what part, if any, the public should play in this debate. His 
particular concern was that it would be easy for majority groups to discriminate against the 
health needs of minorities, and suggested for instance that in an authority with a large 
concentration of elderly people, there would probably be little support for infertility 
services for younger, otherwise healthy people. 
In District 4, a decision had been made not to purchase the gynaecological procedure of 
dilatation and curettage (D&C) for women under the age of 40. This was felt to be 
justified primarily on the grounds of lack of clinical effectiveness, although saving money 
was also an important aim. 
The authority was preparing a formal protocol for rationing IVF, and a version of it was 
already operating informally. The eligibility criteria encompassed the woman's age and the 
number of previous IVF attempts - only three attempts per individual would be funded -
and did not include any social criteria, such as the length and stability of the couple's 
relationship. These criteria were agreed by a public meeting of the health authority but had 
yet to be put in final written form. The protocol would also include a list of preferred 
providers to which referrals must be made, and this too was already working informally. 
GPs would not be allowed to refer a woman directly for IVF, but would have to refer her 
to a particular hospital infertility clinic. Doctors at the clinic would then decide whether to 
refer on to a specialist IVF centre. Again, the criteria were based on clinical effectiveness 
as well as the need to limit expenditure - the respondent described it as a waste of money 
to buy treatments with a low success rate, but emphasised that social criteria were 
excluded from the protocol because they had no bearing on clinical effectiveness. 
District 6 also had a formal and quite detailed protocol rationing access to IVF4 which 
included social as well as clinical criteria. Women seeking IVF must be under 38 and must 
be in a stable relationship of at least three years' duration. Both partners must be childless. 
The total amount available each year was cash-limited, within which treatment was 
available on a first-come first-served basis. GPs were not permitted to make direct referrals 
for IVF, but had to channel their referrals through one of two hospital contracts. No extra 
contractual referrals were allowed. 
Prior to this protocol the authority had had no service within its boundaries, and had 
largely ignored the problem, funding the occasional extra contractual referral if put under 
sufficient pressure. It was then decided that 'we needed something a bit more formal so 
that people knew where they were. Either we were going to do something or we weren't. 
If we weren't, we would have to say so.' It was clear that there was more demand for the 
service than the authority could afford, so some selection criteria had to be established. 
The respondent did not regard the criteria eventually selected as particularly fair, 'all 
criteria are going to be unfair to somebody, and if you are 38 and one month and you miss 
out, or if your now husband had a child by a partner 20 years ago, long since forgotten, it 
is not fair.' However, he felt that it was defensible for two main reasons. Firstly, because 
the authority had been receiving growth funding it could afford to invest in a new service 
without having to cut any other service, and it had been able to maintain relatively low 
waiting times for most of its services. This meant it could say to the public 'that nobody 
requiring a hip replacement will not get it as a result of this investment.' In addition, it had 
given a positive emphasis to the fact that it was investing in a new service for local women 
where previously none had existed, and publicly played down the restrictions on access. 
Turning now to the authorities with no formal policies limiting access to certain treatments 
for specific groups of people, the respondent in District 1 believed clinical decisions of that 
nature were taken, with doctors refusing to operate on people who are grossly overweight 
or delaying treatment for smokers unless and until they give up smoking, on the grounds 
that it would not be effective if they continued to smoke. District 8 also stated that any 
rationing to groups of people on the basis of age or lifestyle, if it is taking place, is done 
purely by consultants and the authority has made no formal decisions in this area. 
The respondent in District 3 thought individual purchasers trying to restrict services in 
their area to those over a certain age, for example, were on dangerous ground and very 
vulnerable to criticism from providers, especially provider clinicians. Although he believed 
continuing financial restrictions would eventually force purchasers to set clearer criteria 
about who should be eligible for, say, heart surgery or renal transplant, he felt this was an 
issue where purchasers needed to agree a joint line and support each other locally or even 
nationally, if possible. 
Assuming that current trends towards greater explicitness would continue, the respondent 
in District 5 expected that rationing targeted at specific groups of people such as smokers 
could become a reality within three to four years. He thought the alternative of leaving 
everything to the value judgements of clinicians was 'not a bad thing in some respects', but 
that something more explicit would probably be needed in future. He, too, was concerned 
that some sort of collaboration between purchasers or a national policy was needed to 
avoid geographical variations in what was available. Some differences in the how much 
service was available would be acceptable, in response to local circumstances. 
The effects of the market on rationing 
All the authorities which answered this point (7 of the 8) agreed that the development of 
the purchasing role has made rationing more explicit, although they were not unanimous 
about whether they could have made such explicit decisions before the introduction of the 
market. 
The respondent in District 1 felt that rationing was now becoming more overt because of 
the split of purchasers and providers into two separate organisations with different, 
sometimes conflicting interests. This he felt made it solely the responsibility of purchasers 
to make rationing decisions and to make clear to the public which items fell below the cut-
off point on its list of priorities. Significantly, however, he pointed out that the local 
exclusion of assisted conception pre-dated the purchaser/provider split and had been in 
place for a number of years. It had been agreed jointly with providers and compliance had 
been good. His point was that it had been possible to take explicit rationing decisions 
before the market was introduced, but that the role of purchaser made it easier or at least 
more likely that such decision would be made and that they would be explicit not just 
within the NHS but to the public at large. 
The respondent from District 3 said in the questionnaire that these kind of rationing 
decisions could not have been made before the introduction of the market, because 'I don't 
think the focus or information was available at that time.' At interview he elaborated that 
being required to set up contracts and to monitor extra contractual referrals had given 
purchasers a whole new set of information about what service activity was taking place -
before that 'we had no idea what was going on, did we?' Thus although theoretically an 
old-style district planning department could have taken a decision not to fund sterilisation 
reversal, it had simply not found its way onto the agenda. 
He believed the market had also brought discussions between purchasers and providers 
into sharper focus, by linking funding much more directly to activity. This meant 
purchasers now had greater leverage over providers to make sure that any rationing 
decisions they took were actually implemented. 
The respondent from District 4 felt such decisions could have been taken before the 
introduction of the market but she was not sure if they would have been. She felt that the 
market had created a climate in which such decision-making processes were more likely. 
However, she added that so far this effect was operating 'only to an extremely limited 
degree - GPs and clinicians still act largely as responsible gate-keepers.' In other words, 
the great majority of rationing decisions were still being made implicitly, on the basis of 
clinical judgement. 
In District 5, it was not solely the market that had brought about rationing of cosmetic 
surgery; it was a combination of responsibility for the contract being devolved to them 
from the regional health authority, and the introduction of the Patient's Charter. Plastic 
surgeons had used long waiting times as an implicit rationing mechanism, giving people 
with cosmetic surgery requirements lower priority than others. By imposing a maximum 
waiting time, the Patient's Charter exposed this situation, and the authority had to fund 
treatment for cosmetic cases in order to clear their waiting lists. This led to greater 
questioning of the kinds of operation being undertaken; since the implicit mechanism of 
long waiting times was no longer available, a more explicit alternative had to be found. 
On the other hand, the authority's decision to ration IVF explicitly was a direct result of 
the introduction of the market. Because previously there had been no IVF provision within 
its boundaries, it had not been a financial issue, even though residents were able to obtain 
treatment in other districts. The setting up of the market meant the authority had to take 
on responsibility for funding all treatments for their residents, wherever they were treated. 
Following a detailed public health analysis of the costs of achieving a successful 'take home 
baby', it was decided not to fund any IVF, although it was recognised that this was a 
difficult and 'political' decision. 
This respondent also felt that such decisions could have been made before the introduction 
of purchasing, but that the new system made them more likely and more explicit. Again, he 
pointed to the increased information made available through contracting as a crucial factor. 
Public health departments had also found the market a stimulus to undertake more detailed 
analyses of effectiveness. However, in a situation of static funding, new priorities identified 
by public health could only be funded by ceasing to purchase some other treatments and 
getting agreement on this remained very difficult. 
In contrast, the respondent from District 7 believed these kinds of decisions could not have 
been made before the introduction of the market. He felt that the use of protocols was 
likely to be extended to other areas in the near future; this would involve looking at clinical 
outcomes and effectiveness. However, he was not convinced that this amounted to 
rationing, but was more a question of providing appropriate care and challenging 
traditional practices. He believed the market was making previously implicit rationing 
mechanisms more explicit; extra contractual referrals exposed areas where local services 
were inadequate, resulting in people seeking care elsewhere. The imposition of maximum 
waiting times was also given as an example of new explicitness being given to old rationing 
methods, although again this was more a result of the Patient's Charter than the market. 
The key difference between the old system and the new market system was again identified 
as the availability of clearer information about the levels and types of activity going on, 
although it was noted that there are still flaws in the information process and that 
occasionally excluded procedures are performed before anyone realises. Increased 
knowledge, coupled with the firm linking of activity with money through contracts, has 
given purchasers much greater control and an explicit framework within which to organise 
change and make rationing decisions. 
However, the existence of a clearer framework did not in itself make the hard decisions 
any easier. The authority recognised that growth money would probably dry up soon and 
that it would then come to a 'crunch point', when new services could only be set up if 
something else were rationed. For example, the authority was considering whether to 
reverse its ban on IVF and introduce some form of service, but 'the only way we could 
achieve that would be by pruning something else out.' 
Finally, the respondent from District 8 also believed that purchasing was making rationing 
more explicit, and that the authority's current list of exclusions would have been impossible 
before the reforms because consultants would simply have refused to accept it and there 
would have been few ways of persuading them otherwise. Contracts now provided an 
effective lever to change behaviour - although despite this, the authority was apparently 
still unable to prevent one plastic surgeon from continuing to perform an excluded 
procedure. 
However, although the market may have provided a mechanism to undertake explicit 
rationing, it was certainly not the sole cause. The respondent estimated that the Patient's 
Charter was about 70% responsible for the list of exclusions, because it had forced people 
to start prioritising. 
Key points from pilot survey 
• all the health authorities interviewed were carrying out some form of explicit rationing 
• all but one had a formal policy stating which services would not normally be purchased 
(the 'what' question), although many of these policies allowed for clinical exceptions to 
be made 
• in many cases, eligibility criteria or scoring systems were in use to determine who 
would have access to services (the 'for whom' question) 
• sometimes a decision had been taken to limit the amount of a particular service 
available, either in financial or activity terms (the 'how much' question). 
• although a few of the exclusions cited pre-dated the market, most were instituted after 
the reforms took place 
• the point was made that in many cases explicit decisions were merely formalising 
implicit rationing that was already taking place 
• the most commonly given reasons for decisions not to provide a particular service 
were financial pressures and evidence of low clinical effectiveness; it was queried by 
some whether decisions taken on the grounds of low effectiveness constituted 
rationing 
• whilst some participants in the survey felt it might have been possible to take such 
decisions before the development of the purchasing function, most felt they would not 
have been taken in practice, and the general consensus was that the market was making 
rationing more explicit 
• the purchaser provider split, greater availability of information and the ability to 
monitor and enforce rationing decisions through contracts were all seen as market-
related factors contributing to greater explicitness 
• in some cases, districts had been prompted to clarify conflicting policies following a 
merger with another district 
• the Patient's Charter had also increased explicitness by closing off the option of 
rationing by waiting lists 
• despite all this, implicit rationing through clinical decision-making was still 
predominant 
The survey findings on the nature and extent of rationing being carried out by purchasers 
are consistent with the evidence presented to the select committee, and confirm that there 
is considerable blurring of the definition of'exclusion'. 
NAHAT analyses of purchasing plans 
How do the findings presented so far compare with other analyses undertaken at the same 
stage of market development? Despite an increase during the early 1990s in the amount of 
theoretical work being done on explicit rationing, and growing media interest in individual 
high profile rationing cases, there was remarkably little empirical work undertaken. The 
early evaluation of the NHS reforms funded by the King's Fund (Robinson and Le Grand, 
1994) provided the most comprehensive view of the development of the market, but did 
not directly address the question of explicit rationing and how significantly it was being 
affected by the market. 
The most relevant empirical findings come from the series of analyses of the health 
authority annual purchasing plans commissioned over the last five years by the National 
Association of Health Authorities and Trusts (NAHAT) and carried out by Klein and 
colleagues at Bath University (Klein and Redmayne, 1992; Redmayne, Klein and Day, 
1993; Redmayne, 1995; Redmayne, 1996). The lessons from these studies are drawn 
together in the authors' most recent book, 'Managing Scarcity' (Klein, Day and Redmayne, 
1996). The most recent of these analyses concerns the purchasing plans for 1995/96, for 
which work would have started in late 1994, the same year as the select committee 
investigation and the pilot fieldwork survey. 
The authors' assessment is that, in the first year studied (purchasing plans for 1992/93), 
health authorities were beginning to tackle the 'what' question and redefine the boundaries 
of the NHS's responsibilities, 'if only implicitly and unconsciously', by listing procedures 
which they would not purchase (Klein et al, 1996, p.70). This 'explicit rationing by denial 
was very much at the margins of NHS activity' (p. 69), comprising mainly cosmetic 
surgery, sterilisation reversal, assisted conception, gender reassignment and alternative 
medicine. The authors also point out that 'the criterion used seems to have been not so 
much whether the procedures were technically effective but whether they represented 
activities appropriate for a publicly funded health care system' (p.70), with a particular 
emphasis on self-inflicted problems such as tattoos and conditions where need is defined 
not by doctors but by the patient, such as cosmetic surgery. These findings are consistent 
with the evidence presented to the select committee and the findings of the pilot survey. 
Over the next two years neither the number of health authorities reporting explicit 
rationing by denial nor the procedures concerned varied greatly, although some new 
procedures were added to the list, such as screening for prostate cancer and several 
instances of varicose veins. The authors suggest this means there was little increase in 
explicit rationing during this period, although there are some possible objections to 
accepting this suggestion. Firstly, it is not clear whether the purchasers identified each year 
as undertaking rationing were the same as those in previous years or in addition to them. 
Purchasing plans focus mainly on changes the authority proposes to make the following 
year, and it would be unusual for a purchasing plan to repeat descriptions of changes made 
the previous year. Thus each year it could be a new set of purchasers announcing that they 
are planning explicit rationing measures, which would indicate an increase in rationing 
activity, albeit not a very great increase. 
The second problem is a related one: because purchasing plans are not fully comprehensive 
statements of services purchased, one cannot be sure that all authorities practising explicit 
rationing actually included it in their purchasing plans. The decision might already have 
been made part-way through the previous year at a meeting of the health authority 
members, and would therefore not necessarily find its way into a statement of next year's 
plans. Alternatively, the authority might simply have been reluctant to declare its rationing 
policies in such a public document as its purchasing plan, even though they were 
formalised and explicit within the Authority - this links back to the argument in Chapter 
Three that there is a continuum from implicit to explicit. 
Nonetheless, the suggestion that explicit rationing remained a marginal activity is 
consistent with the findings already reported in this chapter, and it is unlikely that the 
objections discussed above would result in a serious under-estimate of the extent of 
explicit rationing. 
Even if the extent and range of rationing did not change radically, Klein and colleagues 
note a marked shift in the manner of presentation, perhaps reflecting the reluctance of 
health authorities to get into an entrenched and very public position. Outright, explicit 
denial, they argue, risks provoking the anger not only of patients but also of doctors who 
see it as a challenge to their clinical autonomy. It could be added that it also risks 
provoking the wrath of the NHS Executive, which has become increasingly insistent that 
total exclusion of any potentially beneficial service is not acceptable. (See, for example, 
Secretary of State for Health, 1996). 
They suggest that, in response to medical objections that the effectiveness of any given 
treatment is dependent on the individual circumstances, the NHS had moved away from 
'limiting the NHS menu' to 'specifying the conditions of eligibility for treatment in co-
operation with the medical profession. In effect, the criteria were re-medicalized' (Klein et 
al., 1996, p.71). This reverted to a more traditional division of responsibilities between 
meso and micro levels of rationing, with doctors deciding how to turn broad allocation 
decisions into detailed implementation. However, there was a shift towards more collective 
medical decision-making based on effectiveness evidence and expressed through guidelines 
and protocols, rather than purely individual clinical judgements of what is appropriate and 
effective. 
This certainly matches with the evidence already presented on the ambivalence 
surrounding the term 'exclusion', and the very widespread existence of exception clauses. 
Klein et al. note a further but consistent shift in 1995/96 purchasing plans towards an 
increasing emphasis on effectiveness. The number of health authorities reporting 
exclusions (but with the all-important let-out clause of exceptions on clinical grounds) was 
increasing, as was the number of different procedures. However, some of the latter 
increase resulted from unpacking generic categories such as cosmetic surgery into specific 
procedures, and they remained largely marginal NHS activities. The emphasis on 
effectiveness was also leading to more discussion of reducing some procedures, rather than 
excluding them, and was making purchasers more cautious about new technologies such as 
beta interferon. 
The authors conclude that this phase represented 'a partial retreat from explicit rationing 
by exclusion. The veil of clinical judgement had proved too useful to discard...Services and 
procedures would not be struck off the NHS menu but given low priority in resource 
allocation. And within restricted resource envelopes, clinicians would decide whom to 
treat, and how, according to their own criteria of appropriateness. Science, it seems, had 
come to the rescue of scarcity, offering a new legitimation of selectivity. Patients would be 
turned away not because resources were scarce but because treatment would not be 
appropriate in their case' (p,73). 
It is important to re-iterate, however, the authors' point that clinician-led rationing is no 
longer the entirely individual and implicit enterprise it once was. The retreat from explicit 
rationing by exclusion is not so much to implicit rationing, as to explicit rationing by 
thresholds or by selection. Thresholds for treatment will be set on the basis of effectiveness 
or severity of the condition; the general criteria for determining whether a patient is above 
or below the threshold may be explicit, but their application will be informed by clinical 
discretion and the circumstances of the individual case. This finds an echo amongst many 
contributors to the current debate who favour the idea that doctors should exercise 
professional leadership in rationing, but within an explicit, collective framework, (e.g. New 
and Le Grand, 1996; Lenaghan, 1996). 
Although Klein et al. (1996) thus demonstrate that explicit rationing (in some form or 
another) is a growing feature in the NHS, they suggest that the internal market might have 
been expected to produce much greater explicitness than it in fact has. This they describe 
as 'apparent failure to follow the logic of the 1991 reforms' (p. 50), although they point out 
that the supposed 'logic' of the reforms may always have been unrealistic. Political and 
public unwillingness to countenance a challenge to the comprehensive, universal principles 
of the NHS, coupled with the practical problem of trying to reconcile hard and fast explicit 
rationing decisions with the need for clinical judgements about individual cases, were 
bound to constrain the effects of the quasi-market to some extent. 
However, whilst it may be true that the market has not made rationing as explicit as might 
have been expected initially, it may still have made it more explicit than it would have been 
had the market never been established. The evidence from the pilot fieldwork survey 
suggests that practising managers at this stage felt the quasi-market was indeed an 
important influence. This is an issue which is examined in greater depth in the following 
chapters. 
Chapter Seven 
The experience of explicit rationing within the NHS quasi-market - evidence from 
first round case study interviews 
This chapter analyses the results of the first round of interviews, undertaken between June 
and September 1996. (See Chapter Five for further detail on methods). They give a more 
recent account than that presented in Chapter Six and show how rationing has developed 
as resource constraints have tightened. In the early stages of the NHS reforms, NHS 
spending was increased to ease in the reforms. By the time these interviews were 
conducted, the new, much harsher limits to public spending were having their effect. 
All of the interviewees described the 1996/97 contracting round as extremely tough, and 
none of them anticipated getting any growth funding for 1997/98 - on the contrary, they 
expected to have to make further reductions in service. 
Values and criteria for priority setting 
Before interviewees were questioned specifically about rationing and the market, they 
were asked about any work done locally on articulating values and criteria for priority 
setting, and whether this had been useful in practice. The aim was to establish whether 
there was a general climate of greater explicitness about how priority setting was to be 
achieved and on what principles it was to be based, but also whether this had been 
translated into practical decisions. It is quite possible for very clear statements of values to 
co-exist with implicit or ad hoc decision-making. 
Avon 
Avon had done a lot of work involving staff in trying to draw up an agreed statement of 
values, but the new authority from 1st April had decided to review what had been 
produced. Redrafting was still in progress, but a decision had. been made not to consult 
staff again. It was decided the lead should come from the top - that authority members had 
to debate and agree their own values, which could then be shared with staff and their 
practical implications discussed. 
The current draft at the time of the interview was as follows: 
'Our key aim is to secure the best possible health for local people within the 
resources we have available by . 
- developing an understanding of people's health care needs in their particular local 
circumstances 
- seeking equity of access to health services for the whole community 
- focusing on those aspects of service which maximise health gain by demonstrating 
clear improvements in health status 
- targeting resources to individuals, groups or communities with particular needs 
- working closely with our residents and with all those involved in their health care 
- ensuring that services are delivered in an appropriate way to the service user, 
wherever possible in a primary care setting easily accessible to local residents 
- being publicly accountable and securing the best use of resources in terms of 
efficiency, quality and effectiveness 
- valuing the rights of individuals and seeking methods for involving the community 
in health care decisions generally, whilst developing within individuals a sense of 
responsibility for their own health.' 
The chief executive felt that until the value statement had been finalised it was of limited 
practical use. Nonetheless, she described clear examples where the authority's concern 
about geographical inequity and inaccessibility within its newly enlarged boundaries was 
prompting discussion about service change. She also stressed that a statement of values 
could never remove the ethical complexity of the issues faced, and that practical 
experience might mean further adaptation of the values. 
The deputy director of contracting felt the values expressed in the statement were in the 
minds of contracting staff as they set priorities for negotiation, but that this was probably 
because those values were already deeply held. Writing them down had not made a huge 
difference. She also said contracting staff were very aware of and uncomfortable with the 
unavoidable trade-offs between competing values, and felt some of the decisions that they 
were called upon to defend did not match well with their own beliefs. 
The director of finance took a similar view that they were already his values anyway, but 
that they were something to strive towards rather than actually achievable. Realistically 
they had to be subject to practical constraints. 
The director of public health agreed that staff really did think about the values day to day, 
but identified a curiously British reluctance to talk about one's beliefs - 'it's like an 
Englishman trying to speak French.' One of the biggest problems, he felt, was not so much 
the conflict between the values themselves, but between them and various political 
imperatives from the Department of Health, such as reducing waiting times. However, 
conflict between values was also a problem, exemplified by the individualistic claims of 
expensive ECRs versus equity for the majority. 
Cambridge and Huntingdon 
Cambridge and Huntingdon set out its values in a document called 'Framework for 
Partnership' in 1994. These were taken from work already done by East Anglia Regional 
Health Authority, which was in turn based on work by Maxwell (1984), so their origins 
pre-date the market. They are known locally as the EEEAAR list: 
The chief executive explained that they were adopted at a time when Cambridge Health 
Authority, Huntingdon Health Authority and Cambridgeshire Family Health Services 
Authority were all trying to work as one health commission, whilst retaining separate 
identities and their own set of non-executives. As a result, decision-making was unwieldy, 
and the values were 'imposed', in his words. He did not feel it had been worth doing any 
more participative work with board members until the creation of the new health 
authorities on 1st April 1996. By the time of the interview, the director of public health 
was leading work on a new statement of values for the authority. 
In the Commission's 'Strategic Framework for Acute Services 1995/96 to 2001/02', four 
principles were identified: 
- the published values of the Health Commission (i.e. the EEEAAR list) 
- sound evidence about what constitutes effective clinical practice 
- responsiveness to the views of local residents and health professionals 
- the requirement to sustain teaching and research. 
(This covers broadly the same areas as Avon's statement of values. The two notable 
differences are that Avon does not make explicit reference to teaching and research, whilst 
Cambridge and Huntingdon does not single out individual rights and responsibilities, 






- responsiveness - efficiency 
Inevitably, the very general and superficially incontrovertible nature of these principles 
meant there were mixed views about whether they had had any effect in practice, even 
though some further discussion had taken place with groups of staff about what the terms 
meant and how they could be applied. 
The chief executive thought there were times when the values had been a prominent 
influence on decision-making and other times where there was 'evidence of not much more 
than a sort of after-the-event rationalisation'. This latter approach was also identified by 
the senior registrar in public health, who commented 'rather than the values driving the 
decisions, I think the decisions are made and then the values...inform it, but I don't think 
they drive it.' Although he believed some people in the organisation were well-informed 
about the statement of values and realistic about the tensions between values, he also 
thought there were probably many staff for whom they meant nothing or who had not 
heard of them. 
The director of acute commissioning shared the view that a lot of things were done 
because 'they're politically flavour of the month'. When it came to rationing decisions about 
what not to do, however, he felt these were informed mainly by the question 'If we didn't 
do this, how much suffering would it cause?' As an example, he said they had not taken a 
very strict approach to the reduction of waiting times, seeing an 18 month wait for a 
varicose vein operation as less important in terms of human suffering than making sure the 
parents of a child with complex disability got immediate specialist support. This constitutes 
a judgement about equity, effectiveness and accessibility, albeit not fully spelt out. 
The director of finance took a more positive view that, although there were problems 
translating values into practical effect, most people in the authority did adhere to them and 
tried to use them in their daily work. 
District Three 
District Three had done a considerable amount of work on values, culminating in the 
following four principles for making choices: 
The responsibility of the authority is to enable the local population to be as healthy 
as possible by use of the available resources. 
Choices and decisions on priorities should be made, to the greatest extent possible, 
on rational grounds. 
To justify their use, treatments (particularly, but not exclusively, new ones) should 
have the balance of evidence in their favour. 
Financial resources for NHS spending for local residents will always be finite (even 
if NHS funding is increased). 
Although he had been one of the main proponents of establishing principles (including 
effectiveness) on which rationing decisions should be based, the acting director of public 
health argued the exercise had been 'totally useless' - it was helpful in 'keeping the profile 
[of rationing] up', but made no difference to practical decision-making. The pressures of 
the most recent contracting round had meant principles had taken a back seat, and 
propping up acute services had become the rationale for the choices made. One factor in 
this was 'the fear of the consequences of being tough... so in my more optimistic moments I 
think it's because we haven't had the will and the toughness to apply the principles, rather 
than that they're completely useless.' It was right in principle that decisions should be made 
on rational grounds, weighing up the benefits, risks and costs - it was just that in practice 
'subjective opinion or prejudice' still tended to win the argument. 
The director of finance confirmed that from a financial perspective the principles had made 
little difference. He had not been closely involved in their development, and felt they had 
little relevance to his day-to-day work. 
The chief executive felt members of the public needed to be involved in reviewing and 
perhaps revising the principles over the next few months. He also discussed the difference 
between establishing broad values (such as equity or beneficence), about which he would 
expect most people to agree, and translating those into practical criteria for allocating 
resources, such as the person's age or whether they had economic dependants. In the 
absence of such criteria, statements of principles had only limited value. In his view, the 
rationing agenda was now shifting from denial of certain interventions towards an 
emphasis on clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, and that this was the most 
promising route for finding practical criteria for priority setting. 
Discussion 
The amount of effort being put into the development of statements of values does support 
the idea that there is a general climate of greater explicitness about the principles on which 
priority setting is to be based. However, there is still much work to be done in exploring 
the underlying conflicts between the principles endorsed, translating these into practical 
criteria for decision-making, and in turn ensuring these criteria are actually applied. In the 
meantime, there is still room for implicit decision-making to co-exist with very clear 
statements of values. 
Evidence of explicit rationing and contracting 
Avon 
Avon had taken legal advice on the question of excluding treatments and had been advised 
'never to say never'. As a result, although they had a range of explicit limitations and 
virtual exclusions of services, they always allowed exceptions on clinical grounds. As they 
acknowledged, this placed some of the burden back on the clinician to manage rationing in 
practice, albeit within a very explicit framework. 
Avon's service specifications included a list headed 'restricted purchasing of the following 
procedures', which included plastic surgery, sterilisation reversal, assisted conception and 
wart removal, as well as the more unusual ME, implantable defibrillators, bone marrow 
transplants, intervertebral surgery and epilepsy surgery. In some cases, quite detailed 
circumstances were described in which exceptions could be made. In others, the restriction 
took the form of a limited number of cases per year, without specifying how they were to 
be selected. The restrictions on IVF combined a limited number of cases with selection 
criteria which included the mother's age, number of previous children and whether the 
applicant was in a heterosexual relationship of at least two year's standing. For bone 
marrow transplants, there was a cash limit which was expected to cover an approximate 
number of cases. 
Plastic surgery provided an interesting example of shifting rationing boundaries between 
the purchaser and the clinician. At the request of the plastic surgeons, indicative volume 
levels had originally been included against each of the restricted procedures. The 
contracting department had subsequently been approached by consultants to ask for an 
exception to be made for individual cases. The department's response was that it was up to 
consultants to decide priorities within the indicative volume. After three years, the 
consultants requested the removal of the indicative volume levels, preferring to manage the 
rationing themselves, within the overall volume of the contract. The director of public 
health confirmed that clinicians did not in general like the approach of restricted volumes 
for certain procedures, because they felt it demonstrated a lack of courage on the 
authority's part, and resulted in responsibility being unfairly loaded back onto them. 'And 
they've got a point, of course,' he added. 
The deputy director of contracting was hesitant about the use of the word rationing to 
describe the plastic surgery restrictions, preferring the description 'a fairly carefully 
followed process about a limited resource and making the most use of it'. She expressed a 
strong organisational commitment to a population-wide view, which placed less emphasis 
on rationing for the individual and more on maximising health for the majority. She argued 
contracting or commissioning staff tended to feel greater corporate responsibility and less 
professional allegiance than public health staff, and that this could explain why the director 
of public health accepted the term 'rationing1 more comfortably. Acknowledging rationing 
might somehow be disloyal - 'we may not personally agree with it, but we've taken the 
Queen's Shilling.' 
In fact, the director of public health, when asked if staff locally used the term 'rationing' to 
describe exclusion of services said 'Yes. I think we do. Prioritisation, yes, I think we do.' 
When asked about this shift from 'rationing' to 'prioritisation', he added, 'Well, there used 
to be quite a big embargo against using the V word, there really did, and it came right from 
the top through the regional offices, and so we couldn't ever use it in correspondence. It's 
lightening up now, I have to say - it's becoming more acceptable.' 
The chief executive and director of finance agreed with the term rationing, although the 
director of finance qualified it by saying that not providing something which ought not to 
be an NHS responsibility, such as tattoo removal, did not seem like rationing to a 
purchaser, although it would to people outside the organisation. 
Evidence on effectiveness was seen as an increasingly important influence on priority 
setting, and both 'improve effectiveness based on evidence' and 'maintain an active R&D 
programme' appeared as main headings in the authority's corporate contract for 1996/97. 
As the chief executive pointed out, however, it was easier to use such evidence to 
challenge new developments than to change mainstream services. She recognised that most 
provision continued to follow historical patterns and was not informed by research on 
effectiveness. What evidence there was about existing provision was not always used to 
limit or exclude - often it suggested that more of a particular service should be purchased. 
In a time of no financial growth, however, this meant something else would have to be 
rationed to achieve that reinvestment, either on the basis of low effectiveness or some 
other criterion such as low priority, or by more implicit means such as an across-the-board 
percentage cut. Thus effectiveness evidence could be both a direct and an indirect cause of 
rationing. 
The director of public health also drew attention to the fact that, despite evidence on 
effectiveness, ensuring that services were properly targeted on those who could benefit 
most from them was another matter. He was also concerned that a very vocal minority 
might succeed in getting services of questionable benefit, because of the emotive nature of 
their appeals for funding. 
He also felt strongly about government guidance that beta-interferon should be made 
available, despite research evidence that it was not very effective, which they could have 
used to support a decision to exclude it from the NHS. 'You don't want that kind of help 
from the government.' Avon had in fact decided not to make additional funding available 
for it, and was prepared to argue its case with the Department of Health if necessary. The 
director of public health blamed the pressures of the pharmaceutical market, which meant 
new drugs had to be promoted vigorously by their manufacturers. 
Contract specifications in Avon were quite detailed, not only in listing exclusions but also 
in describing the range of services that would be provided. The director of public health 
estimated that about a third of the contracts contained exclusion clauses. The director of 
finance pointed out that most contracts were financially a simple block arrangement with 
each trust, specifically to avoid transaction costs - cost and volume arrangements 
accounted for less than 1% of total activity. However, this did not necessarily mean any 
loss of control over what is purchased - 'whilst we've got block contracts, we haven't got 
block activity.' 
Although nobody commented on difficulties in monitoring and enforcing decisions to 
ration services, the director of finance did describe general difficulties in ensuring clinicians 
observed the terms of the contract. The director of public health said they tended to start 
specifying numbers of particular procedures only when there was an identified problem in 
that specialty, usually a waiting list. For the most part, contracts relied on discouragement 
to do certain procedures (such as grommets for chronic otitis media), rather than an 
absolute prohibition. He said 'we're quite a small organisation and we've found from bitter 
experience...not to look for trouble where you don't have to. So in many ways, if some 
specialties and services are OK and not clamouring, we're happy to accept that at face 
value, and get on with the specialties that are...I can happily leave much of the ENT work 
which I think genuinely is of low priority alone, despite the fact that it is of low priority.' 
He did feel contracts were really quite specific, but often reliant on co-operation rather 
than compulsion. 
Cambridge and Huntingdon 
Cambridge and Huntingdon is of course well known for one of the most public acts of 
explicit rationing to date, and one which has had a tremendous influence on the quantity 
and quality of debate on the issue - the decision to deny the leukaemic 'Child B' a second 
bone marrow transplant. This was also a clear example of effectiveness being used as the 
basis for a rationing decision, as the chances of success were perceived to be very low, 
even though the family wanted to pursue every possibility. It is worth noting, however, 
that this was a decision which arose not through the normal purchasing plan and routine 
contracting system, but as an extra contractual referral, a point which will be revisited 
later. 
Unsurprisingly, then, staff in Cambridge and Huntingdon expressed willingness to take 
explicit rationing decisions. They were involved in national debate about the need for 
explicit rationing and for the government to acknowledge and support it. Staff were at 
ease using the word rationing - as the director of acute commissioning said, 'I think a lot of 
people try and avoid the "r" word and say it's prioritisation, but it just seems to be a matter 
of semantics. If you deny something to somebody that will be of benefit, however you 
manage it, however you define it, then it is rationing.' 
Some services were completely excluded (homeopathy, osteopathy, chiropractic). Bearing 
in mind the Secretary of State's requirement that no service which is clinically effective 
should be excluded altogether, this was justified on the grounds that they were totally 
ineffective - in the words of one interviewee, 'to put it in a nutshell, homeopathy is to us 
pharmacological nonsense1, although he acknowledged that people who believed in it 
would not accept that definition of effectiveness. 
Some services which were experimental or of low effectiveness were listed in the contract 
with Addenbrooke's as 'not purchased by CHHA' [Cambridge and Huntingdon Health 
Authority], including small bowel transplant, laser treatment for soft palate (snoring) and 
sterilisation reversal. These were also excluded as ECRs to other providers. However, in 
interview the director of acute commissioning said that exceptions would be made on 
sterilisation reversal in particularly tragic and unforeseen circumstances - a social 
judgement of ability to benefit, rather than one based on technical effectiveness. 
There was a lengthy list of plastic surgery interventions which were normally excluded, 
some of them accompanied by an explicit statement of when exceptions would be 
permissible (e.g. breast reduction where the body mass index is <26 and the weight of the 
breast is >500g, or tattoo removal where it is a barrier to employment). No exceptions 
were suggested for the correction of bat ears for people over 15 years, a judgement of low 
priority rather than low effectiveness. Gender reassignment, including surgery, was 
purchased but only 'within a limited cost envelope and following psychiatric tertiary 
referral'. Assisted conception was purchased, precisely on the basis that there was 
evidence of its effectiveness for some women, according to a set of eligibility criteria. Even 
so, the chief executive expressed some doubts whether age limits, although justified in 
terms of clinical effectiveness, were also used as a convenient 'hook to hang a rationing 
decision on', as a way of reducing the numbers to affordable levels. The publication of an 
explicit policy on assisted conception was necessitated by the merger of two health 
authorities, one of which did not purchase IVF, whilst the other did. 
The Addenbrooke's contract contained a list headed 'Indicative service levels - clinical 
effectiveness'. This was an interesting combination of both interventions felt to be of 
dubious efficacy, where Cambridge and Huntingdon wanted to keep numbers down (such 
as varicose veins or tonsillectomy), and well-proven techniques such as hip replacements 
or cataract extractions, where the aim was to keep numbers up. The authority planned to 
monitor progress against these indicative levels specifically during 1996/97. 
Finally, the director of finance/primary and community commissioning raised the issue of 
the use of eligibility criteria for continuing care as an example of explicit rationing. Unlike 
many other districts where the government's intervention was likely to mean reinvestment 
in long term health care, Cambridge and Huntingdon had historic over-provision of long 
term beds and was likely to end up reducing this in order to spend more on acute services. 
However, he felt that nobody within the organisation would regard this as rationing 
because it was retrenchment from something the health service should not have been doing 
anyway. The authority was also doing work on reducing some health visiting services, to 
improve targeting on those in particular need. The word 'targeting' was preferred to 
'rationing', on the grounds that the overall level of resource was not going to be reduced. 
As far as the contracts themselves were concerned, examples have already been given from 
the Addenbrooke's contract of quite detailed limitations and exclusions. Detailed listing of 
exclusions also applied to ECRs, where strict control of funding was exercised. Cambridge 
and Huntingdon was seeking to move from the current detailed annual contract towards 
longer term contracts with Addenbrooke's, based on an understanding of mutual reliance 
and partnership, subject to the constraint of annual budget setting. In practice, however, 
Addenbrooke's had yet to agree to sign the 1996/97 contract (in July 1996). 
The deputy director of acute commissioning explained that the plastic surgery specification 
had been tightened up the previous year, when it was found that the previous protocol 
drawn up some years ago had had little or no impact in changing the pattern of provision. 
This suggests that monitoring and enforcing compliance can be a problem, even when a 
decision to ration a procedure had been made explicit. There were also continuing 
problems in finding out about what was being provided - laser treatment for snoring had 
originally been a research project which had been included in NHS provision without 
explicit agreement and was discovered by chance during a review of the ENT waiting list. 
Despite Cambridge and Huntingdon's willingness to make explicit choices, the chief 
executive emphasised that most rationing was a product of historical levels of investment 
in different services, and that a traditional lack of provision for some vulnerable groups 
was probably the most important kind of exclusion - 'the hidden iceberg of rationing in the 
NHS,' as it is described by Klein et al (1996, p. 82). The chief executive cited the example 
of elderly people in the community being put to bed at 6.00 pm because district nurses 
were not available to do it later in the evening. 
District Three 
District Three operated a number of exclusions and limitations. Firstly, the purchasing plan 
for 1996/97 outlined three areas where, on the basis of low clinical effectiveness, it was 
planned to reduce services: these were grommets, D&C in women under 40 and in-patient 
care following a stroke. It was stated that this would be handled through 'working with 
clinicians rather than trying to impose standard protocols for care'. 
Secondly, the contracts portfolio document for 96/7 contained several relevant sections, 
which will be described in turn. There was a six-page list of contract exclusions by 
provider, which covered a broad range of services such as bone marrow transplants, some 
expensive drugs, cochlear implants, eating disorder services and in-patient homeopathy, to 
name but a few. These were not necessarily excluded altogether; some of them were 
available as part of routine contracts with other providers, and some of them could be 
granted ECR approval at the hospitals where they were excluded from contracts. 
There was also a list of'special services', which explained where referrals could be made 
for these services. Some were mainstream but specialised services such as neonatal 
intensive care. Others were more controversial, such as bone densitometry, acupuncture or 
gastroplasty (stomach stapling) which in other authorities are often on the list of services 
not purchased, but which in District Three were available provided the referral was made 
to a specified provider. The list also included some services which were accessible only via 
a gatekeeper, including eating disorders and addiction services via local psychiatry, and 
pain relief via local anaesthetic services. 
A separate policy on low priority treatments listed treatments which would not normally be 
purchased, although exceptions might be made via the ECR process. The list covered the 
familiar range of cosmetic surgery, sterilisation reversal, gender identity surgery, adult 
orthodontics and dental implants. The director of public health explained how this had 
been supported and even driven by GPs, including GP fiindholders, seeking backing for 
what they felt were difficult but necessary rationing decisions. 
Assisted conception techniques were also included, and were dealt with in more detail in 
the subfertility treatment purchasing policy. As in the case of Cambridge and Huntingdon, 
the need for an explicit policy was in part related to differing practice between merging 
health authorities. Public health did a considerable amount of work looking at research on 
cost-effectiveness, as a result of which it was decided that investigations and a detailed list 
of first-line drug/hormone therapies would be purchased, as well as donor insemination. 
Tubal surgery would be on an ECR basis only, and IVF, GIFT and IUI would not be 
purchased at all, except for couples already on the waiting list in April 1995. This reflected 
District Three's emphasis on cost-effectiveness, in that spending on drug/hormone therapy 
produces a much higher return in terms of healthy babies born per amount spent than IVF. 
In interviews it was explained that the decision had also been informed by a view amongst 
some executives and non-executives that unexplained infertility, once all possible 
investigations had been exhausted, was not strictly a medical condition but a social 
condition, and that therefore it should not be an NHS responsibility. The chief executive 
suggested he might challenge that approach and review the policy. He also indicated that 
in practice some cases of IVF are funded - sometimes because it is simply very difficult to 
say no to everything, and sometimes because GP fundholders have tried to circumvent the 
ban by proceeding so far with preparation for IVF that it becomes impossible to refuse to 
fund it. 
District Three had decided it would fund beta interferon - in fact, the budget set aside was 
considerably underspent, following the introduction of a protocol agreed with local 
clinicians. The chief executive commented that national intervention on this issue had been 
helpful in prompting a debate with the Multiple Sclerosis Society on the need for careful 
targeting of the drug and for giving people with MS clear information about the potential 
unpleasant side effects. This meant the MS Society supported very cautious use of beta 
interferon. 
Despite the lists of exclusions, the chief executive described the great majority of contracts 
as 'relatively broad brush', leaving a lot to the individual clinician to manage. However, the 
district was gradually disaggregating contracts between specialties and specifying more 
closely who would be treated. This was particularly true in developing specialties, such as 
renal medicine, which will be raised again later. 
Future rationing plans 
All three districts expected to have to make difficult, explicit choices in the coming 
contracting round. 
Avon 
Avon was expecting all its providers to come up with plans for releasing cash, in 
discussion with purchasers. The chief executive described the relationship with providers 
as one of'armed neutrality' while they worked together on contentious proposals, 
including closing family planning clinics and reducing school nursing. Her preference was 
for greater explicitness; whilst recognising that clinical judgement would still have a major 
part to play in interpreting and applying purchasing policies at an individual level, this 
should be 'against a basis of clarity which we have the guts to provide'. The director of 
public health described how 10 or 12 main disease entities had been identified, for each of 
which they planned to list those interventions which are of key importance and those which 
are least important and might be the target for service reductions. He was also particularly 
concerned that both renal and oncology services were expanding rapidly, but did not 
foresee any explicit rationing in these areas in the immediate future. 
Cambridge and Huntingdon 
Cambridge and Huntingdon foresaw particular difficulties trying to keep elective surgery 
within the activity levels agreed with Addenbrooke's; although they did not expect to be 
limiting particular procedures, the provider was looking to them to give a lead on how to 
handle the problem, and it was anticipated that waiting times would rise across the board. 
At a more explicit level, they were also trying to reconcile two lists - one of new 
developments they felt were essential and would improve health, and the other of services 
they might cut to achieve that reinvestment. In the words of the chief executive, "Now, the 
question is, how radical, brave, foolhardy are we going to be? Are we going to halve that 
list and know that potential health gain out there is lost, because we're spending it on 
things that frankly don't deliver that health gain, but politically we couldn't cut?' He argued 
that if the government were to allocate additional funding to the NHS in the run-up to the 
election, it would only delay the time when the inevitable need for explicit rationing would 
be acknowledged and action taken. The director of public health echoed this: 'I don't think 
we should duck this any more.' 
District Three 
In District Three, as in Avon, rapid growth in renal services was a pressing concern, and 
one which it was felt would have to be tackled more explicitly. The use of a financial cap 
was proving difficult to maintain, given local clinicians' increasing reluctance to make 
choices between patients to stay within budget. The authority was therefore working with 
the provider on a protocol which would set out eligibility criteria for being accepted onto 
the programme. 
Discussion 
Initial results from the three case study health authorities support the conclusions reached 
by Klein et al. (1996), namely that explicit rationing has increased, and that there is 
increasing use of the effectiveness criterion to justify the exclusion of services, but that 
explicit rationing remains marginal. 
There was certainly evidence from the case studies that explicit rationing was taking place, 
and that all the health authorities believed more of it was inevitable. The kind of 
procedure-specific exclusions being applied and the detailed protocols about who would 
be accepted for treatment and where exceptions could be made are unlike anything seen at 
district level before the introduction of the market. Clinicians may in the past have had 
some similar guidelines - for example the use of strict eligibility criteria for renal dialysis in 
some treatment centres as early as the 1970s (Wing, 1983). However, as Klein (1995) 
points out, it was 'not ministers or civil servants' making these judgements, but 'the 
clinicians concerned' (p. 78) What is new is the way that purchasers have become involved 
in agreeing or even leading the development of such protocols, and in using them as a way 
of controlling clinical activity. 
A similar shift is apparent in attitudes to clinical effectiveness evidence. There is 
considerable evidence from the first round of interviews that purchasers now regard this as 
a central part of their territory, and believe ideally it should be one of the most important 
factors, if not the most important, in deciding how resources should be allocated. 
In practice, however, health authorities themselves acknowledge that both explicit 
rationing based on relative social priorities and explicit rationing based on clinical 
effectiveness are still a relatively minor part of overall resource allocation decisions. 
Historical service patterns at a collective level and clinical judgement at an individual level 
continue to play a major role in rationing. There is also widespread concern that 
effectiveness is treated as a black and white solution to rationing, rather than a complex 
continuum. There are very few areas where it leads to unequivocal decisions for whole 
populations - for the most part, effective use of evidence still relies on clinical judgement in 
the light of individual patient characteristics. 
What are the reasons for greater explicitness in rationing? 
In the previous section, it was stated that the detail of procedure-specific exclusions and 
the exceptions to them are unlike anything seen at district level before the introduction of 
the market. This is by no means to say that the market is the cause; the timing could be 
purely coincidental, or both the market and the growth in explicit rationing could be the 
result of some third factor. As Ham et al. have described, the immediate catalyst for the 
review which led to the 1990 Act was a funding crisis within the NHS in the mid 1980s 
(Ham et al., 1990), and the Government itself acknowledged the financial pressures which 
lay behind the review in the White Paper 'Working for Patients' (Secretaries of State for 
Health etc., 1989). Thus both the establishment of the internal market and the growth in 
explicit rationing could result from pressure on resources, even if the government hoped 
that the internal market might help avoid explicit rationing by achieving better value for the 
money. 
Interviewees were asked a number of questions which aimed to elicit their views about the 
causes of explicit rationing, the impact of the market and, more specifically, the impact of 
contracting. The complexity of the situation is reflected in the uncertainty of the answers 
received and the way in which most interviewees developed their thinking in the course of 
the discussion. This uncertainty is in itself evidence of the multifactorial and circular nature 
of causation in the relationship between rationing, the market and other pressures. 
In order to do justice to the complexity of each individual's arguments on this point, they 
are analysed individually. 
Avon 
Director of Finance 
The director of finance identified lack of resources as the main driving force behind 
rationing. However, he noted that becoming more explicit had started at a time before the 
financial situation was as constrained as it now was, and had been prompted by providers 
wanting new developments. Even though there was no requirement to cut services to stay 
within budget, it was necessary to move money around with the trusts, away from things 
of little value towards the new developments. Purchasers had therefore been involved in 
identifying activities of low priority. He felt it was more appropriate for purchasers to do 
this than to leave it to implicit rationing amongst doctors, because of the need to maintain 
a focus on the needs of the population as a whole, and on cost-effectiveness (as opposed 
to effectiveness alone). Having said this, he did feel the market was increasing doctors' 
awareness of finite resources. 
He felt the purchaser provider split was having an impact in terms of allowing purchasers 
to focus on health needs, rather than on providers. However, he had doubts about 'this 
business of charging all over the place for things' - Avon had kept mainly to block 
contracts specifically to avoid wasteful transaction costs, even though the activity was 
specified in some detail. He argued providers were realistic that simply having more 
complex contract formulae was not going to increase the total money available, although 
recent rises in emergency activity had led to more provider pressure for additional 
reimbursement. 
The extent to which the activity levels specified in the contract were adhered to was 
questionable. The director of finance believed that sufficient leverage was exercised over 
providers through regular monitoring, but he also said they varied the levels of activity 
according to what the demand was anyway and virtually always overperformed. There 
seemed to be two factors at work here - one was that trust managers found it difficult to 
control clinical activity, but on the other hand they were genuinely (in his opinion) trying 
to work with purchasers to squeeze more out of the system. He said, 'certainly the way we 
have a relationship with the trusts, we're probably working more like one big health 
authority.' He suggested that, apart from the independent status of providers, the 
relationship between purchasers and providers was very similar to that between area health 
authorities and districts from 1974 to 1982. He did not believe abolition of the market 
would make much difference to the way that relationship worked and had always worked. 
Some form of contract would still be necessary, but not necessarily any different from 
what he felt was already a fairly flexible, informal and non-market contracting system now 
in place. 
Finally he questioned whether not buying certain procedures, however explicit the process, 
was going to save resources - in particular, he felt a sense of shared responsibility with 
providers to cope with their fixed infrastructure costs. Moving resources around within 
one provider to buy more desirable developments might be feasible, but taking money out 
in large amounts was not. 
Chief Executive 
The chief executive was very conscious of geographical variations in access to services 
within the district, particularly in IVF, cardiac surgery and renal dialysis, which had 
become an issue because of the merger of districts with previously different purchasing 
policies. For the most part, she expected this to exert an indirect effect on explicit 
rationing; it was unlikely to be publicly acceptable for the district to say that, because 
people in one half of the district could not have IVF, nor could the other half, so a process 
of gradual 'evening up' was the only feasible route. To achieve this would require 
redirecting money from elsewhere, however, and this in turn meant more explicit decision-
making elsewhere. Service variations were 'flushing out more explicitly the differences that 
there are and therefore in itself to a certain extent driving our thinking about where 
recycled money should go.' 
Family planning clinic provision was being 'evened down' to match the level in the district 
with lower access, but this was coincidental - a decision had already been taken that 
reducing choice for women seeking family planning services was preferable to not having, 
say, sufficient renal or cardiac services. Demonstrating that this brought the service down 
to the same level as in the other half of the district was described as 'a post hoc 
commentary.' 
As far as the list of excluded procedures was concerned, the chief executive's primary 
reason for these was 'our perception of clinical worth or value', in spite of the possibility of 
growing waiting lists. She added that she took the importance of lack of resources as read 
- in times of plenty, such procedures might be only '399th on the list' but might nonetheless 
be funded. 
However, sometimes low priority services might not be funded even if the money were 
available. She explained that family planning staff were working on a proposal to save the 
money that closing the clinics would save, but in a different way which would allow them 
to remain open. Her planned response, if they produced such a proposal, was to be 'thank 
you but no - this is an area where we are not prepared to say that there is this degree of 
choice and duplication of service, when in other services there is none.' 
Monitoring waiting times had been an important factor recently in tightening up referral 
criteria for varicose veins. Although waiting times were within Patient's Charter targets, 
monitoring had shown up a 'long tail' in general surgery, much of which was varicose 
veins. Exclusion of all but ulcerous veins had previously been agreed with clinical staff, but 
because GPs had kept referring they had continued placing them on the waiting list. The 
situation was 'brought to a head during this last year's contracting round' and clinical staff 
were given additional guidance on telling the GPs that they would not accept such 
referrals, backed up by the same message direct from the authority to GPs. The chief 
executive felt consultants needed reassurance that they could blame it on the authority 
rather than have to make the rationing decisions themselves. 
The role of contracts and contract monitoring here was ambiguous - clinical staff had been 
resisting a previous agreement because they did not like enforcing it, but on the other hand 
monitoring was eventually effective in picking this up and making sure practice changes 
were achieved. In general, the chief executive thought there was fairly complex interaction 
between rationing and contracting, and that contracting had brought 'a degree of painful 
clarity and more precision than was ever the case before'. Sometimes difficult problems 
requiring explicit hard choices might come up during the year independently of the 
contracting cycle and contracts might then be simply a convenient place to record such 
decisions. Sometimes 'the intensive period of debate around January to March, around 
contracting time...is an appropriate and often inescapable time for it to come out into the 
open.' 
Would growing resource pressures have caused explicit rationing to bubble up anyway, 
regardless of the contracting system? The chief executive could not imagine how they 
would have avoided it, and could certainly not envisage a return to the old system of 
paying without knowing much about what was being purchased. (However, this may be 
because NHS staff are now so used to contracts that they cannot imagine life without 
them, rather than because implicit rationing could genuinely not have coped with further 
resource pressures). 
The chief executive was in no doubt that contracts had demanded a level of detailed 
information which there had never been before, and without which it would have been 
impossible to know what the authority was buying and decide what it was not going to 
buy. On the other hand, the quality of information in community and mental health services 
was still poor, despite the existence of contracts, making it difficult to 'really answer 
questions about what is being provided within the community part of budgets'. A 
particular structural problem she identified was the fact that three of the local trusts were 
in fact generic (acute, community and mental health services all in one trust). Although a 
separate contract for community services was negotiated with each of these trusts, 'the 
ability for fudging and little bits of financial flow' meant it was difficult for purchasers to 
keep control, and in effect the trusts acted like mini districts, doing their own implicit 
rationing to stay within global budgets. Indeed, whole district management teams had 
moved over to trusts in the first and second waves of trust creation, and 'they still 
substantially think of themselves as health authorities.' Here, perhaps, was an example of 
hierarchical organisation never having gone away, let alone creeping back in in the form of 
block agreements and partnerships. 
Interestingly, this view has been supported by the chief executive of one purely community 
trust in Avon, who says of combined management of acute and community services 'we 
tried for 45 years and it didn't work. Every time the acute dinosaurs roared, the community 
primates were sacrificed to feed their insatiable appetite...I hear it's still happening now in 
the all-in game reserves' (Pughe-Morgan, 1996, p.20). 
A side-effect of this structural problem was that the real district health authorities had been 
left stripped of expertise and with management costs so low that their ability to assemble 
and manipulate the necessary detailed information for strong negotiations was seriously 
impaired. 'Provider capture' was inevitable. It was only with the amalgamation of the three 
health authorities that a strong enough team could be put together to carry out effective 
contract negotiations. 
The chief executive did not feel Labour had really thought through how comprehensive 
healthcare agreements would differ in practice from contracts. Abolishing the internal 
market might lead to some sensible reductions in information requirements such as the 
efficiency index, but the NHS would continue to need something broadly similar to 
existing contracts, if it were not to revert entirely to handing over a blank cheque. She 
argued that a return to an integrated organisation would not necessarily avoid explicit 
choices - she described the former budget negotiations between District HQ and directly 
managed units as very tense and often aggressive, with little sense of'one big happy 
family', although she noted there may have been a greater cabinet-style closing of ranks 
after the negotiations had been settled than is the case now between purchasers and 
dissatisfied providers. Conversely, under the current system there were signs locally that 
providers were willing to work privately with purchasers on proposals for rationing 
services, and perhaps to consult jointly on these. Whether they would be willing to share 
responsibility in public was not yet clear, however. 
Director of Public Health 
The director of public health brought a new slant to the question of lack of resources: he 
identified three reasons why spending on some individuals had recently increased 
dramatically, thereby intensifying resource pressures for the majority of services and 
requiring explicit decisions one way or the other. These factors were a growing use of 
intensive care, ECRs for expensive and sometimes dubious treatments and new 
technology, especially expensive new drugs. For him, inequity in the distribution of 
resources was an important influence on the need for more explicit allocation mechanisms, 
and he was particularly concerned that a few individuals were making enormous demands 
on resources whilst others' needs were not adequately recognised. 
ECRs for 'difficult to place' mental illness patients, child and adolescent psychiatry 
(especially eating disorders) and neuro-rehabilitation for people with behavioural 
disturbance following head injury have created a particular pressure. However, he was not 
convinced that the need to approve ECRs explicitly rather than simply making out-of-
district referrals which came under another district's budget was the sole reason why these 
problems were surfacing now. 'It all coincides with the loss of the so-called back-ward, the 
so-called mental illness bins. You used to have pleasant-sounding named wards like the 
Ethel Johnson Ward for the Tragically Mad or whatever, and you find out that what it is is 
a real sink, where these incredibly difficult people are looked after in conditions of 
confinement...Of course, in our great desire not to tolerate or put up with that kind of 
thing, we have shut them all, and moved exactly that provision to the private sector, where 
it is to be had at a price.' Furthermore, professional sub-specialisation in mental health and 
the general 'contraction of the bed base' had led to much tighter definitions of which 
patients would or would not be accepted - 'there are now very great sort of lacunae 
between the various sub-specialties, where these patients just don't fit.' 
When asked how rationing fitted into contracting and the wider process of commissioning, 
he said that at 'most steps along that process, we are implicitly, and in a consensus fashion, 
making choices'. Having to write things down in a contract had probably made it more 
explicit, 'but not to the great extent that we once thought it might'. As a small organisation 
(see chief executive's previous comments), they had learnt to focus their attention where it 
was most needed and to leave many service specifications broad. They also had a 
preference for dissuasion rather than prohibition in contracts, partly because contracts 
were in any case unenforceable. 
He identified a moral and a technical component to rationing - in the former, one might 
decide that it was more equitable to shift money from one service and invest it in another. 
The technical component was how one actually implemented such a decision - 'and let me 
tell you, it is still as difficult in the health service to get things changed as before.' In fact, 
in some cases he thought contracting had made things worse, precisely because it required 
explicitness - 'you can't work with providers to achieve change that ordinarily they might 
have agreed with, but, because you're putting them on the spot and saying it's got to be a 
black and white thing, they kick up and say, "no, I'm not going to do it".' Nonetheless, this 
does to some extent support the idea that contracts make rationing more explicit, even if in 
practice it makes it less easy to do. 
Contracts had in his view failed to explore the great bulk of provision, and explicit 
rationing remained marginal. They could not hope to specify every single thing done, and 
many possibly undesirable activities remained undiscovered. Even when problems were 
identified and changes in practice planned, contracts alone were often an inadequate 
vehicle for ensuring changes took place. In plastic surgery, where the authority had made 
an explicit decision to stop purchasing some procedures in order to meet Patient's Charter 
waiting time targets, consultants had undermined the decision by filling up their waiting 
lists with other cases. 'They weren't with us, they weren't in a kind of joint venture, which 
was to do with the general population, the greater good. It was all about "that's your 
problem, not mine".' 
Nonetheless, the discipline of having to think constantly about waiting times had brought 
into much sharper focus what was really important and what was not; even if it ultimately 
only formalised an existing implicit position, it meant an explicit choice was made not to 
invest more money in that particular service to deal with waiting times. 
The director of public health was undecided whether there was any ethical obligation to be 
explicit. He certainly felt that many public sector staff'feel quite uncomfortable about 
doing things that really are down to our prejudices1 and acknowledged a general pressure 
to give the public a clearer account of how and why decisions are made. Whether this 
should extend to getting the public involved in making rationing decisions was another 
matter; Avon was embarking on its own research with the University of Bristol to test the 
public's willingness and ability to be involved. 
The possibility was discussed that health authority staff, like the public, might prefer a 
system where they could be involved in commenting on others' rationing decisions but not 
have to make the decisions themselves. In this case, it could be doctors who would have to 
explain how and why decisions had been made, but still retain responsibility for making 
them. The director of public health thought this might appeal to some authority staff, many 
of whom felt more comfortable with rules and a framework on which to lay responsibility 
for the decisions they had to take, rather than having to 'hold the smoking gun' themselves. 
However, he felt this was not realistic, partly because doctors trained in high tech medicine 
were increasingly uncomfortable about letting people die and 'don't like making rationing 
decisions any more', and partly because it was clearly a role for health authority staff to 
make such decisions. 
One possibility for passing some rationing back to doctors lay in the handling of tertiary 
ECRs. Avon was keen to make paying for tertiary ECRs a provider responsibility as a way 
of controlling costs, or alternatively to make reductions to the contract price if such ECRs 
exceed a certain number. The director of public health commented, 'I would rather ration 
that kind of care than compromise basic health care for the population.' 
Finally the director of public health explained his understanding of where the NHS's real 
financial problems lay: in the creeping increase in unnecessary investigations and use of 
new expensive drugs of dubious efficacy. He commented on the market's failure to 
improve the situation: 
'It was meant to take care of all that, and manifestly it has failed, utterly, utterly 
failed, and in fact it's made things worse. We have left people who have nothing to 
do with funding decisions in charge of the consequences of funding, and of course 
they don't care, you know. And the market reforms have dislocated us who do care 
about funding decisions from being able to manage and manipulate the process. I 
could see the logic; I could see the logic, but it hasn't worked.' 
Assistant Director of Contracting 
Service variation was mentioned again in this interview as an influential factor, combined 
with financial pressures. Plastic surgery had risen at an unaffordable rate, and this had 
prompted comparison with the rates in other districts. It had been found that Bristol had an 
unusually high level of plastic surgery, although this was treated with some caution 
because of the existence of a sub-regional centre - the effect of this being that cases which 
might elsewhere be treated by a general surgeon or even a GP were referred instead to 
plastic surgery. However, it was decided that too much was being done and this had led to 
the development of the list of limited procedures. (This was the example where the 
consultants eventually decided they would like to move back to managing the rationing 
themselves, within broad activity levels). 
The deputy director of contracting argued that contracting - and she was emphatic that she 
meant contracting, not commissioning or the purchaser provider split more generally - had 
led providers to market their services very aggressively, 'as if the market meant that there 
were freed resource somewhere, without recognising that it was still the same pot of 
money and it was just going to be divvied up differently.' This had accelerated clinical and 
public demand 'for new and better and more. And that has led to discussions which are 
about limiting that, and if it's not limiting the new and the better, it's about limiting some of 
the old to make way for it.' In her view, it was only in the last year that providers had 
begun to realise that there was no new pot of money. This was in direct contrast to the 
views of the director of finance that providers had been behaving realistically and 
responsibly until the last year. 
Although she did feel the purchaser provider split had enabled purchasers to 'take our 
minds off the difficulty of implementing some of what we ask for1, the virtual monopoly of 
local provision meant ultimately purchasers still had to have one eye on the effect of hard 
choices on local providers. This and the fact that the government was anxious to avoid the 
full logic of the market resulting in unsuccessful providers going bankrupt weakened 
purchasers' ability to make radical decisions. 
She thought the Patient's Charter had been a very important factor, although its effect was 
now waning in the face of a rising tide of emergency workload, and government 
acceptance that this should take priority. 
She discussed both public and clinical pressure to be explicit. The public 'want and expect 
explicitness, but they don't demand it' - where their influence was most strongly felt was 
retrospectively, in explaining the rationale behind individual decisions not to treat, or in 
consultation about specific service changes. Clinicians, on the other hand, 'repeatedly ask 
for explicit rationing decisions', sometimes because they felt they needed support from 
purchasers in turning down referrals they also thought were probably inappropriate, but 
sometimes because they were using it to try to push purchasers into making additional 
money available. 
Making explicit rationing decisions was hard for purchasing managers and they often felt 
vulnerable - the deputy director described personally distressing negotiations where she 
had questioned the appropriateness of what she had been required to do, and even one 
case where she had had to stop purchasing a service which she had been responsible for 
setting up in a previous job as a provider. She was affected by the way some clinicians 
personalised their attack on purchasing decisions, for example by saying purchasing 
managers were endangering patients' lives. She also referred to the fact that 'the clinical 
directors are often men and the contract managers here are often women', which gave a 
particular slant to the power relations between the negotiating parties, as did the doctor 
versus non-doctor issue. However, she did not believe these kinds of ethical and personal 
difficulties were ultimately going to stop the process of explicit rationing, and she did not 
think there was any way of finding an easy technical fix to replace difficult judgements. 'If 
contracting was simply a technical process, all you'd need was a technician', whereas in 
fact contract managers were highly graded and trained. 
Cambridge and Huntingdon 
Cambridge and Huntingdon as an organisation was keen to draw a clear distinction 
between contracting and commissioning. Contracting, in the words of the director of 
public health, was 'a subset of commissioning' - the process of agreeing and writing down 
what the health authority would get for its money. Commissioning was the wider function 
of priority-setting, strategic planning and managing change with providers in the longer 
term. 
Director of Finance/Primary and Community Care Commissioning 
In discussing the development of eligibility criteria for continuing care, it was suggested to 
this interviewee that this could be an interesting example of explicit rationing which had 
come about independently of the market, because of government and public concern about 
inequality of access and erosion of NHS provision. Although he agreed that it was 
independent of the market, he also felt that it had become an issue locally before the 
government decided to make it a central initiative. 
'I suppose it arose initially from a recognition that acute services in our patch were 
more thinly spread than most others. We were struggling with waiting times, 
Patient's Charter standards and...as we tried to examine why that should be the 
case in our patch, one of the things we examined our mix of expenditure... And 
when we were able to compare the broad analysis of our expenditure by 
programme areas with what was going on in other places, it was clear that we were 
spending less on acute services and more on continuing care, significantly so...We 
weren't getting best value for money from our investment in caring for the elderly 
in that way, as compared with the value we might get by investing in acute care.' 
The idea that long term care should be excluded from NHS provision predates the market 
by a long way, and was a response to financial pressure. Indeed, the explosion of nursing 
home provision for former long stay NHS patients funded through the benefits system was 
what prompted the Griffiths report on community care (Griffiths, 1988), which in turn 
influenced the 1990 Act. Equally, Cambridge and Huntingdon's concern with inequity 
between specialties, and variation between their own expenditure pattern and that of other 
districts, is not specifically related to the market. 
However, although there have always been attempts to compare expenditure between care 
groups, the advent of contracts with more detailed costing and activity analysis than ever 
before could be assumed to have made this kind of analysis easier and more informative. 
The director of finance believed the NHS reforms had made allocation decisions more 
explicit, but this was because of the new focus on acquiring services for a population 
rather than managing providers. The negotiation of contracts was less significant. He felt 
contracts in their current form did not deal well with any kind of rationing, except the total 
exclusion of some marginal procedures. When it came to less clear-cut issues such as 
reducing the number of D&Cs performed on women under 40, this had to be pursued 
through persuasion and discussion with clinicians, allowing room for the operation of 
clinical judgement at individual patient level. 
However, notes of such discussions were appended to the contract as an agreed statement 
of intent or 'planning agenda', perhaps less strictly defined than the contract but part of it 
nonetheless. He felt 'gentleman's agreement' was a fair description of this process, although 
the chief executive was subsequently to describe it as much firmer and more binding. He 
did also acknowledge that the very process of writing things down had led to greater 
explicitness, not least because there needed to be some record of what had been agreed 
against which monitoring could take place. 
Other factors identified by the director of finance included lack of resources generally, and 
changing public attitudes, which meant that taxpayers wanted to know clearly what they 
were getting for their money and would not let public officials 'get away with' continued 
decision-making behind closed doors. He also described a strong ethical imperative to 
ensure that the interests of minority groups such as those with learning disabilities or 
mental illness were protected, and felt discrimination was much less likely to happen in an 
explicit system of resource allocation. There is certainly evidence that such groups have 
suffered from historic inequities in service provision, and that even explicit attempts to 
give them funding priority have been overwhelmed by political and professional pressures 
to subvert official priorities (Ham, 1992). On the other hand, there is a risk that explicit 
rationing may disadvantage such groups still further - the suggestion, for example, that 
fetuses and severely handicapped newborns do not have full personhood and may therefore 
be accorded lower priority (e.g. Tooley, 1972) is a case in point. The director of finance 
responded that, if this view of personhood were made explicit, he believed the public 
would not accept it. 
Chief Executive 
The chief executive's initial view on whether the purchaser/provider split or the process of 
contracting had caused greater explicitness was 'I don't think it's any of that, it's just 
running out of money.' 
This lack of resources was often brought to a head by new technology, and he cited IVF 
(which Cambridge and Huntingdon purchased within a strict protocol) as an example. He 
thought many authorities had excluded it because they could not afford to keep investing 
more in it, 'and then all kinds of spurious, after-the-event rationalisation is used to justify 
that decision, one of which is to say that it's nothing to do with health.' In Cambridge and 
Huntingdon's particular case, merger of two authorities had been a factor in the 
development of the current policy, as one of the authorities did purchase IVF and the other 
did not, resulting in untenable inequity within the new district. The chief executive 
suggested that personal or family experience of infertility among health authority staff 
could be a more influential factor in whether an authority purchased IVF than evidence of 
effectiveness. 
Because he saw lack of resources as the primary factor in explicit rationing, he had no 
doubt that it would be happening regardless of structure. However, he went on to say that, 
although he did not think it was dependent on the NHS reforms, they did appear to have 
made the process more open, especially because purchasers could think about the needs of 
the population first and foremost. The needs of provider institutions were less important to 
districts than they had been, and this was 'a cultural change for the good'. 
He argued that greater explicitness within the NHS was part of a wider societal change in 
attitude, which meant the public felt it had a right to know more about what was going on. 
This in turn was influenced by the 'decline of deference' generally, and specifically 
deference to the professions. He made the same point in relation to the Patient's Charter -
in his experience, GPs blamed the Charter for making patients more demanding and ready 
to complain, but he saw it rather as an attempt by the government to respond to changes in 
consumer attitudes already taking place. He equated explicitness with being open with the 
public, and regarded decisions which were explicit between, say, doctors and managers, as 
still implicit by his definition. 
Although he accepted the imposition of maximum waiting times had forced implicit 
rationing of some procedures to become more explicit, he thought this was only marginal. 
Many other elective procedures continued to be purchased despite the fact that greater 
health benefit would be gained by spending that money elsewhere, because there was no 
political support for tackling the issue. 
Although he felt the reforms had not made much difference to explicit rationing, he 
believed the fact that contracts were public documents and providers were signing up to a 
certain amount of work for a certain amount of money, and to changes in the way the 
service was delivered, did have some influence. He described previous attempts to change 
services, whether by introducing new procedures or reducing existing ones, as a wish list, 
which no-one had'signed in blood'. 
However, he argued that contracting was speeding up an existing movement towards 
increased explicitness which was being driven by other reasons. 'Things were moving in a 
direction really well before the NHS reforms - introducing management into the NHS, 
introducing the whole notion of setting priorities. I mean, in those days it wasn't called 
rationing because it was about priorities over new money, that was the thing - it wasn't 
about changing what we've got. And I think that's just got more and more intense.' 
The role of extra contractual referrals was discussed in some detail. Because they are often 
highly expensive and often deal with controversial or rare treatments not catered for in 
mainstream contracts, they have been at the cutting edge of explicit rationing. Child В was 
a case in point. The chief executive was particularly concerned at government plans 
(subsequently deferred) to replace the system whereby each ECR had to be approved by 
the relevant health authority with automatic acceptance and payment. He felt the removal 
of this rationing mechanism was a recipe for disastrous loss of financial control. 
Senior Registrar in Public Health 
The views of the senior registrar are included because although, as he pointed out, 'I'm not 
one of the executives', he had been closely involved with rationing work at both local and 
national level. 
Although he felt lack of new money had sharpened thinking about where less effective 
services could be curtailed in order to develop new services, he suggested the issues 
tackled so far, such as homeopathy, had not released significant savings. To make major 
savings would require major shifts in purchasing, beginning to eat into services that are 
effective to some extent, and he thought the resulting public and political outcry would be 
so great that it would not be feasible. 
He was doubtful of the extent to which effectiveness evidence really influenced decisions, 
especially when it pointed to more rather than less investment. He had produced a detailed 
report on the evidence for greater investment in back pain - 'yet in terms of "does that 
make a health authority change the way it purchases?" the answer's "no" - certainly not 
here.. .That's because back pain is not as sexy as cancer and heart disease...The evidence is 
there and everyone round the country's talking about it, yet it's not making a lot of 
difference...Evidence does help, but there are a lot of political imperatives.' 
He felt there was a move towards explicitness, but was sceptical that it was being put into 
practice to any real extent. The contracts, in his view, were a 'mechanism of expression' for 
the 'real decisions' which had been taking place in behind the scenes discussions between a 
few key people in the health authority and clinicians. Persuasion, influence, discussion - the 
broader activities of commissioning rather than contracting - were much more important in 
setting priorities than contracts themselves. 
The fact that ultimately decisions were made by the chief executive and director of public 
health might, he suggested, be entirely right - someone has to take final responsibility for 
weighing up all the evidence and pressures on the service and making a judgement, and 
explicitness was only possible to a limited extent. He was concerned, however, that the 
'rhetoric of explicitness' was not matched by any real transparency of process, and that this 
was essential for public accountability. Whilst each actual decision itself might be made 
behind closed doors, the authority ought to be able to show the public clear, written 
procedures for how decisions generally were made, who was involved and what factors 
were taken into consideration. He discussed a model of informed consent, with the 
authority as organisational doctor and the public as organisational patient - the patient 
might not want or be able to participate in every step of the doctor's decision-making 
about their case, but they would want to be reassured that he or she was acting according 
to certain principles and procedures, and had considered all relevant factors. 
A number of other factors were identified, including media pressure and changing public 
attitudes in favour of more explicitness. Added to this was pressure from academic sources 
associated with the NHS and health care. Health authority staff increasingly felt a sense of 
obligation to be more explicit, and this was at least partly driven by the purchaser provider 
split. 
Director of Public Health 
In this interview, lack of resources was again cited as a primary factor. 'I think it is the 
raison d'etre of health authorities to set priorities, to ration, to allocate resources - use 
whatever term you like...basically it's about the fact that there's a cake of a given size.' The 
resource management initiative, which predated the market, was identified as another 
major factor behind increased explicitness, because it had made the whole of the NHS, 
clinical staff included, more aware of cost. The other important influence, he felt, was the 
clinical audit movement, 'which has turned into the clinical effectiveness movement. Again, 
we don't need the purchaser provider split to get doctors and nurses to understand that it's 
not just their opinion that matters, but is there any scientific backing for what interventions 
they use?' 
He did not believe the NHS was operating a real market in any sense, and described it as 
'the worst of both worlds'. He felt the purchaser provider split had introduced perverse 
incentives; because providers were no longer 'part of the NHS family, working together 
within the framework of a finite cake', but at the same time not subject to genuine 
competitive pressure, it was in their interests to 'hype up technology' and generate 
unmanageable demand. Their lack of willingness to accept that there was only a finite sum 
of money was one of the reasons why difficult choices were having to be made - only a 
pure market, or reintegration under district control, would control the situation. 
On the other hand, he argued that personally he did not think it right that purchasers 
should try to suppress the development of new technology - 'we should let providers do 
what they think is right medically. Then we should ration, and ration very hard. But no 
government will allow that.' His preferred situation would be one where national rationing 
would determine what was to be available as a core state funded service, and individuals 
would be free to purchase whatever extra services they wished. To the extent that the 
market had exposed the conflict between what the state could afford and what was 
medically possible more clearly than ever before, it was perhaps leading to greater 
explicitness, but he believed this would still be necessary without a market, as the 
mismatch between the possible and the affordable would remain. Thus the market affected 
the degree and speed of explicitness, rather than causing it. 
Director and Deputy Director of Acute Commissioning 
The director's view was that 'the mismatch between money and demand' was the main 
driving force behind greater explicitness in rationing. His deputy suggested that the 
contracting process had resulted in much better information being available about what 
their residents were and were not getting, and that this had itself prompted some explicit 
rationing decisions. The director's response was that availability of information in itself was 
not the reason for explicit rationing, and in any case, even if the market had never existed, 
other things would have happened to the NHS, particularly resource management and the 
Patient's Charter. He did not think implicit rationing was possible any more because the 
gap between resources and demand had become so much greater. 
He then discussed whether the internal market had increased the pressure to be explicit, 
and like the director of public health pointed out that 'in the old days before the internal 
market, directly managed hospitals would be under the same pressure and be looking at 
ways to get round it', whereas now this constraint had gone. He also mentioned that, now 
purchasers were responsible for a resident population, the loophole of referring outside the 
district to a provider who would provide the relevant service had been closed off, which 
had made things more explicit. 'So I suppose I'm sort of arguing the reverse of what I 
originally said', he concluded. He also expressed concern that abolishing ECR controls 
would lead to GPs being able to by-pass local exclusions by referring elsewhere. 
The deputy director reiterated the importance of information availability, although the 
director said lack of knowledge was still an obstacle to greater explicitness. 'We do have a 
much better idea of what's going on, but if you were to turn round and say, "well, how do 
we ration urology?"...then where you start is just a nightmare.' He felt detailed 
understanding of procedures was still relatively marginal, and all the easy or obvious ones 
had already been picked off. 
The Patient's Charter was felt by the director to have made existing rationing more 
explicit, rather than actually increasing the total amount. On the other hand, one trust had 
made its own decision to start turning back referrals for a particular procedure, because it 
was compromising its ability to meet Patient's Charter targets. The case of experimental 
laser treatment for snoring (now excluded) had also only been discovered because of a 
review of ENT waiting times. However, a review of the ENT waiting list might not in 
itself have shown up such cases, were it not for the detailed requirements of the contract 
minimum data set now recorded for every episode. 
Plastic surgery provided an interesting example of weaknesses in monitoring agreed 
rationing. A 'loose protocol' had been drawn up some years ago, but GPs were continuing 
to refer people for limited procedures and consultants did not feel able to refuse the 
referrals. It was only as a result of lengthening waiting times and rising emergency activity 
levels in plastic surgery in 1995 that this situation came to light, and the new, more explicit 
protocol was negotiated, including specific criteria for making exceptions. 
The director identified an ethical obligation on health authorities to ration explicitly. He 
felt the gap between resources and demand was something 'we just can't run away from'. 
'This is something most health authorities, and certainly central government, just want to 
duck and just hope it'll go away. I don't think it's fair on anybody, really. I think it's much 
more honest to say, "yes, there is a problem, we do have to ration, but we'll do it as 
humanely as possible".' He was concerned at attempts to disguise rationing as something 
else, such as patient empowerment, giving the example of interactive videos informing 
people about the side effects of prostate surgery as a way of dissuading them from having 
treatment. 
District Three 
Director of Finance 
Although the director of finance argued that lack of money was the main driving force 
behind explicit rationing, the first example he discussed (grommets) was in his view driven 
more by the discovery of service variations - one local consultant was found to perform 
more than twice the national average. The savings identified for reducing this were 'not 
huge in financial terms'. 
However, he identified an urgent need to develop explicit eligibility criteria for renal 
dialysis, where the financial problem was much greater. The kind of cosmetic surgery and 
low priority procedures rationed already were the easy ones, with little financial impact, 
but rationing mainstream services was going to be much harder. 
Many of the decisions taken already had been stimulated by the Patient's Charter. Others 
had first come to the authority's attention as ECRs - these were often the developmental, 
alternative treatments and new drugs which were not covered under normal contracts. 
Like the director of public health in Avon, he identified lack of provision for mental illness 
patients as another factor in the burgeoning cost of ECRs, and suggested that the internal 
market had given the private sector a chance to develop expensive services which the NHS 
had not previously had or even thought it needed. This is further evidence of the market 
unleashing previously suppressed demand. 
The market had also enabled providers to pass decisions back to the purchasers which 
providers had formerly had to make implicitly. Having said this, he added that consultants' 
increasing reluctance to take responsibility for rationing was probably a result of 
worsening financial pressures, and would have happened anyway regardless of structure. 
He concluded that the structure had probably speeded up the process, but it was 
impossible to be certain because so many other circumstances had changed over the last 
five years, particularly the development of new technology. 
The effect of contracting more specifically was unclear. He felt rationing decisions and the 
contracting process were not always well integrated - sometimes things were picked up as 
part of negotiations, but just as often the discussions ran in parallel. One area where 
contracts had made a difference was in increasing the amount of detailed information 
available, particularly because providers needed accurate data to support invoices. He 
contrasted the current situation with the old-style approach to reducing waiting lists, which 
was to allocate more money, rather than analyse what procedures people were waiting for 
and whether they were necessary. 
Enforcing rationing decisions through contracts was another matter - even if monitoring 
showed there was a lack of compliance, there was a limited amount one could then do to 
change the situation. Clinicians did not seem to find the fact that they were in a market 
relationship with the health authority a constraint on what they wanted to do, and if 
anything it made them feel free to 'push it to the hilt'. Peer pressure from clinical 
colleagues concerned about the inequitable use of the resources available might after all be 
a more effective route. The director of finance did feel, however, that contracts helped 
make clinicians more aware of each other's use of resources. 
A further difficulty in using contracts as a way of enforcing rationing decisions was the 
presence of GP fiindholders, who were not bound to follow the same decisions. 
Consultants were more reluctant to abide by exclusions in the contract from the district 
purchaser if they were continuing to provide that service to other patients. 
The director of finance took a somewhat different view of public involvement to his 
colleagues. Whilst he felt it was entirely right and proper that decisions should be more 
explicit at purchaser level, there were great dangers in making them public. In his view, 
public scrutiny operated as a pressure towards implicitness. 
In direct contrast with the views of Avon's chief executive, he did not feel that trusts, 
particularly generic trusts, were trying to do any of their own explicit rationing - the 
impetus came from purchasing. He believed having a generic trust made it easier to move 
money from acute services into community services, because it did not involve depriving 
the trust as a whole of some of its income. He did acknowledge, however, that there had 
been examples of generic trusts moving resources in the opposite direction to support 
acute care, and that this had been one factor in the change in national policy after the 
second wave towards generic trust applications. 
A move away from trust status under a new government would not, he felt, make a great 
difference to current relationships with providers, which were already a process of 
continuous dialogue, but it probably would mean that 'the purist contracting way we do 
things will be watered down to a very large extent.' 
Chief Executive 
The chief executive felt evidence on effectiveness was becoming an increasingly important 
influence on rationing. 'Our discourse on priority setting, resource allocation and rationing 
has changed subtly but very firmly away from notions of rationing as denial to some people 
of certain interventions towards a much greater emphasis on clinical effectiveness, and on 
cost-effectiveness of treatments.' It was primarily for this reason that the authority did not 
operate any blanket exclusions except in IVF, because a demonstrable clinical need should 
always override the decision. He also agreed with his director of finance that fiindholding 
made it impossible to hold the line on absolute exclusions. 
Personal views and social judgements also played a strong part. They had been influential 
in discussions about whether IVF should be provided locally, and the chief executive said 
he thought previous experience in mental health provision amongst individual staff 
members had resulted in a more liberal purchasing policy towards various mental health 
interventions than in other districts. He also discussed the social judgements underlying 
policies on funding abortions. 
He felt contracts had made rationing more explicit, although perhaps not as much as some 
people had thought it would. Many contracts were still relatively broad brush and left a lot 
to the individual clinician, but gradually 'as we have moved to disaggregate contracts 
between specialties...there is a move more and more to specify more closely who we will 
treat and on what basis.' Technological advances in some specialties, such as renal dialysis, 
were also forcing the pace because of the resource pressures they created. 
The reason why many contracts remained broad brush was not that it was impossible to 
specify services in more detail. 'First of all, it wasn't felt perhaps necessary at the 
beginning. Secondly, there was opposition from consultants to specifying more clearly 
what they should do - the clinical freedom argument. It took some time for purchasers and 
providers to get a grip on that. Thirdly, the money has become tighter over time. At the 
beginning it may not have been as necessary as it now is to specify more clearly. Fourthly, 
I think, there were arguments that rationing...that there was a Holy Grail somewhere, if 
only we could find it, and we would be able to determine what should be treated and what 
shouldn't. We've realised that that's actually very difficult - that in many cases you can't say 
"never". And therefore you begin looking at what's possible....As we've gradually become 
more knowledgeable, as purchasing has developed, as we have recognised that 
effectiveness is the key, we've had to begin to think about developing protocols and 
guidelines for using the services.' 
He concluded that lack of money and greater availability of research evidence were crucial 
driving forces and that contracting was 'simply the mechanism' for expressing the results, 
not in itself the cause of explicit rationing. 
He added that the purchaser provider split, which had disrupted the historic funding to 
providers, and the competitive nature of the service were further factors. He illustrated 
this by describing how one hospital had begun to develop a particular specialist service 
against the policy of the district, which wanted to concentrate this specialism at another 
provider. The district was responding by developing a detailed protocol to specify safe 
levels of service and under what circumstances a patient should be transferred to the 
specialist provider. 
The role of competition was limited, however; for the most part the system did not really 
operate as a market, so things would not change significantly under a Labour government. 
It was precisely the lack of a real market which made protocols and guidelines so 
important as an alternative way of controlling provider activity - 'I think the future does lie 
in terms of effectiveness issues, rather than in terms of buying where we get the best 
quality and price within the market.' The Labour idea of healthcare agreements was simply 
contracts by another name, and they would continue to be a way of enshrining agreed 
protocols. It was unclear how abolishing ECRs would work, however. 
The chief executive anticipated that rationing would become more explicit, but gradually, 
rather than dramatically; although there were pressures to remain implicit, he did not think 
these would win the day. He felt one of the pressures in favour of implicitness came from 
the public, who would prefer not to have to face these decisions and would rather hold on 
to the belief that doctors can be trusted to make the best judgements on their behalf. 
However, the Patient's Charter, rising consumer expectations and debate over cases such 
as Child В meant that there was now increased awareness of the issue and a point of no 
return had probably been reached. Once people became aware doctors were making 
rationing decisions, they wanted these to be open and would challenge a decision not to 
provide active treatment. Some doctors might believe the point of no return had not yet 
been reached and that they could still maintain a purely implicit approach, but equally there 
were other doctors who would prefer not to have this responsibility any more. 
Acting Director of Public Health 
The acting director of public health was due to leave shortly after the interview to become 
director in another district. The new director had not yet taken up post. 
He began by stating that much of the pressure to ration low priority treatments more 
explicitly had come from GPs, because many of them felt uneasy continuing to refer 
patients for such treatments, but unable to refuse. They felt 'it would strengthen our arm 
considerably if there is a policy.' GP fundholders were also involved in seeking an explicit 
policy, partly to give their own policies a wider framework of support, and partly to avoid 
losing patients to other practices if they wanted a treatment that the fundholding practice 
did not feel should be provided. This offered a somewhat different perspective to the chief 
executive and director of finance view that exclusions were made more difficult to operate 
by the presence of GP fundholders. The Patient's Charter had had some influence, 'but it 
felt more like an environmental factor - that that was part of what made GPs feel the way 
that they were feeling.' 
The other main strand in work on low priority treatments was clinical effectiveness, which 
the authority wanted to make a driving force as a matter of principle. However, he said, 
'I'm very worried that when we stand back from it and look at that, an awful lot of it has a 
very discriminatory flavour about it', thinking particularly of procedures such as tattoo 
removal, gender reassignment and reversal of sterilisation. 
IVF had come up as an issue, as in Cambridge and Huntingdon, because of the merger of 
health authorities with different policies. Again, it had been approached from a rigorous 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness approach; although there had been discussions about 
whether infertility was a social or medical condition, he did not feel this had influenced the 
final outcome. Even though IVF was excluded, other therapies for unexplained fertility, 
such as drugs, were not excluded, and the decision as to where to draw the line was based 
solely on 'cost per maternity'. Nonetheless, he felt there was an important point here for 
the future of rationing, 'as medical technology makes it possible to do things which are 
"unnatural"', and to alter conditions which 'it's much harder to define as diseases'. 
Although he had been one of the main proponents of establishing principles (including 
effectiveness) on which rationing decisions should be based, he suggested that in practice 
decision-making was still largely dominated by 'subjective opinion or prejudice' and by 
political pressures such as the need to maintain emergency services. 
His view on the processes of contracting was 'I don't think they've led to very much more 
explicitness. They've led to much more explicitness about levels of activity, and some sort 
of things around cost, but not really around the balance between choices... The naive 
concept of the quasi-market might have been that the purchasers would say what they 
want, and providers would think of ways of meeting those. And of course it doesn't 
happen that way at all.' 
However, the ethos of competition had led to 'providers, especially clinicians, being more 
robust in their justifications of what they want to do.' This had had an impact on making 
choices, because it had thrust them back at purchasers and demanded a more explicit 
response. As other interviewees had suggested, 'the purchaser provider split has decoupled 
health authorities from the old methods of control that they used to use, which were 
basically control of supply', although occasionally providers did retain some sense of 
corporate responsibility. Competition had also made providers fearful that if they did not 
develop new services they would lose out to other providers, so there had been 'multiple 
developments of specialist services... Then the pressure is on to do something we might not 
have chosen to do.' 
He did not believe contracts disaggregated by specialty made any difference - he thought in 
any case most authorities had specialty-specific activity, but 'nobody has contracts which 
are rigid by specialty.' Variations between contracts, or between specialty activity levels 
would still be handled by allowing underperformance in one to compensate for 
overperformance in another. However, he agreed that the difficulties in renal services were 
now such that the trust would no longer work within a general financial cap, and was 
seeking more explicit patient selection criteria from purchasers - in effect creating a 
specialty-based contract. This may be a case of the need to ration explicitly causing a 
contract to become more explicit, rather than the other way round. 
In general, however, he felt that the need for flexibility, combined with prohibitive 
transaction costs, meant that most contracts would remain broader than this. This would 
tend to support the Williamson and Bartlett thesis that bounded rationality and uncertainty 
require something more adaptable than a rigid contract specification. He also suggested 
that where very specific contracting had been tried, the sum of the individual contracts 
negotiated always ended up being greater than the total purchasing budget available, so it 
was a dangerous route. 
For him, the ultimate reason for explicit rationing was 'cost control versus all those 
pressures that we know about - elderly population, medical technology and all those sorts 
of things.' However, whilst cost control required choices to be made, these did not always 
have to be explicit but could be implicit. 'Some of the choices that are involved are so 
difficult that it is actually really quite hard to present them to people in ways that they can 
understand' - not least because of the complexity of effectiveness evidence and poor 
understanding of statistical risk. 'That's actually extremely difficult for people, individually 
or collectively, to make those choices - whether those people are doctors or not, actually. 
And there's some kind of negotiation processes that go on, where the implicitness is 
around those people who have that bit more knowledge, experience, training, and are more 
able to weigh those things up, and take that awfully heavy burden of doing that for other 
people.' He identified a different kind of transaction cost - that of trying to explain the full 
benefits and risks of a particular procedure to a patient, when it takes years of training for 
even the doctor to understand it. 
Another advantage to implicitness was that 'we do face a lot of rabid values out there', 
amongst GPs as well as the public; whilst it might be paternalist to say it, it might be the 
only way to protect people with, say, learning disabilities from more extreme forms of 
rationing than they already experience. 'That's where I really become a benevolent 
dictator.' 
Directors of Commissioning 
District Three has two patch-based directors of commissioning, one of whom (DC2) had 
only taken up her post the week in which the interviews were carried out. Most of the 
comments below are therefore from the existing post-holder (DC1). 
DC1 was sceptical about the ability of contracts to specify and control activity to the last 
detail, and that this might be in any case undesirable. She favoured using more professional 
self-regulation through the Royal Colleges and protocols to decide what care would and 
would not be provided, as opposed to the current approach of Royal Colleges of 
specifying ideal wish lists. At the moment, she said, the simplistic view of contracts was 
'we specify, they do', whereas the reality was 'we specify, they think about it, and then 
carry on doing what they normally do.' Difficulties of monitoring and enforcing detailed 
contracts and their subversion by clinicians was a recurring theme during the interview. 
The other danger with a very detailed specification was that 'clinicians use it as a powerful 
lever to abrogate any responsibility that they have for making rationing decisions, and use 
it as a way of exercising leverage on us, for us to give them more money. So the 
specification can actually be used very negatively against purchasers.' 
This did not necessarily mean in her view that the contracting process was bound to be 
inefficient, but that it could only be efficient if contracts were broad and flexible, and were 
backed up by changes in clinical practice led by the professions. 'In terms of the documents 
being at least manageable, then you have to assume that common sense and custom and 
practice will prevail. But actually putting that down in the document is particularly 
challenging.' 
However, she too described how the problems with developments in a specialist service at 
one hospital which the authority did not support were resulting in precisely that kind of 
detailed and prescriptive contract being drawn up, if only 'to protect us from a medico-
legal point of view'. 
A further concern was that monitoring detailed contracts relied on professional staff 
having in place quality assurance mechanisms that sometimes turned out not to exist -
'there is the reluctance to use specifications because it does uncover weaknesses...in the 
current system.' 
Both interviewees felt equity of access was a major motivating factor in making explicit 
rationing decisions, along with a strong sense of the unfairness of low priority treatments 
being continued at the expense of other more important interventions. DC1 acknowledged 
that, in fact, stopping low priority treatments rarely released much money to reinvest in the 
more important things - 'it's more the principle than the number of people'. 
The Patient's Charter was felt to have operated in a number of ways - it had given 
purchasers 'added legitimacy' in challenging clinical practice, it had improved provider 
efficiency, and had removed the potential for consultants deliberately to maintain a long 
waiting list to create demand for private practice. However, DC1 noted that not providing 
certain treatments at all could also channel patients towards private care. The Patient's 
Charter could also exercise a negative influence; clinically necessary breast reductions 
(which took three to four hours to complete) might have to wait longer than they would 
otherwise have done, because consultants were reluctant to fill up their theatre sessions 
with one case and thereby slow down their throughput and lengthen their overall waiting 
times. 
Both directors discussed the potential for sharing research evidence with patients to reduce 
the need for rationing, because some patients might then choose not to have the operation. 
On the other hand, they were concerned about the possible presentation of information in 
such a way as to persuade patients to choose the cheapest rather than the best option. An 
additional problem was that purchasers might simply not know what alternative treatments 
were available, and could not trust providers with vested interests to let them know. This 
was an area where GP fundholders could prove useful allies. They were undecided 
whether offering someone an alternative treatment that might be more beneficial but which 
they did not want counted as rationing - was need or demand the criterion against which 
rationing should be judged? 
On the subject of personal ethical difficulties, both directors agreed explicit rationing was 
hard, especially at an individual patient level (as in ECRs), and that telling the public or 
providers could make them feel very vulnerable and unsure if they were doing the right 
thing. However, being open about it was also a defence and a necessary responsibility. 
DC2 said 'I think they're shared decisions, aren't they? Which makes it more bearable', and 
DC1 said the worst kind of decision was having to say 'no' to an ECR 'if I'm the last 
person left in the building'. This echoes the comment from Avon's director of public health 
that no-one wanted to be left 'holding the smoking gun', although the uncomfortable nature 
of the decisions was not actually preventing the directors of commissioning from taking 
them. They certainly did not believe it was right or even possible to get the public to make 
the decisions instead. 
There was an ethical imperative for purchasers to mount an explicit challenge to some 
aspects of clinical practice - whilst lack of money might account for 'two thirds' of the 
reasons behind explicit rationing, DC1 felt it was an important way to stop patients having 
needless operations or being subjected to heroic intervention in the last days of life, if 
based on sound effectiveness evidence. It might also reduce clinical experimentation with 
resource-intensive procedures when it might be quicker and more efficient for patients as a 
whole 'if you just got the knife out and got on with it'. 
The process of contracting might help by making available information that would 
otherwise not have been there - 'without the purchaser side of it would we ever have sat 
down and thought about what services were like and described them? I don't think that we 
would have.' 'I think that we may have done it in some areas, but not quite as 
comprehensively as I think we've been forced to.' It had accelerated a movement that had 
begun before the market to question what value would be obtained from appointing an 
additional member of staff - assessing investment in terms of service benefits rather than 
whole time equivalents. 
Contracts were a means to start dialogue and also to record its results, but could not 
replace the delicate process of change management with clinicians; contracts had to be 
used 'as an agreement, rather than as a blunt instrument that we try and catch each other 
out with', otherwise they might be counter-productive. It was therefore unlikely that a 
change of government would mean any great change in contracts. What it might mean was 
a reduction in the transaction costs of'invoices and lots of accountants and processing'. 
Discussion 
There are clearly identifiable recurring themes in interviewees' explanations of the driving 
forces behind greater explicitness in rationing. The most important of these is lack of 
resources, although so far the kind of rationing decisions being made are only scratching 
the surface of this problem. Nonetheless, the general climate of scarcity is extremely 
influential. 
Lack of money on its own is not a sufficient explanation, however, as one possibility 
would be simply to increase the amount of explicit rationing taking place. Several other 
themes emerged during interviews - the possible interactions between these factors are 
discussed more fully in Chapter Nine. These themes included: 
The Patient's Charter 
Other government initiatives, such as eligibility criteria for continuing care 
Changing public attitudes 
Contracts (to a limited extent), especially the greater availability of information and the 
need to specify services in more detail than ever before 
The purchaser provider split more generally - the focus on the population, not on 
providers, has freed purchasers to make tougher decisions, and also made providers 
less likely to comply with implicit rationing 
Perceived inequity (often geographical, made more stark by HA mergers) and the need 
to protect disadvantaged groups 
An ethical obligation to be explicit, both because it is seen as a way of guaranteeing 
fairness and because it is a democratic responsibility 
Improved information for reasons other than contracting (e.g. resource management 
initiative, audit) 
The clinical effectiveness movement and improved availability of research findings. 




Lack of beds (particularly in mental health) 
Technological advance 
What are the obstacles to explicit rationing, or pressures in favour of implicitness? 
There was a remarkable degree of consistency between health authorities and between 
disciplines in analysing the obstacles to explicit rationing; their views are therefore 
discussed mainly in aggregate. Some of the obstacles have already been mentioned in the 
previous section, as interviewees explored the often contradictory effects of the factors 
they identified. 
There was an absolutely clear agreement that political reluctance to be seen to be 
rationing explicitly was the most obvious difficulty. Views about whether it would be 
desirable to have some form of national rationing framework differed, but the unanimous 
view was that in reality it would never happen, because it would be politically 
unacceptable. This applied to all political parties. 
The chief executive of Cambridge and Huntingdon commented on the planned abolition of 
the approval system for elective ECRs in this context. The ostensible reason for making 
ECRs automatic was to reduce transaction costs and bureaucracy, but the chief executive 
felt the reasons were in fact more overtly political - to 'prove that the internal market is 
responsive to clinical need, and they don't want managers to keep saying no to doctors.' 
The director of acute commissioning in Cambridge and Huntingdon saw the ECR question 
somewhat differently: he agreed that the government did intend it to be 'a sop to GPs' to 
guarantee freedom of referral, and a sop to cutting bureaucracy and transaction costs, but 
saw the potential loss of financial control as 'cock-up rather than conspiracy', stemming 
from a lack of understanding of real practicalities. 
The government requirement that no treatments should be subject to a total exclusion 
unless completely ineffective was also evidence of government unwillingness to allow the 
ideal of a comprehensive NHS to be openly challenged, even if rationing was accepted 
tacitly. Several interviewees commented on the government's decision to make beta 
interferon available on the NHS, despite evidence of low effectiveness which would have 
given them an opportunity to reject it. One respondent contrasted this with the 
government's willingness to introduce limited list prescribing before the market was 
established. 
Interviewees felt effectiveness evidence did have the potential to encourage and to justify 
more explicit rationing decisions; on the other hand, taking effectiveness seriously also 
meant 'never say never'. There would always be individuals for whom a treatment of 
generally low effectiveness was worth trying, and this required flexibility for clinicians to 
exercise judgement. Allowing exceptions to be made meant allowing implicit rationing to 
maintain a significant role, albeit 'against a basis of clarity which we have the guts to 
provide', as the chief executive of Avon said. 
Despite increased availability of effectiveness information, several interviewees pointed out 
that it still barely scratched the surface of the majority of healthcare provision, and that 
historical funding patterns continued to form the basis for most allocation decisions. 
Sometimes even where evidence was available it was ignored, because cutting a service 
would be politically and publicly unacceptable. Sometimes the evidence suggested that 
more of a particular service should be purchased, rather than offering a rationale for 
limiting it, but again, such evidence might be ignored because it would prove too difficult 
to cut other things to find the money. The urgent need to prop up emergency services in 
the last contracting round had also taken priority over other longer term projects. 
Interviewees were very conscious that rationing was a difficult but inevitable responsibility, 
whether implicit or explicit. Personal and collective ethical concerns were already present, 
therefore, and did not generally act as an obstacle to explicitness; although psychological 
and emotional reluctance to be explicit was mentioned by several interviewees, it tended to 
be outweighed by a perceived ethical imperative precisely to be explicit. However, it was 
acknowledged that so far only procedures where there was a reasonable degree of 
consensus had been tackled, and where the effects of rationing were not generally life-
threatening, so purchasers still felt on reasonably safe ethical ground. IVF was probably 
the most controversial of the commonly rationed procedures, and this was reflected in 
more ethical concerns as to whether the right decision had been made. There was general 
acknowledgement, too, that areas such as renal dialysis and oncology presented a huge 
ethical challenge, and that this was definitely delaying the introduction of explicit rationing. 
However, most seemed to feel that this delay would not be indefinite and that in the end 
the ethical problems would have to be overcome. 
Two interviewees took opposing views about the benefits of explicitness for vulnerable 
groups such as those with learning disabilities. One suggested that it was the best way to 
protect their interests against those of the more glamorous acute services and ensure they 
were not surreptitiously denied appropriate services. This contrasted with the view that 
implicit, paternalist decision-making might be the only way to protect people with learning 
disabilities from more extreme forms of rationing than they already experience. However, 
this was more a theoretical argument in defence of implicitness rather than a belief that it 
would in practice act as an obstacle to explicitness. 
The views of the public were seen in similar terms to ethical considerations - in some 
ways an obstacle to greater explicitness ('the pressure of the bureaucracy for a quiet life'), 
and one of the things that made explicitness most uncomfortable - but at the same time 
constituting a pressure towards greater explicitness. Many interviewees commented that 
they thought public attitudes had changed and that people would no longer tolerate 
secrecy, even if they did not like what they then found out. 
Although contracting had increased the amount of detailed information available, 
interviewees reported that there were still large gaps in purchasers' knowledge of what was 
being provided and how worthwhile much of it was. Part of the problem was that to 
specify every eventuality would be a) very expensive and b) probably not possible, with the 
result that for many areas broad, flexible contracts would continue to be needed. (See 
further discussion of transaction costs below). 
Furthermore, there was strong evidence of difficulties in monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with contracts - 'we specify, they think about it, and then carry on doing what 
they normally do' - and concern that providers would not always be open about what was 
being provided. There were several instances where lack of compliance had been 
discovered almost by chance. Once discovered, it frequently led to the contract being 
tightened up, with even more explicit specification of exclusions. However, several 
interviewees felt that no matter how specific contracts became, they could still not replace 
the need for co-operation, persuasion and influence needed to achieve changes in clinical 
practice. These were sometimes integrated with the contract negotiating process, but more 
often ran in parallel with it. One interviewee suggested very explicit contracts had actually 
made it more difficult to achieve such change, because they alienated clinicians who might 
otherwise have been more willing to compromise. Although most interviewees felt 
providers used the purchaser provider split as a way of forcing rationing back onto 
purchasers, there was limited evidence from Avon that clinicians felt so constrained by the 
result that they decided to re-establish more implicit mechanisms. 
Most interviewees felt the market did not work as a market because of local monopolies 
(amongst other factors), which enabled providers effectively to ignore contracts if they so 
chose. Despite the feeling that purchasers had been liberated from worries about provider 
interests, some continued to express a sense of shared responsibility for providers' fixed 
infrastructure costs, suggesting that monopoly provision also restricted their ability to 
make explicit rationing decisions, let alone enforce them. 
Two districts were actively pursuing the idea of longer term contracts, and in practice all 
the districts regarded contracts as expressions of longer term commitment to providers, 
albeit with a continuing need for annual re-evaluation. There was a general view that they 
were already seeking to negotiate the kind of contracts described by Labour as healthcare 
agreements. 
The existence of GP fundholding was felt by many to be an obstacle for health authority 
purchasers in enforcing explicit rationing decisions, because it was hard to stick to the 
decision if other patients locally were exempt. Even in cases where GP fundholders were 
not officially able to buy the procedure which was excluded, they were able sometimes to 
circumvent this unofficially. 
Other structural problems included the existence of generic trusts and the sometimes 
linked problem of inadequate staff numbers and expertise at district level. Generic 
trusts were felt to reinforce the difficulty of getting adequate information out of providers, 
and to allow providers to retain greater control over continued implicit rationing between 
community and acute services, particularly where a previous district management team had 
transferred to the trust virtually intact. The knock-on effect was to leave the health 
authority drained of skill, local knowledge and sheer numbers of people. 
Views on the extent of transaction costs were somewhat mixed. The chief executive of 
Cambridge and Huntingdon said, 'I just do not believe there has been a massive increase in 
transaction costs between health authorities and trusts. Where there has been a massive 
increase in transaction costs has been all the transaction costs associated with GP 
fimdholding...they occur in the GP practice, but they also occur in the trusts, because the 
trusts have to manage a whole series of tiny contracts.' His views were based partly on 
local experience of health authority mergers, which had led to reductions in staffing costs. 
However, this was comparing the costs of two health authorities already set up as 
purchasers as against one authority, rather than comparing the cost of a purchasing agency 
with an old-style district before the market. 
He did acknowledge that the purchaser provider split and the contracting process did entail 
some extra costs but added 'whether the transaction costs that that generates are 
outweighed by the benefits is an interesting question. I genuinely don't know the answer to 
that.' He was emphatic that transaction costs could not be judged on their own, without 
some assessment of whether the system was achieving better value for money as a result, 
so did not see high transaction costs in themselves as prohibitive. This was particularly the 
case with ECRs, where he thought investing in a few staff to scrutinise requests for 
approval rigorously could save the authority much more than it cost. 
He did identify managerial pressure to get a quick decision as a pressure in favour of 
implicitness, because 'explicitness means openness of discussion, it means consultation 
periods, it means public meetings.' This could be interpreted as unaffordable transaction 
costs acting as an obstacle to explicitness. 
The chief executive of Avon echoed the view that GP fiindholding was the main culprit in 
increasing transaction costs and that its abolition would lead to a substantial reduction in 
staffing in trusts and general practice. In health authorities, by contrast, what purchasing 
staff'spend most of their time doing in most of the year is actually working with the trusts 
to ensure that the services are what we want them to be - that they're of a decent quality, 
and that we are putting the time in together planning the new things...the old service 
planning agenda, if you like. The fact that then, for three to four months of the year, they 
nearly kill themselves working about 80% overtime for a period of time, does mean that 
you would not halve the number of contracting staff [if contracting were abolished]... Of 
that team of about twenty people, if you didn't have as precise a contracting arrangement, 
you'd probably take out a couple, quite honestly.' A few information posts might also go, 
and simplifying some of the information requirements 'would take a degree of the silliness 
and the messiness and the playing arithmetic games out, and that would be entirely 
sensible.' Essentially, however, she supported the view that transaction costs were not that 
significant and gave good value for money. 
Her director of finance pointed out that most contracts were financially a simple block 
arrangement with each trust, specifically to avoid 'this business of charging all over the 
place for things' - cost and volume arrangements accounted for less than 1% of total 
activity - even though within the block of money activity could be specified in some detail. 
Although the director of public health in Avon agreed that transaction costs were a good 
reason for sticking to block contracts in financial terms, he was less sanguine about 
whether it was possible or even desirable to specify activity in great detail nonetheless. 'I 
can envisage it going on exactly the same as if we were health authorities and the senior 
people in the health authority were setting service level agreements with their operational 
people [i.e. pre or post market]. And is that because contracts can just never get that 
explicit? I mean, you know, listing absolutely everything that's done, because it would just 
be too much work and a waste of time?' 
Other interviewees, particularly in District Three, expressed the view more strongly that 
the purchaser provider split and the process of writing contracts had indeed entailed extra 
costs, particularly in financial administration, and that the value obtained was sometimes 
doubtful. The acting director of public health believed further increases in transaction 
costs, coupled with the need to retain flexibility, would prevent further development of 
explicit contracts on a large scale, even though it would happen in a few areas where 
particular resource pressures were forcing the pace. 
Discussion 
At one level, some interviewees argued that transaction costs were not an obstacle to 
explicit rationing because although they undoubtedly existed they were not in fact very 
high, at least in health authorities. Yet at another level there was recognition that they 
could be a lot higher if contracts were specified in greater detail across the board, and that 
a deliberate decision had been made to avoid increasing transaction costs in this way, 
because the gains would not justify the expense. 
It would appear that there was a trade-off at work here, which was not necessarily fully 
acknowledged. The perception that the transaction costs of running a market and writing 
contracts were not very high in fact reflected a view that an appropriate balance had been 
struck between the benefits and costs of greater explicitness. There is a point at which the 
costs of obtaining information, negotiating and monitoring does become an obstacle to 
making contracts more specific - interviewees took differing views as to whether this point 
had already been crossed or had been skilfully avoided. 
Whether this obstacle would prove to be insurmountable was another matter. Most 
interviewees believed explicit rationing would continue to spread, albeit in selected areas 
rather than across the board. Again, this probably demonstrates the view that in these areas 
there were still gains to be had from greater explicitness that would outweigh the 
transaction costs, whereas in other areas the costs could not be justified. 
Most did not believe there was a significantly cheaper way of achieving the same result, 
because they could not envisage a return to a hierarchical and integrated organisation. 
They did not believe the Labour Party's proposals would mean a return to hierarchy; 
although they might make marginal reductions in transaction costs, the essence of the 
contracting system would have to remain. One interviewee pointed out that even before 
the purchaser provider split, the NHS had been moving towards more sophisticated cost 
and management accountancy and this would have incurred its own transaction costs. 
Chapter Eight 
Back from the brink? The effects of a pre-election budget 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the second and third round of interviews in the three 
case study health authorities. (See also Chapter Five on methods). The second round of 
interviews was carried out in January and February 1997. It was planned to interview the 
directors of public health and the directors of contracting/commissioning, as they would be 
closest to the detail of contract negotiations. Owing to timetabling difficulties, in District 
Three it was possible to interview only the director of commissioning. 
At the first round of interviews, it was striking that the directors of finance expressed a 
feeling of distance from the dilemmas of rationing, and did not feel they were the best 
people to interview. Their sense of remoteness from the debate about rationing is in itself 
an important finding, particularly in terms of the extent to which greater explicitness is 
finance-driven, or otherwise. At any rate, it certainly does not seem to be finance director-
driven. 
The third round of interviews took place in June and July 1997; the directors of public 
health and contracting were re-interviewed, and the chief executive in two of the three 
districts. The third was unable to keep the appointment. 
At the first interviews in the summer of 1996, there was a general consensus that the 
financial position for 1997/98 was going to be extremely tight, and that further 
developments in explicit rationing would be inevitable in order to deal with this. A 
prophetic note was sounded by one chief executive, however: 'Something that I think 
would be a backward step would be for a government in the dying days before an election 
to shove a whole lot of money into the NHS, because it would just literally be buying time, 
because next year we would be at the point where in fact we're at this year. So no amount 
of money will do anything other than act as a time delay.' 
There is always disagreement within the NHS and between the NHS and the government 
about exactly what percentage of real growth a particular budget settlement represents, 
after allowing for inflation, efficiency savings and keeping pace with technological and 
demographic change. Different authorities use terms such as 'deficits', 'unavoidable 
commitments', 'essential developments' or 'priorities for development' in different ways, 
and it is not easy to be sure like is being compared with like. Nonetheless, the settlement 
for 1997/98 did seem to make a radical difference to the authorities being studied, 
although the effect was by no means uniform. In fact it resulted in considerable divergence 
between the three authorities, and between their plans for explicit rationing. 
All three authorities received more than the 1.89% allocated nationally. Avon received 
2.2% growth, Cambridge and Huntingdon 2.5% and District Three 2%, according to their 
own documentation. However, both Cambridge and Huntingdon and District Three 
reported that serious deficits experienced during 1996/97 were a first call on growth 
money, which reduced the amount available to them considerably. This was in addition to 
ECR shortfalls, which Avon also reported. 
The original aim of following the case studies through a whole contracting cycle had been 
to pick out one or two concrete examples of new explicit rationing decisions in each 
authority and to explore how they were made and whether they were in fact implemented. 
It became apparent in January that the changed financial position meant this would not be 
possible as planned. 
Given the divergence between authorities, the experience in each one is analysed 
separately. 
Contract negotiations for 1997/98 
Avon 
In Avon, the director of contracting reported that their original expectation of a £2m 
additional allocation had been transformed into an actual addition of £8m, a fourfold 
increase. In fact by the time of the third interviews, the extra allocation had turned out to 
be £8.4m (2.2% real growth), plus an additional £0.6m from reductions in regional levies. 
Some of this was due to a greater than expected increase in general growth funding and 
some of it was due to a change to their advantage in the way that the 'market forces factor' 
was applied to allocations. There was some speculation about the extent to which this was 
a result of political lobbying by local conservative MPs in marginal constituencies, worried 
about losing their seats at the election if the local health service was seen to be having 
funding difficulties. 
As a result of this allocation increase, the district's senior managers felt they could defer 
major explicit rationing decisions within existing services that might otherwise have been 
necessary, although in the longer term they believed their allocation would be reduced 
again as further adjustments to weighted capitation were made. They were therefore still 
pursuing less immediate plans for explicit service reductions, especially in oncology 
services, and in 1997/98 would continue to challenge some existing provision (such as 
D&Cs in women under 40) on the grounds of low cost-effectiveness, but this was likely to 
be marginal to their annual purchasing plan. The rationing issues were 'still there, and 
they're happening all the time, but what we haven't had is the urgent need to suddenly 
impose a new layer.' The district had no deficit to make up, but all the available growth 
money went on essential developments, particularly in coping with growing acute service 
pressures. The point was also made that waiting times had to be allowed to lengthen in 
order to stay within the allocation, an example of the continued use of more implicit 
mechanisms. 
By the time the third interviews took place, district managers were optimistic that further 
adjustments to weighted capitation would not affect them as adversely as they had 
anticipated, so the financial position looked more stable. 
The director of public health anticipated continued 'unofficial suppression of demand1, 
particularly in the field of new drug technology. This was an area which interviewees in 
other districts also identified as a problem. Unofficial suppression took the form of the 
authority telling the clinicians that additional money for new drugs would simply not be 
made available. In several cases this had been accepted and the clinicians were not 
prescribing the drug in question. Although this agreement was unofficial, it may well have 
reflected a belief on the part of the clinicians that the authority would formalise the 
decision if unofficial mechanisms were not accepted, as indeed it had done very explicitly 
in the case of beta interferon the previous year. 
The authority took differing approaches for different drugs. In the case of beta interferon, 
it had refused to make additional funding available, but accepted that it might be effective 
for selected individuals and that, if the neurologists wanted to prescribe it from within their 
existing budgets, they could do so. In other cases where concerns about effectiveness were 
stronger, such as Riluzole for motor neurone disease, 'we went further, and said "not only 
are we not going to fund it, but we don't think clinicians in the area should use it either." 
But that wasn't public in the sense that we advertised that at a public health authority 
meeting, or took the decision in public. It's public in that that's the content of letters which 
have gone to trusts and clinicians.' Neither beta interferon nor Riluzole were mentioned in 
contracts. This was partly influenced by continuing uncertainty as to whether a drug 
constitutes a treatment in its own right, which should be specified in the contract, or 
whether it is merely an in-put to treatment, in the same way as staffing levels or medical 
supplies, which would be assumed as part of the price and not specified separately. 
The use of recombinant Factor VIII for haemophiliacs was also the target of explicit 
decision-making. Recombinant Factor VIII is a synthetic, genetically engineered clotting 
agent, which can be used instead of the traditional product derived from human blood. As 
this was the source of HIV infection which affected so many haemophiliacs, they are 
understandably keen to use the new recombinant version for absolute safety. The 
authority, on the other hand, took the view that new production methods for old-style 
Factor VIII meant it no longer posed any infection risk. In all other aspects it performs as 
well as recombinant Factor VIII and is a fraction of the price1. 
The director of public health felt that, despite 'vituperative' opposition to the authority's 
decision, it would be stated explicitly in contracts: 
'What we're increasingly doing, I have to say, is being explicit about it all right, but 
not agreeing with them. We don't reach agreement - there's no point at which they 
say, "all right, fair cop", and there's no point at which we say, "all right, we give 
in". We just simply say, "no, we are not making that money available". The trusts 
can't hold up contracts for that, so we have this kind of "not agreed" position.' 
In fact by the time of the third interviews, the authority had not formally agreed its 
decision, so the issue had not been concluded in the contracts for 1997/98. 
Both the director of public health and the director of contracting agreed that refusing to 
purchase new services in this way did constitute rationing, and yet at the same time they 
both stated that the financial allocation for 1997/98 meant they did not have to do much 
explicit rationing. The public perception of what rationing means is generally making cuts 
in existing services, and health authority staff respond to this perception in the way they 
present their decisions, even though in their own minds they are clear that there is no 
rational difference between cuts and not purchasing new services. As noted in Chapter 
Three, differences in perceptions and use of terminology are a recurrent feature of the 
rationing debate. 
In some ways it is not surprising that decisions not to purchase new technology sometimes 
fail to find their way into contracts, since the purpose of a contract is to state what will be 
provided. Whilst it may be expected that contracts would state the exclusion of something 
that has formed part of the contract in the past and now does not, it may not be reasonable 
1 It is interesting to note that media coverage of a law suit against three health authorities in the north 
west of England to try to force them to pay for recombinant Factor VIII for four haemophiliac children 
presented the issue as one of geographical inequity. The families too stressed that they thought it was 
unfair that their sons should not be treated with it when health authorities in the south routinely paid for 
recombinant Factor VIII. The authority in this case study was in the south and was choosing not to buy the 
treatment despite a year of unforeseen plenty in financial terms. 
The question of infection risk has recently become an issue again, this time in relation to new variant CJD. 
to expect contracts to describe services that have never been provided and are not going to 
be provided. 
All the interviewees in Avon expressed particular interest in the use of thresholds as a way 
of rationing - rather than blanket exclusions (and perhaps partly to cope with the fact that 
these go against ministerial guidance), the aim is to cap demand by setting thresholds for 
treatment using explicit criteria. The financial position meant that they could delay 
debating one such move, which would have been to reduce the frequency of breast-
screening. On the other hand, continuing resource pressures in oncology meant they would 
be developing more explicit protocols, covering issues such as restricting access to 
chemotherapy for palliative care and shortening the standard period of radiotherapy from 
six weeks to a month, whilst at the same time providing additional funding for oncology. 
In continence services, on the other hand, user complaints about a previously determined 
norm of three incontinence pads per day had led to a relaxation of the policy : 'the 
thresholds are still reasonably there, but it gives more discretion around what does 
constitute an exceptional case.' 
The use of thresholds is also a response to the complexity of information about 
effectiveness and the need to target services at those most likely to benefit from them. 
There was a sense that most of the easy targets for rationing had already been picked off 
and that any further rationing was going to get into more expensive and more contentious 
areas. The very complexity of the issues, however, and the ethical dilemmas of rationing 
potentially life-saving or life-prolonging treatment made it dangerous territory for 
purchasers. The relationship between purchasers and clinicians when discussing limits to 
treatment was described as 'manoeuvring' or 'a bit of a dance with the renal physicians'. In 
some cases, clinicians were known to have their own guidelines for withholding treatment, 
for example in neonatology, but the extent to which purchasers could move in to enforce 
such guidelines was acknowledged to be a contested area. On the other hand, there was 
concern that unless purchasers got more closely involved, the guidelines would not be held 
to and would therefore not be effective as rationing mechanisms. In many cases, the 
interviewees felt guidelines might not be developed at all without purchaser pressure. 
As with decisions not to purchase new drug treatments, the inclusion of decisions about 
thresholds in contracts was variable. In response to a request from the regional office, 
Avon had undertaken a ' stocktake' of all its services subject to exclusions or restrictions. 
Although the director of public health commented that it had revealed 'a surprisingly large 
amount of limiting material in our contracts', it did not cover most of the rationing by 
threshold, which was largely agreed through other channels. The stocktake exercise, 
coupled with a review of a patient complaint about plastic surgery exclusions, had led the 
authority to look again at its decision-making process. The chief executive commented on 
the need 'to have a more established route through which to bring those things to the 
authority'. Although rationing decisions were not in any way intended to be secret, there 
were inconsistencies in the process of formal agreement through the health authority and 
formal expression in public documents which needed to be addressed. In many ways, 
concerns about procedural fairness and equity were as important as financial pressures in 
being more explicit. 
Although the longer term rationing agenda was still being pursued, particularly through 
thresholds, the lifting of the immediate pressure to take decisions in such difficult areas 
was greeted with relief. In the words of the director of public health, 'we want to avoid 
that as much as we can, because we get such bad publicity and because we rarely bring it 
off satisfactorily.' Later he added 'we really don't want to undermine the public's 
confidence in the NHS unless we really have to. Some of us think we probably will really 
have to, but the moment is not now.' He reported having heard that the Treasury took the 
view the NHS could only take one or two years of really hard financial pressure at a time, 
after which it was necessary to take the pressure off for a breathing space to prevent total 
collapse. This, he said, reinforced his view that NHS crises were cyclical rather than a 
linear process. At the same time, he and the chief executive both acknowledged that 
financial crises could sometimes serve a useful purpose in creating a climate for radical 
change, and perhaps for greater openness and information sharing on the part of providers. 
Without that background of crisis, decisions continued to be largely incremental and 
financial difficulties were handled through general budget trimming. 
The director of contracting suggested that they had fairly deliberately provoked political 
intervention to stop them from making further unpalatable explicit rationing choices, 
precisely by making some very high profile choices last year, including cutting family 
planning (see previous chapter) and reducing palliative radiotherapy by referring patients 
back to their GPs for morphine instead. 
'I think there are examples where we've been seen to be tying ourselves to the stake 
and pouring the petrol on. And of course the strength of our position, I think, is 
also that this authority adamantly refuses to overspend in any circumstance. That's 
the one thing they're absolutely clear on. And of course that's becoming quite 
unusual now for health authorities. And in a way I suppose it's quite a powerful 
purist position, I think, to refuse to overspend and then to burn yourself at the 
stake over all these kind of rationing decisions. It puts quite a lot of pressure, I 
think, on the regional office and the centre, because nobody can condemn you for 
refusing to overspend. And it would be a much easier way out than what we keep 
doing, which is pouring on more petrol and chucking a match on.' 
It would be hard to find a clearer exposition of brinkmanship. 
The extent to which the most difficult rationing decisions can or should be pursued 
through contract negotiations was questioned. With reference to oncology, the director of 
contracting felt that contracts suffered from a poor information base and that 'contracting 
certainly lends itself to simplistic ways of counting oncology work', which did not capture 
the specialist and complex nature of the service. 'I think it is easy to get diverted by the 
much more simple areas where you can say "this operation's not of very much value and 
therefore let's cut it out" or "we'll only do twenty". These are much more fine and 
complicated issues.' The district's approach therefore was to work on a separate briefing 
paper and to pursue negotiations between public health, GPs and the clinicians concerned. 
'I think one of the big dangers of the system we've got is allowing things to happen 
through contracting, really.. .We're [the contracting team] generally there as the organisers 
and facilitators and implementers, and I think it's very dangerous to allow contracting to 
get exposed and into such a way that it's actually trying to take those decisions. I don't see 
how contract managers can, because they're not clinical people - 1 don't see how they 
should, either.' 
The director of public health commented on the lack of knowledge at purchaser level 
about the effect of their decisions on provision; 'it's quite possible that the contracted for 
limitations have no effect whatsoever, and the ones that we don't specify have the most 
massive effects.' 
One major source of financial difficulties in Avon was tertiary ECRs, particularly in mental 
health. Here the district was planning to make it a pre-condition of all contract 
negotiations that secondary care providers should take the budget for tertiary ECRs and 
accept the financial responsibility for controlling them. This is an example of moving back 
from the very stark purchaser-led decision-making process associated with ECRs towards 
a more implicit clinician-led process. The director of contracting was uncertain whether 
they would be successful in negotiating this with trusts; the director of public health agreed 
that hitherto providers have always resisted such proposals, but felt the fact that they were 
in a growth year might enable the district to persuade providers to accept it in exchange 
for some other developments, or alternatively by being told they would not get 
developments unless they took on tertiary ECRs as well. 'What gets things changed is the 
judicious application of blackmail and bribes - the blackmail being "if you don't play ball 
with this particular piece of policy, we will withdraw something or other which you need 
to get things done". The bribe is "you know, we were going to invest x in you. I don't 
think we will now". And we've always done that....It is essential that you have some 
money to spend in a year. It's the dynamic that you can wrap a great deal of change 
around.' 
He also commented that it was the expectation of new investment overall that was 
encouraging the oncologists to co-operate with the development of thresholds for some 
aspects of cancer: 'they're quite confident that their time has come, that this is an era in the 
NHS when oncologists are going to have their ten years in the sun.' 
In practice, by the time contract negotiations had been concluded there had been varying 
progress in including ECRs in contracts. Providers were anxious about being left holding 
the entire risk, so some risk sharing agreements had been negotiated. In one case, the 
authority had made a decision not to fund an additional neurologist. However, the 
neurology department had been given to understand that, if they accepted budgetary 
responsibility for managing their own tertiary ECRs, where there had recently been 
substantial overspending, they could use any savings to fund a new neurologist themselves. 
Thus an apparently explicit decision was in fact left to the discretion of providers, as long 
as they remained within budget. 
There was some discussion with the directors of public health and contracting about how 
the same rationing issue can be presented differently in different authorities. Explicit 
restrictions on renal services in a neighbouring district were described as 'so marginal that 
they're not really what other people might recognise as restrictions. They're what the 
clinicians do every day.' Avon had recently been criticised on television by a local 
oncologist for not funding trials of Taxol, a new anti-cancer drug, whilst a neighbouring 
district (where the oncologist also worked part-time) was said to be funding it. 'It wasn't -
they didn't know what they were funding. It was just being used on their patients because 
there was enough money left in their contract.' 
The issue of cataract removal for the second eye, which was an issue in Cambridge and 
Huntingdon (see below), was also discussed. The director of public health suspected that 
not many such operations were performed in Avon - 'it just may be that that's happened 
by custom and practice...an unofficial bit of rationing has taken place, and we don't need 
to say "don't do second eyes".' The director of contracting stated that in fact there had 
been discussions with the ophthalmologists about whether to restrict second eye cataract 
removal. 'They all have slightly different policies from each other...and slightly different 
views on the clinical priority that they should give to it.' As a result, it had been decided 
that it would not be appropriate to make it an official exclusion. 
Cambridge and Huntingdon 
In Cambridge and Huntingdon, the general growth allocation had also increased, from an 
expected maximum of £ 1.5m to £3.875m (2.51%). However, at least £lm of this was 
expected to disappear straight away into inflation, the allocation for which was felt to be 
unrealistically low. Furthermore, there was a list of service pressures (including recovering 
from a £1.5m deficit incurred in 1996/97) and priorities for development which were 
thought to require additional funding in 1997/98 and this list outstripped the remaining 
growth funding, so explicit rationing was still very much on the agenda. 
Rather than impose rationing decisions on providers, the health authority took the 
approach of developing a menu of 29 possible rationing or 'disinvestment' areas, although 
some of these could in fact be achieved by service rationalisation rather than reduction. 
Some (such as replacing complex pacemakers with simpler ones) would result in reduced 
quality but the same volume of service. Included on the list were cataract surgery for the 
second eye, male and female sterilisation, health visiting and school nursing, varicose 
veins, prostate surgery, sleep apnoea, psychiatric rehabilitation and community midwifery, 
to name but a few. The authority was careful to insist that none of these would be subject 
to a blanket exclusion; clinically necessary exceptions would be allowed, in line with the 
recent White Paper 'The National Health Service: A Service with Ambitions' (Secretary of 
State for Health, 1996). However, it was also made clear in the Draft Annual Plan that 'the 
Authority recognises that there will be a health loss associated with each and every 
one...but considers that the relatively greater health gain resulting from investment in the 
priorities for development must take precedence.' 
Providers were told only a fixed amount of money was available, and if, in order to live 
within that amount of money, they had to make reductions in any of the services included 
on the menu, the authority would endorse that decision. This was on the assumption that 
providers could not find any further efficiency savings to meet the shortfall. If, on the other 
hand, they could come up with their own alternatives for saving the money and those 
alternatives were acceptable to the authority, then this would be welcomed. The director 
of public health was particularly insistent that this approach did not mean the authority was 
making a decision to stop providing sterilisations, for example. Rather it was offering a list 
of suggestions to the trusts to allow clinicians to decide the most appropriate areas for 
disinvestment, an approach which bears strong similarities to the developments in explicit 
rationing described by Klein et al (1996) which were discussed at the end of Chapter Six. 
Given this authority's past history of very high-profile rationing decisions, and the 
controversial inclusion on the list of health visiting and sterilisations, the possibility that 
this was intended as a way of off-loading responsibility for hard choices is not an 
immediately plausible explanation. Indeed, the director of public health said at one point 
'we would have the guts to say "no" to x, except that we've been told by the Secretary of 
State we're not allowed to say "no" to Furthermore, he stressed the authority's 
willingness to take final public responsibility for the choices made at provider level. 
'The authority puts its hand up and says, "I've taken 20% off the ENT budget or 
ophthalmology, and so you're not going to get all the services that you want, and it 
is our fault, because we can't afford it," but the decision as to whether they do a 
cataract rather than a squint, Mrs X rather than Mr Jones, has surely got to be a 
clinical decision. And implicit at that, I suspect.' 
He regarded this emphasis on affordability as being an even more explicit basis for 
rationing than previous approaches, which had confused issues of effectiveness with issues 
of affordability, as in the case of beta interferon. However, he recognised that it would be 
'worrying for politicians'. 
As a general principle, he felt the sharing of responsibility for rationing at the different 
levels could be described as an '80/20 situation - or even 90/10'. 'Deciding how much we 
put into ENT or gynaecology...is 90% our responsibility. We take the can for the million 
pounds available for ENT. But when it comes to how you spend that million pounds on 
Mrs Jones and Mrs Smith...that is 90% your [the clinicians'] decision...Although the two 
are not totally separate...it is separating out rationing at the meso level and the micro level.' 
The rationing suggestions for 1997/98 were thus presumably meant to fall within the 10% 
of micro rationing where purchaser involvement was appropriate, although it would in fact 
seem more interventionist than that. This can be partly explained by conflicting views 
within trusts identified by both interviewees. 'You get this tension between "well, don't try 
and manage clinical decision-making in detail" on the one hand, but "if you want us to 
reduce the service you want, you have to tell us in detail which services you're not going 
to purchase" and the two don't add up.' Trust chief executives in particular were reported 
to be unhappy about rationing decisions being passed back to them. 
Faced with this situation, the authority took the line that 'flagging up some broad areas for 
disinvestment is about as far as we can go without meddling in the details of running a 
hospital... The mix between them and the degree to which they disinvest in each of these 
individual lines is down to them to plan.' However, he already felt confident in January that 
some of the proposals would definitely happen, some would probably not and was 
uncertain about the outcome in only in a few cases. 
As it turned out, the response from providers and others consulted, such as GPs, was 
regarded as a disappointing demonstration that providers did not believe the rationing 
proposals would really be implemented. Despite the strong emphasis from the authority 
that there was a fixed amount of money available to each provider, negotiations for more 
money had continued until quite late in the process. As a result, few rationing alternatives 
had been put forward, and the authority's original list was implemented almost in its 
entirety. 
However, it had been agreed with the ophthalmologists to withdraw the proposal to ration 
cataract surgery for the second eye, and to give the clinicians a savings target which they 
would manage themselves. This was felt to be a move in the right direction by the director 
of public health. 
The decision to exclude male and female sterilisations had been implemented, but had 
created such concern amongst the gynaecologists that they were now prepared to consider 
cutting other procedures in order to reinstate sterilisations. 'It has taught us that maybe to 
get their attention, instead of threatening to cut, you've got to cut first and then negotiate.' 
Part of the reasons for the gynaecologists' concern seemed to be that, although they were 
able to make exceptions within the terms of the authority's decision, there was uncertainty 
whether exceptions were to be made only when pregnancy posed a real health risk (for 
example when hormonal changes in pregnancy could accelerate some forms of cancer), or 
when there was a broader 'genuine social need'. The gynaecologists were uncomfortable 
with this position. 
The Draft Annual Plan also included a list of ten areas which were originally considered 
for inclusion on the menu but were rejected following discussion by members of the 
authority, for a variety of political, personal or scientific reasons. These include assisted 
conception, termination of pregnancy, impotence treatment, music and art therapy, patient 
advocacy and gender dysphoria. Proposals from providers for service reductions in these 
areas would therefore not be accepted. 
The director of public health reported that there had been considerable disagreement about 
terminations amongst authority members. The reasoning why terminations had been 
treated differently from sterilisations had not been clearly articulated, but was felt to have 
been influenced by the fact that in the case of termination a fetus was already present and 
that therefore there was an immediate need, whereas sterilisation was preventive and 
therefore less immediate. There was also a perception that those seeking termination were 
likely to be less able to pay for themselves than those seeking sterilisation. 
The director of commissioning commented on the irony that IVF, which was dropped from 
the list of rationing suggestions, was not as effective as sterilisation but added 'neither's 
ventilating old people or ventilating babies, but...it's all about values in the end...There is 
no scientific way of making these decisions', despite the fact that evidence on effectiveness 
had been the theoretical basis for a number of the decisions discussed. In the case of 
impotence, the argument had been 'why target one particular dysfunction when there's lots 
of others that we treat quite happily?' The decision to drop gender surgery from the list 
was taken purely on the grounds that so little was purchased anyway that to reduce it 
further would risk contravening the requirement not to ban anything altogether. 
In fact, consultation on the rationing menu had resulted in a reconsideration of assisted 
conception and gender reassignment, and both these procedures were ultimately re-
included on the list of services to be rationed. 
As well as changes in the authority's thinking about rationing, the decision to offer 
providers a menu from which to choose can also be attributed to changing views about 
how best to manage negotiations and about the purpose and form of contracts. The 
director of commissioning in Cambridge and Huntingdon commented on the irrelevance of 
distinctions between contracting and other mechanisms 
'It's all the same really...there is a sum of money - what are we going to get for 
that? I mean, that's the contract negotiation. It's basically that the contract 
negotiation isn't about money - it's about service. Which is what it should be about, 
really, because otherwise you spend lots and lots of time arguing about notional 
amounts of money, without getting down to what the service issues [are]. It's easy 
to get obsessed with money, you know - there's a huge NHS infrastructure devoted 
to having debates about money, but it's relating money to the actual service that's 
the important thing.' 
This perspective reflects the general view in this health authority that the contract was 
simply the expression of agreements reached through the wider commissioning process, 
and not in itself a driving force. 'Whether it's in the contract or not is not the important 
thing, it's whether the people that matter within trusts are signed up to it or not.' 'Mos^f 
it's in people's heads, that's the important thing.' 
The director of commissioning expressed considerable disillusion with the use of activity 
specifications in contracts, and felt negotiations over activity levels were futile given the 
constraints of a fixed budget. 
'What we're trying to do here is get away from that, and say 'well, look, it doesn't 
really matter what the activity is - there is a certain amount of money, and that's all 
there is to it... You can keep within that cash limit in a number of ways. You can 
either pull back on your activity, by things like the sterilisations and things, or you 
can cut back on your infrastructure. Really we don't mind which you do. It is open 
to you either way. But at the end of the day there's a certain amount of money and 
that's it, so there's not much point saying "well, the activity's going out the roof'. 
And there's no point. I mean, it's just a pointless conversation, because unless one 
or other of us goes into deficit there is no other way round that.' 
This demonstrated precisely the frustration of trying to reconcile a supposedly demand-led 
market with a fixed global budget - a recurrent feature in interviews throughout this 
research has been the perception that providers behave as though there is no limit on 
money and if they increase their activity levels they should simply be reimbursed 
accordingly. As the director of commissioning said, 'we've got an internal reimbursement 
system, but we don't have the money to reimburse everything everybody wants 
reimbursing.' 
Does this shift in approach mean that, after all, Cambridge and Huntingdon was off-
loading the responsibility for hard choices onto providers? It is conceivable that a district 
which had had such harsh experience of media reaction to open rationing might want to 
share some of the burden - although this was not how they themselves saw it. The director 
of commissioning responded in two ways. Firstly, he argued that: 
'activity doesn't make the process more explicit, because nobody controls 
activity...Health authorities may say that "oh yes, we'll buy twenty less of HRG 
64"...but it's not like that. It's not like a fundholder who can decide that "we're 
going to do eight hip replacements, and Mrs Smith and Mrs Jones and Mrs Brown 
will have them"...We're managing a system where we don't directly manage the 
activity. Now, we can put things in that will hopefully have an effect on activity, 
like we can have a rationing policy on sterilisations which will have an effect on 
activity. We can give a steer that we want them to cut down on grommets and 
tonsillectomies...But the translation from that into activity is guesswork. It's not 
scientific.' 
In other words, the apparent explicitness of clear activity ceilings in contracts was 
spurious; therefore omitting such activity specifications from contracts did not represent a 
real reduction in explicitness. 
Secondly, he argued that they would be just as explicit in contracts about what they 
wanted for their money, but that it would be expressed in terms of quality standards and 
service targets. 
'If you take it to the extreme, you could say "well, what we want is access for 
emergency admissions, twelve month or fifteen month waiting targets, we want these 
particular infrastructure improvements... This is the amount of money that's on the 
table. Get on with it. And what we want from you - what we want in terms of contract 
monitoring is what your waiting times are, the number of days you've restricted 
emergency admissions, trolley waits, when you've put in this forensic 
development... We don't want to know about activity - activity doesn't matter. If you 
can manage, if you can deliver those service targets, it doesn't really matter if the 
activity's 80% of what we think it's going to be or if it's 120%...The key thing is the 
service targets.' 
In fact the director of commissioning recognised that this would be an extreme position, 
and that an understanding of activity levels would always be necessary - 'because how else 
do you measure whether hospital x is working harder than hospital y, who's got the more 
pressure? You need some way of counting it.' It was more a question of developing a 
different emphasis and being realistic about the limitations of contracts. The contracts for 
1997/98 did not contain detailed targets for reductions in activity in the areas included on 
the list of rationed procedures, but they did set out an agreement that there would be 
reductions. It had also been agreed with providers to reduce the total activity assumptions 
specified in contracts in recognition of the budgetary constraints imposed upon them, 
although there were doubts whether providers would actually keep to those reduced 
levels. By the time of the third interview, overspending was already becoming apparent in 
some trusts. 
This change of emphasis from detailed activity specifications back towards global budgets 
could be seen as an example of a move back to hierarchy, in response to the unworkable 
nature of the quasi-market. Alternatively, it could be seen as a refinement of the market 
relationship, to focus on more appropriate outcomes than crude activity levels. 
In any event, it marks an increasing perception that the proper role of purchasers was to 
set an explicit framework, within which implicit decision-making could appropriately 
continue placing trust and responsibility with clinicians. This was not so much a return to 
implicit rationing, as a reassertion of its importance and the relatively marginal role of 
explicit rationing. The director of commissioning commented, 'we haven't gone from 
implicit to explicit, we've gone from implicit to implicit plus explicit.' 
It was planned to begin discussions with providers about next year's contracts much earlier 
than the previous year, reinforcing the principle of a fixed budget, within which they would 
have to manage. Reflecting the authority's position that responsibility for micro rationing 
lay with clinicians, it was not planned that the authority should itself come up with a 
detailed rationing menu again. 'It 's really trying to throw it back to them, and say "well, 
hang on, we did all the running last year - this list of things came entirely from us. It's not 
a realistic way to manage the NHS. There's 150 of us, and there's thousands of you out 
there, working in the trusts, and you've got to take some ownership of the problem and 
work out how you're going to cope".' The director of commissioning was in no doubt that 
the purchaser provider split had led to 'unprecedented cost inflation' as providers had 
struggled to increase their share of an ultimately cash limited system; the approach now 
being adopted in Cambridge and Huntingdon sought 'to confront them with the stark 
reality of the foolishness of that approach.' 
He was emphatic that there was no single approach to controlling costs that could provide 
the answer. 'People keep casting around for the Holy Grail, and I don't think there is one.' 
Certainly explicit rationing alone could not tackle the problem, unless really radical 
exclusions of whole areas of service were undertaken, but these would be politically 
unacceptable. The current fashion for reconfiguration was also insufficient. 
'If you use any policy instrument as your sole way of managing the NHS then 
you're doomed to failure. It's more complex. It requires some explicit rationing, it 
requires some implicit rationing. It needs pursuing efficiency, it needs rigid cost 
control, and it needs all of these things in order to function.' 
District Three 
District Three was experiencing a substantial deficit in 1996/97, largely as a result of 
fundholder overspends. Some providers had also been running up deficits. This had 
affected the financial outlook for 1997/98; even though the additional growth allocation of 
£3.85m (2%) was slightly better than anticipated, they did not expect any of it to be 
available to fund new developments. Approximately half of the allocation would go to 
meet a shortfall on inflation, and the rest would be taken up by covering deficits, meeting 
cost pressures in the budgets for ECRs and continuing care placements and some 
unavoidable prior commitments to develop mental health services and resettlement of 
people with a learning disability. This position assumed that the district would be 
successful in negotiating down the deficit within trusts to some extent; it was hoped this 
would be achieved 'just by sheer haggling and horse-trading, rather than explicit rationing'. 
If necessary, some of the unavoidable developments could be slipped to start later in the 
year, building up a full year cost problem for 1998/99. 
There was therefore still a strong feeling that resources remained very tight; one 
interviewee likened the settlement to 'somebody helping you pay some of your credit card 
bill' but not solving the longer term mismatch between resources and demands. 
Given the expectation of an approximate break-even, the director of commissioning 
reported that the authority was 'not actually looking at any positive disinvestment this 
coming year'. This meant that there would be no explicit rationing decisions which 
involved taking money out of contracts. However, 'there are things that trusts might offer 
us as a development, which we wouldn't want to accept' - and again the pressures of new 
drug technology was mentioned - 'and there are odd things such as sleep studies, that...we 
currently purchase on an ECR basis, and we may start saying "thank you but no thank 
you".' A reduction in sleep studies would probably be implemented by refining the existing 
clinical protocol to 'raise the threshold' for referral. She anticipated that this would be a 
temporary measure for the next year, with a view to phasing it out altogether in 
subsequent years, on the grounds of ineffectiveness. This was 'not mega-bucks in the 
scheme of things, but it's probably one more thing we can try.' In the event, 1997/98 
contracts focused on ensuring all referrals for sleep studies were channelled through one 
tertiary referral route. 
In addition there were some procedures within contracts which would continue to be 
reduced, such as grommets and D&Cs in women under 40. These were mentioned in the 
purchasing plan for 1996/97, but were proving difficult to implement. The director of 
commissioning said 'we're chasing up those to make sure we know what's gone through, 
what's been paid for and really being very assertive with the trusts to actually show 
tangible reductions in our contract volumes when we've said we won't buy something.' The 
estimated potential savings from these two changes of £350,000 a year would be 
financially much more significant than sleep studies. However, the director of 
commissioning said the figure was ambitious and was based on being able to withdraw full 
costs, which might not be realistic. In practice providers were told the savings would not 
be taken away from them, but should be used to offset the overall deficit they were asking 
the purchaser to make good; no explicit targets for activity reductions were included in 
contracts. This was not 'positive disinvestment' because the resources stayed with the 
provider; however, it was a redirection of resources to support higher priorities. The 
director of commissioning felt 'we have a very delicate path to tread, in terms of policies 
and procedures that, by their very nature, are going to cap demand', and that even this kind 
of less visible approach could face considerable opposition from trusts. 
More substantial conflict was reported between purchaser and provider over renal 
services. The district was seeking to develop protocols to restrict demand in both general 
nephrology and dialysis, whilst at the same time putting in more resources. At the time of 
the second interview (mid-February 1997), the trust had not yet agreed to sign the contract 
for 1996/97, the current financial year. Independent clinical advice had been sought on 
issues such as the balance between peritoneal dialysis and haemodialysis (the former being 
considerably cheaper). The district was also concerned about the appropriateness of using 
haemodialysis as part of palliative care in people who were dying of some other condition 
and developed kidney problems as well. 
However, there was still clinical opposition to carrying out rationing decisions on the 
authority's behalf. Negotiations were being pursued both through and in parallel with 
contract discussions and the director of commissioning commented, 'It just goes to show, 
as a purchaser, when you come up against resistance from a trust, it really does get to the 
heart of what influence you have as a purchaser, without sort of resorting to "well, we'll 
stop paying you completely "...we've got in many respects very, very crude tools to use, 
which at the end of the day we probably wouldn't use, because that's inappropriate and 
unprofessional as well.' 
A particular problem in the case of renal services was the perceived lack of support from 
trust management. 'Trusts don't necessarily feel an obligation to work within the 
contracted volumes, and you will get the chief executive siding with the clinicians to 
demonstrate why they need more money, rather than managing their clinicians to force 
through an agenda of "Are we doing too much? Is it clinically appropriate? Is it best 
practice? Is it acceptable practice?" So we're not getting the internal support, I believe, 
from the trusts, that certainly was originally envisaged.1 This offered an example of how 
the purchaser provider split has made previously implicit rationing decisions more explicit. 
The director of commissioning said 'it only works if we're all part of the same conspiracy', 
but the conspiracy was breaking down and trust managers were prepared to support their 
clinicians in refusing to conspire. 
By the third interview, close examination of local renal services had provided some 
evidence that their unit costs were considerably higher than in other districts. The 
implication that the district might move services elsewhere had put the local trust under 
pressure to bring costs down. The director of commissioning remarked 'I think probably 
we're still trying to squeeze the last drop out of any contracting or management 
intervention, without having to go down the road of more explicit rationing.' This seemed 
to be a counter-example where market competition, rather than driving rationing into the 
open, was making it possible to use a more implicit approach by reducing prices. A focus 
on high unit costs could also be effective within one trust, by encouraging peer pressure 
from colleagues who felt their own service developments were being jeopardised by 
another department's high spending. 
As elsewhere, the question of expensive new drugs and whether it was legitimate to 
exclude them from normal contracts had been a major problem. The approach being taken 
in District Three was to work with local clinicians (and users) to develop protocols for 
determining access, a 'sensible half-way house' between a blanket 'no' and a blanket 'yes'. 
In some cases this might mean the purchaser would require evidence that the patient had 
been involved in a discussion of alternatives to the new drug, such as palliation. The 
director of public health reported that clinicians were finding this approach helpful, as it 
gave them continued clinical discretion but protected them from accusations of wasteful or « 
inappropriate use of new drugs. The chief executive and director of public health were 
both strongly pursuing the line that drug-exclusive contracts were unacceptable. 
District Three was also seeking to negotiate some financial responsibility with secondary 
care providers for tertiary ECRs, particularly in mental health. They planned to restrict 
access to private hospital beds where they felt these were being inappropriately used, by 
refusing to accept the responsibility to pay; if secondary care providers continued to use 
them, they were likely to have funding withdrawn from their contracts to pay for the ECR. 
The director of commissioning commented, however, that the chances of successfully 
negotiating this kind of arrangement with providers were not good, given the fact that 
most were 'exceptionally risk-averse'. By the third interview, she reported that the principle 
had in fact been accepted, although there was still some 'horsetrading around how much 
money we give them to manage the tertiary ECRs'. 
In the longer term, she thought providers would be more positive about plans to work with 
them on 'repatriating' referrals which had traditionally gone elsewhere, either as ECRs or 
through contracts. This would mean giving local providers the money normally spent on 
such referrals to enable them to build up local services. In some cases, this might also help 
purchasers regain more explicit control over provider activity. She described the position 
in one out-of-district provider where patients referred for routine secondary care were 
often referred on within the system and purchasers were required to pay invoices for 
subsequent treatment many years after the original referral. 
At the third interview, the chief executive reported that it had been necessary to 'rein back 
on activity to get within budget' and conclude contract negotiations. An important element 
of this had been to 'put a ceiling on the cash that any of our in-area or local providers will 
get from this authority, whether they get it on block contract from the authority, from a 
Total Purchasing Pilot or from a GP fundholder....Fixed budgets - we've already got back 
to that.' This was partly a response to trusts seeking to 'play the system and bring the 
business in and force us to run an overspend'. Although this was to some extent a return 
to implicit rationing by providers within their overall budgets, it was accompanied by some 
explicit reductions in contract activity levels, and an explicit understanding that this would 
result in longer waiting times. 
Furthermore, the chief executive described plans to incorporate more explicit priority 
setting mechanisms within waiting lists, so that there would be clearly specified criteria for 
assessing individual patients' level of need. This was expected to be similar to mechanisms 
being tried in New Zealand (Hadorn and Holmes, 1997) and would result in patients who 
met the priority criteria being given a booked admission date. Patients not meeting the 
criteria would not be put on a waiting list. He felt many consultants 'would argue that 
waiting lists are a good form of rationing - that waiting lists in many ways are not 
unethical', particularly if combined with a more equitable way of deciding who should be 
placed on the list. 
Although GPs (including fundholders) were largely supporting the fixed budget approach, 
there was some concern that they might try to circumvent it by referring patients elsewhere 
on an ECR basis. However, it was suggested that fimdholders, who constitute a high 
proportion of the district's GPs, were actually experiencing quite strong budgetary 
constraints themselves, so it was not expected that referrals away from main providers 
would become a very serious problem. 
Even though the 1997/98 contracting round had not required many very explicit rationing 
decisions, it was not anticipated that this would be sustainable in the longer term. 'We're 
not quite there yet, but I think this time next year will be very difficult.' The very fact that 
the new government had made more money available than anticipated might contribute to 
the problem - 'cost pressures emerge, simply because there's money there to meet them'. 
All the interviewees believed that further explicit rationing decisions would be required for 
1998/99. Although the scope for further exclusions, as opposed to rationing by thresholds, 
was limited, there might be some new additions to the list of items not normally purchased, 
particularly new drugs of unproven or low effectiveness, such as Taxol. It was also 
suggested that chiropody might follow the example set by dentistry and be excluded from 
the NHS or only offered to certain age groups. 
The director of public health expressed concern that 'you need to be very careful that 
you're not allowing cheap, inappropriate, ineffective treatments for common conditions, at 
the expense of something that's more appropriate and effective, but where the individual 
cost is a little higher.' The director of commissioning agreed that there were a number of 
high volume low cost areas where activity reductions might be appropriate, but suggested 
that in practice gains were likely to be greater in reducing a small number of very 
expensive procedures. In addition, 'we've got to be conscious of our management capacity 
to actually bring about some of these things. And therefore I think that does drive us down 
the low volume high cost route.' Both interviewees were conscious that trying to tackle 
the whole agenda at once would be very costly and probably impractical. 
There remained a commitment to some major service changes: 'we wouldn't in any way 
back away from what we're trying to do with the acute services, irrespective of what the 
settlement gave us. We might not have to cut so deep, but it wouldn't stop us from making 
a good start...Because the settlement's been slightly more generous, some of that money 
can actually be used positively between us and social services and the trust to bring about 
some more radical change.' 
The use of thresholds was expected to become much more widespread. The director of 
commissioning commented on the practical difficulties for purchasers of monitoring 
compliance with threshold criteria - 'if we wanted to look at every case note there would 
be thousands' - and suggested that medical peer pressure might actually be a more 
effective means of ensuring compliance. Nonetheless, the development of treatment 
thresholds and eligibility criteria was seen as a more promising and realistic way forward 
than exclusions, and it would be expected that purchasers would take an active role in 
ensuring protocols were in place, and sometimes in writing them. 
As in other districts, there was a growing sense that health authorities had a responsibility 
to set an explicit framework within which clinicians could work: 
'We're currently asking GPs and also hospital consultants about things that they 
feel they would prefer not to do, or would prefer not to refer. And I think 
interestingly this is, I suppose, crystallising the role of the health authority, in terms 
of we would be where the buck stops - if such and such a service was no longer 
purchased, that we would take full responsibility for that decision being made. And 
that consultants and GPs in particular would say it is not the policy of the health 
authority to purchase this.' 
Discussion 
What can be learned from the experience of these three districts in negotiating contracts 
for 1997/98? Inevitably the answer is complex. To some extent, it re-emphasises the 
primacy of shortage of resources as a driving force behind greater explicitness. It has 
already been pointed out that many explicit rationing proposals do not in fact yield huge 
savings, so they may not solve the financial problems to which they are a response. 
Perhaps more important is the organisational atmosphere generated by financial problems, 
which makes managers feel they must bring hard choices out into the open. It may also be 
a gradual process, beginning with the more obvious targets but progressing into more 
difficult areas, where greater savings may be obtainable, if resource pressures continue to 
grow. 
If, on the other hand, there is a temporary financial let-up, managers may be only too glad 
to step back from the brink, even though they know it may not last for long. 
There seem to be differences in how committed different managers and authorities are to 
the principle of explicit allocation decisions. Some expressed considerable doubts about 
the Tightness of explicit decision-making, leaving aside the view that it was probably 
inevitable. On the other hand, there are those, like the chief executive quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter, who feel impatient to emerge from the trenches and tackle the 
issue head on. 
'Something that I think would be a backward step would be for a government in 
the dying days before an election to shove a whole lot of money into the NHS, 
because it would just literally be buying time, because next year we would be at the 
point where in fact we're at this year. So no amount of money will do anything 
other than act as a time delay.' 
To him a generous allocation would mean an opportunity to go beyond the point of no 
return had been missed. He did not want to feel an invisible political hand pulling them 
back from the brink. 
These differences of opinion suggest managerial attitude may be an important factor in 
how far authorities are prepared to go. Nevertheless, the chief executive's comment 
suggests that even the most committed would feel obliged not to pursue extensive explicit 
rationing if given a pre-election bonanza. As it happens, he was chief executive of 
Cambridge and Huntingdon, where there remained a large gap between the allocation and 
funding requirements,. However, it is intriguing that Cambridge and Huntingdon reported 
the largest percentage growth increase of the three districts, and was yet the district 
pursuing the most explicit rationing. Some of this is undoubtedly because of the need to 
cover existing deficits, which was not such an issue in Avon; however, deficits were a 
serious issue in District Three, and yet they had not pursued the same overt approach as 
Cambridge and Huntingdon. 
There is of course an important difference between explicit rationing on the basis of good 
evidence that a treatment is not very cost-effective, and rationing highly effective 
treatments. As already mentioned, Avon will still be looking at reducing areas where there 
is consensus on low cost-effectiveness, such as D&Cs in women under 40. However, this 
is far removed from Cambridge and Huntingdon's inclusion of effective procedures such as 
cataract surgery and sterilisation on its rationing menu. The district is entirely open that its 
proposals for disinvestment all involve 'health loss'. 
Evidence on effectiveness continues to provide a rationale for many explicit rationing 
decisions, although whether it in fact causes them to be made is another matter. Certainly 
it is not always the decisive factor, and many interviewees commented on the value 
judgements involved. Moreover, its effects are still felt largely in marginal areas, although 
this may change as pressure for more substantial savings directs attention to more complex 
clinical areas where effectiveness evidence can be used to set thresholds for treatment. 
Explicit decisions do not always find their way into contracts. Some major decisions are 
taken mid-year in response to financial crisis and some are pursued through parallel routes. 
Contracts may catch up with this later by formally recording the decisions made, but are 
not necessarily the mechanism by which agreement has been reached. Nonetheless, there 
was broad agreement amongst the interviewees that levels of explicitness had increased 
dramatically since the introduction of the quasi-market, and this is explored further in the 
next section. 
However, implicit rationing mechanisms continue to play an important role, and there is 
evidence of districts returning to or re-emphasising implicit mechanisms in response to the 
perceived failure of more explicit methods to achieve the desired results, and in response 
to doubts about its appropriateness at purchaser level. The re-inclusion of financial 
responsibility for tertiary ECRs in secondary providers1 contracts is one example of this. 
More striking is the evolution in both District Three and Cambridge and Huntingdon 
towards contracts based on fixed budgets, which lay greater emphasis on the role of 
clinicians in making allocation decisions, albeit within explicit guidance. This does seem to 
provide support for the theory that managing a fixed budget within a quasi-market 
produces so many irreconcilable tensions that there will be a drift back to less visible ways 
of capping demand. It could be argued that it is unclear whether this will actually be 
achievable now that the 'conspiracy' of implicit rationing has been exposed by the 
purchaser provider split. However, it is important to note the consensus amongst 
interviewees that in making these changes they did not intend to abrogate responsibility for 
hard decisions. There was a clear view that they retained responsibility for making meso-
level decisions (about how much should be spent in different areas); for taking a lead on 
the development of more explicit criteria for access to services and suggesting appropriate 
areas where reductions could be made; and finally for supporting micro rationing decisions 
made in their name by clinicians and 'taking the blame' in public. There was no desire to 
conspire, but rather to ensure a proper balance between implicit and explicit approaches. 
A more important doubt about the likely success of this strategy is the extent to which 
clinicians - and trust managers - will be willing to accept it. 
Reflections on previous approaches to managing resource pressures 
In addition to investigating the current contracting cycle, the second round of interviews 
was also used to ask participants to reflect on previous approaches to managing resource 
pressures, both before the market was introduced and in the early days of the market. They 
were asked to compare what they would have done then with what they were doing now, 
and to consider the reasons for any differences in approach. 
Documentary analysis 
To supplement this discussion, each district was asked if it could supply examples of 
strategic and annual planning documents from past years and particularly from 1989/90 
and 1992/93. The purpose of this was to see whether the interviewees' recollections of 
how things had changed was supported by written evidence. It was anticipated that there 
might be problems with this, however, as all three districts had undergone a variety of 
boundary changes and mergers during the past ten years, resulting also in office moves and 
changes in document storage. In the event, Cambridge and Huntingdon was unable to 
supply any such documentation. 
Avon and District Three were able to produce quite a few documents from their previous 
constituent districts, from which some interesting contrasts emerged. For example, both 
produced an acute services review, in Avon dating from as far back as 1986 and in District 
Three dating from 1989. This document from District Three provided a classic example of 
pre-market facilities-based planning; the reasons given for the review were almost entirely 
to do with the viability of the local district general hospital, decommissioning an older 
hospital with unsuitable accommodation and providing an adequate base for medical 
training purposes. Although the review referred to 'Working for Patients' (Secretaries of 
State, etc., 1989) it was simply to use the idea of locally available 'core services' as a 
justification for expanding the local hospital. There was strikingly little mention of health 
needs, apart from one paragraph on standardised mortality ratios, half a page on 
demography and a third of a page on the social characteristics of the local population. This 
contrasted with an entire chapter devoted to estate issues. Discussion about service levels 
was mainly in terms of staffing levels and traditionally calculated bed targets. 
District Three also made available a further acute services review for the whole county 
from 1993, the main purpose of which was to discuss moving contracts away from 
expensive providers in central London towards more local providers who could provide 
high quality care at lower cost. As might be expected, this placed considerably greater 
emphasis on health needs and activity levels, using detailed ICD and OPCS codes, rather 
than sites and physical capacity. This was founded on a distinct separation between 
purchasers' interests, on behalf of the population, and providers' interests in running their 
own hospitals. It showed a sophisticated understanding of referral patterns for both 
elective and emergency work and of the need to make any proposals sensitive to the 
different reasons underlying such referral patterns. For example, it might be appropriate to 
cease buying lithotripsy from London, because alternative provision was available locally, 
but the Lane Fox Unit at St Thomas' provides a unique specialist service which they should 
continue to purchase. Information from contract specifications and ECRs clearly formed 
the basis for this level of understanding, and yet the document referred to the 'relative 
insensitivity of the analysis' - perhaps illustrating that the more you know, the more you 
realise how much you do not know. 
The impact of this shift away from describing facilities in terms of staffing and sites 
towards detailed activity breakdowns is that it paves the way for explicit rationing of 
services. Saying that a certain hospital or ward will close does of course imply that there 
will be some reduction in service, but it is not specified who will be refused treatment or 
for what conditions. It is also possible that activity levels will in fact remain unchanged and 
will j?e simply be absorbed elsewhere in the system. However, once the description is 
couched in terms of clinical activity, it becomes much harder to conceal the effect of any 
changes on that activity, and indeed activity becomes the common currency for expressing 
change. 
In Avon, documentary evidence of the move from facilities and staffing-based planning to 
service activity and quality was not as clear-cut. The Acute Services Review from 1986 
was astonishingly detailed in service terms for its date, for example giving a breakdown of 
urology activity by ICD codes which included the number of people treated for malignant 
neoplasms of the kidney and urinary organs, diseases of the urinary system, diseases of the 
prostate and hydrocele, to name but a few. Having said this, most of the proposals for 
change were expressed in terms of site rationalisation, number of clinic and theatre 
sessions, additional consultant posts and bed numbers. 
One of the few examples of a clear decision not to provide a particular treatment was IVF 
at the local teaching hospital. The region decided not to make ear-marked funding 
available 'because its priority compared with other services did not indicate that earlier 
priorities for service development should be over-ridden.' Of the three districts which make 
up the present single authority, two decided not to fund it themselves, and one decided it 
would fund current levels of provision only for its own residents (at a time when district of 
residence was not normally a criterion in planning who should get treatment). For those 
not covered, the system would continue as it had been up till then - namely as 'a semi-
private non-profit-making service involving donations by couples to the University'. As 
mentioned in Chapter Three, IVF was one of the few examples of pre-market explicit 
rationing, but there was always the possibility that women could get accepted for NHS 
treatment at a hospital in another district. 
Despite the detail on activity contained in the 1986 document, it was clear from Avon's 
contracts portfolio for 1992/93 that things had moved on. The contracts contained very 
little on staffing or facilities issues, and considerable information on activity broken down 
by procedure, as well as comprehensive descriptions of the range of services provided by 
each specialty and a statement of special issues and developments in each one. There were 
more explicit references to rationed procedures, such as laser treatment for birthmarks, but 
not many. It is notable, for instance, that there was no reference to restricting cosmetic 
surgery, D&Cs, sterilisation reversals, varicose veins or grommets. Indeed, it was stated 
that varicose veins, hernias, tonsillectomies and grommet insertions should be performed 
to a minimum level, rather than a maximum being set. More emphasis was placed on 
increasing the proportion of these operations performed as day cases. 
This is substantially different to the service specifications in 1995/96 contracts, which in 
plastic surgery listed eight individual cosmetic procedures which were not normally to be 
undertaken, together with an expected number of exceptions for each procedure and the 
grounds on which exceptions could be made (such as psychological distress or severe 
difficulties in finding employment). However, this is an interesting example, as it is in this 
district that the plastic surgeons requested that the indicative volume levels be removed 
from the contract for 1996/97, as they were finding it too restrictive and wanted to return 
to more implicit clinical decision-making to determine how many of each of the restricted 
procedures should be allowed. 
The documentary evidence accords generally with the views expressed at interview 
discussed below, namely that in general terms resource allocation had shifted from a 
facilities and staffing approach to an approach focused on activity and quality targets. 
There was also consensus that rationing had become more explicit. However, the reasons 
for this were not seen as solely or even primarily to do with the market. 
Interview analysis 
Avon 
One factor identified by the director of public health in Avon was changing clinical 
attitudes at provider level. This did not always work towards greater explicitness, as 
demonstrated by the evolving attitudes of the plastic surgeons. However, in most cases 
there was an increasing tendency for clinical staff to decline responsibility for implicit 
rationing, perhaps in response to growing resource pressures. Before the market was 
introduced, there had been a comparatively low rate of take-up for the renal replacement 
programme, but the clinical staff at the time had genuinely felt they were not turning 
anyone away who felt they could benefit from treatment. The director of public health, by 
contrast, believed they had been rationing subconsciously by operating a high eligibility 
threshold. Since then, new consultant staff had been appointed who wanted to treat more 
people and were reluctant to apply financial thresholds which they felt did not match 
appropriate clinical thresholds. In fact the director of contracting suggested that so far the 
renal physicians were expressing this reluctance much more strongly to other purchasers 
than to their host purchaser, 'although they do threaten, you know, they do get a bit 
menacing from time to time.' She added that GPs, whilst generally supportive of the need 
for the authority to take hard decisions, could occasionally force things out into the open 
that they felt were unacceptable. It was a GP who had called in the media the previous 
year when palliative radiotherapy was reduced. 
Both the director of public health and the director of contracting believed there was a 
considerable amount of rationing going on before the market, but it was largely in terms of 
limiting supply by closing wards and reducing staffing, as the whole focus was on 
providers. The director of public health said, 'It was much more permissible to think in 
terms of the good of a hospital, of an institution, rather than the population - and I'm 
saying that as a public health person. So very often we would take a stance which would 
be at best equivocal, in terms of its effect on the population, but that was taken specifically 
to further the aims of X Hospital or Y Hospital...Now that still is important these days, 
because we want to ensure the health of our institutions and we don't want them to 
collapse. But on the other hand we're much less concerned about that - much, much less.' 
His recollection of how resource pressures would have been handled before the 
introduction of the market was that a 'cost-savings programme' would have been set up, 
which would have meant 'we'd have weeded the gardens a bit less often, all that sort of 
stuff, or the hotel side of it being raided.' By the time the reforms came, he argued that 
most of the potential for this kind of infrastructure efficiency had been exhausted, and that 
to some extent therefore it was coincidence that the introduction of the market had come 
at the same time as health authorities had turned their attention much more towards 
clinical services in looking for efficiency. 
However, the introduction of the market itself had (at least initially) marked a watershed in 
the way decisions were made and expressed. 
'That was less because there was pressure on the budgets and increased 
demand...but because we were very conscious that that was what purchasing and 
providing was meant to do. It was meant to polarise, it was meant to create a body 
in the health service whose job was to say what got treated and what didn't get 
treated, and to do it out loud, and another body that was supposed to get on with 
the work it was commissioned to do. But I think we pretty quickly settled down 
into realising that we couldn't do that overnight. Partly it's because it's one thing to 
say that's what we should be doing, and another thing to get it done. It's very 
unpopular. And also we weren't in such terrible trouble in the beginning. We've 
only really had one bad year, I suspect - about 1992/93, 1993/94, it's one of those 
early years - when things did look absolutely calamitous. It was when medical 
emergency admissions had one of their what I now recognise to be cyclical hike-
ups, and...hospitals were closed to admissions regularly. We had all sorts of trouble 
just literally keeping the basics going. So, although I think we wanted to be explicit 
and that was where we wanted to practice, we rapidly settled down and realised 
how very difficult that is.' 
This casts a somewhat different light on the role of extreme resource pressures. Here, the 
director of public health seems to be arguing that it actually stopped purchasers from 
taking explicit decisions that they felt driven towards by the market, because the situation 
had got so bad they resorted to capping supply by closing to emergencies. In his view, all 
the international evidence seemed to suggest that extensive explicit rationing was not 
sustainable. He was also 'convinced that the market notion is a failed notion...It's 
unthinkable that we let an institution go phut because it's not doing what we want it to do, 
and they [providers] know that.' Ultimately, therefore, the need to keep the system going 
would force purchasers back into taking a more implicit, facilities-based approach to 
managing demand and allocating resources. 
The director of contracting in Avon held similarly ambivalent views. As she pointed out, 
'there have always been processes within the health service for deciding priorities, and 
they're perhaps slightly different now than they used to be...We used to have a bidding 
process where all the departments could put in proposals for the district's plan, and then 
there'd be a big power struggle, and some things would win and some things would lose.' 
She agreed that this had usually been expressed in terms of facilities and staffing, although 
she gave examples of how the public health department had taken an explicit approach to 
rationing clinical services (such as neonatology) before the market. That approach 
remained confidential between public health and hospital doctors, however; the difference 
now was that 'the whole health authority has tried to move towards those ways of 
thinking, it's much more widespread currency. And of course there's a gulf between 
ourselves and the trusts as a result of that, because we think and like to express ourselves 
in certain ways, and they still tend to think in in-put terms.' The development of the 
purchasing function had meant 'a real conversion' in the way district-level staff began to 
think about the detail of service provision; in the early days of the market, there were 
weekly health needs meetings, at which 'public health would try and educate us about 
health needs'. 
She had mixed views about the difference made by contracting - by and large she felt it 
simply reflected changes already driven by policy (such as a decision to reduce the amount 
of mental health care available to people with minor psychiatric disorders in order to 
concentrate on the severely disturbed). In addition, 'the process of contract-setting does 
tend to get explicit when there have already been problems identified. So...all that explicit 
stuff in the plastic surgery specification came after months of discussion between public 
health and ourselves and the plastic surgeons. So by the time it was at the stage of being 
reflected in the contract, the conflict was over. Usually the contract - the process of 
writing a spec - isn't used as the kind of battering ram to force the issue. The issue's out 
and being discussed and dealt with.' 
Nonetheless, the development of information and monitoring systems set up to support 
contracting had been an essential pre-requisite for actually knowing what the plastic 
surgeons were doing, and 'allows you to implement policies that you couldn't implement 
before'. (In practice even decisions specified in contracts are not always implemented - the 
director of public health said he knew varicose vein operations were still being done by 
local providers, despite a general ban in contracts). 
The purchaser provider split in general and contracts in particular had also had the effect 
of making the consequences of decisions more explicit than they had been before the 
market. An important factor here was fundholding, although the same argument can apply 
to neighbouring health authorities: the fragmentation of decision-making amongst several 
purchasers in the same area exposed rationing in a way that would not have happened 
when a single district determined policy in all its local providers. 'If you actually sit in the 
hospital as a clinician or as a patient, you can often see that the person from the 
fundholding practice or the next door health authority is getting a level of service which 
you are not getting.' 
Although the general effect of the purchaser provider split had been to make providers feel 
less responsible for resource allocation than they had before the market, there were 
exceptions. The director of contracting reported a conversation with a respected trust 
manager during contract negotiations two or three years ago - the timescale may be 
important, as it was in the earlier days of the market. 
'"Fuzzy is good", he said. "This is the way the health service has always been run -
it's been fuzzy - and we've got along because we've allowed things to be fuzzy. 
You don't want to make things too clear." And I thought that was very interesting, 
because it allows just that little bit of leeway...I thought it was quite enlightened. 
And I think with some of our trusts at least, quite a few of them have still got the 
"let's not rock the boat" view about things - "we're all in this together, we're trying 
to do the best thing for a population that we serve and for patients, whether they 
come from further afield, and that we're not going to do that by having kind of high 
confrontation levels and things being over-explicit and all the rest of it".' 
She noted that some of this was probably to do with local circumstances which meant that 
most of the previous district-level staff had moved over to trusts. The bad side of it is that 
they don't accept that we've got the right to do things, but the good side of it is that some 
of them feel a quite broad responsibility.' 
This seems to be an example of an organisation dealing with complexity and uncertainty 
'in an adaptive, sequential fashion...Rather than specifying the decision tree exhaustively in 
advance,...events are permitted to unfold and attention is restricted to only the actual 
rather than all possible outcomes' (Williamson, 1975, p.25). Thus it could be seen as 
further evidence of an unofficial drift back to hierarchy (or never having left formally left 
it), although it is clearly not the way decisions are always made, even in this district. 
Cambridge and Huntingdon 
Both the director of public health and the director of commissioning in Cambridge and 
Huntingdon supported the general idea that many of the easy rationalisations, supply 
reductions and savings on hotel services had already been exhausted by the time the 
market was introduced. Both believed there were still inefficiencies to be found in trusts, 
but they were now harder to find and were more likely to be fin the clinical sphere, rather 
than in the sphere of porters and caterers and heating and lighting'. Thus to some extent 
the move towards explicit rationing of services was coincidental with the introduction of 
the market. 
At one point, the director of commissioning suggested that financial pressures were no 
worse now than in, say, the winter of 1987/88; on the other hand he raised again the issue 
of providers having no incentive to 'dampen down on their operating costs', and therefore 
inflating resource pressures. 
Both interviewees expressed reservations about the wisdom of abandoning facilities-based 
planning and the idea of a budget which covered all your operating costs, and said the 
increasing focus on activity was in many ways undesirable. This shift in focus was ascribed 
to the process of contracting. The director of public health was critical of the way in which 
trusts sometimes declare they have run out of income and will not perform elective work 
until the next financial year. 'So for a whole month they've got their plant lying idle, they've 
got their surgeons lying idle. In fact the genuine marginal cost is probably very small...and 
yet they feel obliged to charge £400 or £800 for that procedure.' In effect, the focus on 
activity creates an artificial need for rationing. 
They also questioned whether the internal market could ever really function as a market 
because of the reality of a fixed budget, and because of political reluctance to allow trusts 
to go out of business. Anglia Harbours, he said, was 'one trust among 600 over five years -
in business you'd expect about a third of trusts to have gone out of business by now, if 
there was a real market...it's peanuts, really.' In a situation where trusts could not expect to 
get significant resources redirected to them from other trusts because of the risk of forcing 
them out of business, they were confined to bidding for growth money. 'And having this 
huge contracting infrastructure to have debates about that much money is crazy, really 
crazy... We have all the disadvantages of a market, in terms of the contractual relationship, 
in terms of the transaction costs, but none of the advantages which are really forcing 
people to make radical changes because of market pressure.' 
The director of public health, although vehemently supporting the claim that the market 
was nothing like a real market, took a slightly different view of its potential to achieve 
change. 
'I think the market in itself has probably done very, very little. I think it's the longer 
terms trends - resource management, clinical audit, explicitness. I think what the 
market has done is it's been much easier to create change on two sides. I think that 
change management has been made easier for the trusts when they've been able to 
blame some third party, whilst if you were both the resource allocator and the 
operational manager, it's really very difficult to take a million pounds out of service 
x in order to invest that million in service y. Because the people in service x are 
your own employees and it's much easier to maintain the status quo. But if some 
third party forces you to do it...' 
District Three 
The above view was to some extent challenged by the director of commissioning in 
District Three when she described trust chief executives 'siding with clinicians to 
demonstrate why they need more money, rather than managing their clinicians to force 
through an agenda' of change. This was an example of a provider not taking the 
opportunity to make change and blame it on the purchaser, but resisting change strongly. 
She contrasted this with pre-market planning and rationing, which she felt was 
collaborative, implicit and largely focused on capping supply. 
She too argued that although financial pressures had existed before the market, 'we were 
never acutely aware of deficits. We knew there were problems with the trusts [sic] and 
closing wards, but I think I would say there was probably enough flexibility in the system 
to actually accommodate a lot of that, so nobody minded too much.' The ability to run 
long waiting lists had been one factor in that flexibility, and much higher bed capacity was 
another. 'What we're seeing now is a combination of trusts squeezing everything out of the 
system in terms of reduced length of stay, increased day cases and cutting down on their 
estate so they're working in much tighter areas.' This was chiefly a result of perpetual 
efficiency targets rather than the market per se. 
The cost of expensive new drugs was again raised as one of the main pressures on 
resources, but at the same time purchasers' awareness of drug costs had grown as a result 
of more explicit contract negotiations. In pre-market days there had been occasional 
debates about individual preparations, such as erythropoietin and Factor VIII, but these 
were seen as the exception. 
The director of commissioning felt contracts had resulted in a complete shift of approach 
at provider level to managing financial pressures, which resulted in many issues (such as 
costly drugs) being thrust up the line to purchasers. 'The trusts are just getting more and 
more adept at charging differently, presenting information differently.' Purchasers were 
'running hard to keep up with 76 contracts', but could only do so much to keep control of 
the situation. 'The rest of the agenda is just so big that if you take your mind off one of 
those items that's going to pop up as a problem, next year. And you're forever doing the 
old plate-spinning, and it does get quite wearing.' This illustrated how the introduction of 
the market polarised responsibility for managing resources and undermined collaboration 
between districts and providers. 
Although the director of commissioning was certain contracting had created extra work, 
she was not convinced that this led to higher transaction costs. 'I would say in the last 
three months of the year, it is time that could be better spent... A fair proportion of that is 
actually done because people work much longer working weeks than they used to, so in 
terms of manpower we cope with it, but if you look at the number of hours those people 
are working, that's where the pressure is.' 
Expectations of change under the Labour Government 
By the time of the third interviews, there had been a change of government, and the 
opportunity was taken to discuss the potential implications of this change more 
extensively, although the issue had been touched on at previous interviews. It should be 
borne in mind that at this point no White Paper had been published, so there was no 
definitive account of what Labour planned to do. However, interviewees were able to 
comment on proposals to introduce GP commissioning throughout the NHS and the 
principle of abolishing the market, and what effect this might have on rationing. 
Avon 
The director of contracting in Avon believed GP commissioning would not simply be the 
market by another name, although it would probably only be 'slightly different'. She 
thought there was a danger that it could prove to be an 'emasculated' version of GP 
fimdholding, with fewer budgetary incentives to make change and negotiate hard with 
providers. If providers were given a more guaranteed income, this would also make them 
less prepared to change. 
On the other hand, she perceived some potential advantages in reviewing 
'the levels at which the contracting approach makes sense. So in community 
services it might be mainly sensible to think of things at the practice level, and for 
ordinary secondary care it may be sensible to think of things at the district levels, 
and for the specialised stuff, the tertiary stuff, to get rid of ECRs and revert to 
block funding in the way that A&E departments are block funded. Which would 
require some formula to adjust the growth on some basis, but then you would be 
returning to a situation where you did what you did in the old days - providing the 
service until the money ran out and then you stopped. And you stopped for 
everybody and for most things Tertiary services have run away with the money 
in recent years, because of the incentives in the system. So it might be quite 
tempting to try and cap them, and that might then lead to a different approach to 
rationing.' 
Although she did not believe there would be a wholesale return to implicit rationing of this 
kind, she thought the government would find this a pragmatic option in some areas, such 
as tertiary services. 
She was uncertain what the government's approach would be to tackling inequity between 
districts with regard to what was rationed and what was not, even though she anticipated 
that this would be a major concern for the government. 'It 's easy for Labour to have a go 
at the fundholders and issues of equity and inequity, but they just don't know what to say 
about the situation between districts and so they're not thinking about it.' 
The chief executive agreed that the government would find it difficult to sustain the 
inequity of the 'total lottery approach to decision-making on priorities', but that they 
would also face huge political difficulties in trying to tackle it. Whatever they did, she did 
not see it making much difference to the amount of explicit rationing, even if it were to 
become more consistent nationally. 
Both she and the director of public health agreed that competition had been completely 
unsuccessful as a way of controlling costs and that some other mechanism would be 
needed, but still within an internal market framework. They anticipated that funding would 
move from a capitation basis to budgets for providers, based on expected activity levels. 
The chief executive thought the government might usefully opt for greater openness of 
accounting by trusts, to enable commissioners to be better informed about where real 
financial pressures were being experienced, and where trusts were 'crying wolf. Although 
these developments would make it 'feel very different for trusts', it was unlikely that there 
would be a return to direct management. There would still be a need for a commissioning 
function, although the chief executive was in no doubt that reducing the transaction costs 
incurred by GP fundholding in particular was sensible. 
The director of public health was uncertain what effect, if any, the proposed changes 
would have on explicit rationing. Superficially, Labour's emphasis on open government 
and freedom of information might suggest an interest in more explicit rationing, but this 
was politically difficult territory. It was also practically difficult to realise the ideal of 
democratic legitimacy - 'even the most complex democracy doesn't get anywhere near it, 
and yet we knock ourselves senseless trying to achieve it.' 
He personally felt 'terribly torn about whether to be explicit or implicit', and thought 
ultimately responsibility would have to be shared between managers and clinicians; 
certainly an approach which did not involve clinicians and implicit rationing was untenable. 
He argued that a retreat from even existing levels of explicit rationing was possible, 
because 
'exclusions don't work.. .I suppose the way it would happen is they'd just decay 
into kind of misuse over time. So for example you'd have quite a tight specification 
for varicose veins: it's got to be associated with ulceration, pain and distress of a 
certain point on the scale, and all the rest of it, which the providers stick to. And 
then they find that the general surgery contract, for all sorts of other reasons, is 
doing quite well, they have a bit of space, they have a research fellow who needs to 
learn the trade as well. So they start to - off their own bat - lower the threshold, 
and before you know where you are...And it would not be noticeable - we 
wouldn't know. We might see that there was an increase in varicose veins, but we 
might think, "well, what the hell?'" 
This perhaps raises a question mark over the extent to which even an explicit framework 
for implicit rationing is sustainable in the long term. 
Cambridge and Huntingdon 
The director of commissioning in Cambridge and Huntingdon remarked that abolishing the 
market yet keeping commissioning was 
'almost the worst of both worlds - we'll keep the institutions and the expense of 
the internal market, but we'll remove any ability to actually use it creatively to 
lever change...I do think fundholding was a policy mistake, but they're leaving 
fimdholding, but they're taking away any incentives on fundholders to be 
imaginative. Because a lot of the fundholders have delivered good change.' 
Both interviewees in Cambridge and Huntingdon were in favour of some kind of return to 
provider-based budgets, perhaps routed through host health authorities but based on 
expected levels of activity at that provider rather than on capitation for the local 
population. Patients from other districts could either be funded as part of this budget, or 
through limited funding transfers between health authorities. Providers would then 'have 
to cope with all comers within their allocation'. 
It was not anticipated that there would be a return to direct management, as 'one of the 
good things that has been a success with the purchaser provider split is exactly the 
separation of the operational management of trusts from the strategic organisation', and 
this was a benefit worth retaining. Nonetheless, the director of commissioning expressed 
some interest in restoring direct management, to tackle trust managers' 'freedom to 
mismanage the system - collectively the NHS is in debt and people have just ploughed 
ahead with unaffordable schemes.' 
The director of public health suggested that the best way to implement GP commissioning 
would be to leave health authorities responsible for the planning and funding of secondary 
care, whilst GP localities held budgets for primary and community services. If the 
government opted for the 'bureaucracy of every GP commissioning secondary services', 
the transaction costs would be 'crazy', and worse than the already 'huge transaction costs' 
incurred by GP fundholding. 
The preference in Cambridge and Huntingdon for fixed provider budgets was in line with 
their view that meso-level rationing by health authorities should remain explicit, but 'you 
have got to retreat from it at the micro level, because I don't think it's bearable', as the 
director of public health said. Fixed budgets would re-create a structure where implicit 
rationing by clinicians was seen as legitimate and desirable. They did not believe pursuing 
GP commissioning would achieve the same result. 
District Three 
The very high proportion of fundholding in District Three was felt to influence the way 
local GPs felt about possible changes: 'a lot of our fundholders are saying that 
fundholding's run its course. They're interested in unified budgets, they're interested in 
developing total purchasing pilot arrangements, but fundholding per se isn't actually 
terribly attractive any more.' 
The chief executive felt they would only be interested in GP commissioning if it included 
fully devolved budgets, not just indicative budgets. However, this would raise concerns 
about accountability and maintaining financial control, and would certainly not avoid the 
need for rationing. 
'In fact it'll make it worse in some ways, because you've got smaller risk pools, 
more localities having to make separate decisions....I can't see why GP 
commissioning will suddenly make the financial situation better.' 
Although it could have many advantages in terms of bringing decision-making closer to 
local needs and creating closer links between consultants and GPs, the management costs 
associated with it could be substantial. He did not believe that it would result in a return to 
more implicit rationing; in any GP commissioning group there were always likely to be one 
or two practices who would be unhappy with any rationing decision agreed privately 
within the group, and would want to bring it to public attention. 
The director of commissioning agreed with this assessment, and did not think GP 
commissioning could replicate the current position within fundholding, where GPs were 
able to make implicit individual judgements about cases they were also responsible for 
funding. The collective nature of GP commissioning was likely to make decisions more 
explicit than fundholding decisions. It could also reinforce the role of health authorities and 
public health staff in developing clear population-wide policies, with greater public 
consultation and more consistent use of effectiveness evidence. 
She welcomed the principle of reducing the transaction costs of fundholding, and the 
action already taken by the government to reduce the administrative costs of checking 
every invoice by suggesting GPs use a sampling approach. However, she agreed with the 
chief executive that GP commissioning brought its own risk of higher management costs, 
and would require considerable organisational development support. 
As far as providers were concerned, she was doubtful that a move to three-year contracts 
would have a significant impact on transaction costs, however desirable it might be. It 
might have a greater impact 'if trusts are instructed not to negotiate for high prices'. At a 
more general level, she was hopeful that the government's approach would 'send very 
positive messages down to trusts' not to continue setting up new services in the hope of 
generating more income. A stronger emphasis on mergers and partnerships between trusts 
would also 'cut down some of the unnecessary competition and the vying for scarce 
resources'. 
The director of public health expressed some optimism about three-year contracts. She 
argued it was possible 
'to abolish the aspects of markets that are associated with transactions for 
transactions' sake, and if you move from having an annual contracting round to 
having a three to five year comprehensive care agreement, you can refocus activity 
from the market bit of the relationship to the health and health care bit of the 
relationship.' 
On the other hand, she believed people had overestimated the impact of the market, and 
that 'differences and tensions between the health authorities and the hospitals' had always 
existed, although 'admittedly there isn't the line management relationship that there was 
previously'. She did not envisage a return to direct management. 
The director of public health had concerns both about the management costs associated 
with fundholding and the lack of accountability for the use of fundholder savings. She 
commented 'all the potential gains of fundholding can be made by strong GP 
commissioning, by strong GP leadership. It doesn't need fundholding to do them.' She felt 
that different parts of the market had been subject to 'different regulations and different 
constraints', and that competition had therefore never been fully realised. 'If you remove 
the perverse incentives to good practice that developed in the market, then you have the 
basis for longer term collaboration, but something where you have healthy tension, but 
without the threat. Because a lot of the market threats were never real threats.' 
The purchaser and provider split was thus a positive influence, which could be maintained 
and improved if other aspects of the market were abolished. The market had 'simplified, 
and arguably oversimplified, a number of complex things in order to help people tackle 
them', but ultimately the need for a longer term, complex, collaborative process had to be 
recognised. 
Discussion 
As is evident from the previous section where interviewees compared the current situation 
with the pre-market NHS, there was substantial agreement amongst all interviewees that 
the NHS market did not really function as would be expected of a real market. The lack of 
a real threat that providers would go out of business meant there was little genuinely 
competitive behaviour; competition manifested itself simply as spiralling bids for more 
resources against a background of a fixed budget for the NHS. As the director of public 
health in Cambridge and Huntingdon commented, 'the combination of the purchaser 
provider split at a time of tight resources is explosive - they are two completely opposing 
directions.' 
This accords with the views expressed by Whitehead et al. (1997) in relation to Sweden's 
reconsideration of its market reforms, that reimbursement-style funding arrangements 
created 
'the wrong incentives when cost control and structural changes in supply became 
political priorities in the 1990s. These incentives were designed to solve 
"yesterday's" problems of decreasing productivity and access. But when the 
reforms were implemented the underlying problems - decreasing tax revenues and 
rising unemployment in society - were completely different and the reform 
solutions were counter-productive' (p.938). 
This scepticism about the NHS market has two important implications for understanding 
interviewees' thoughts about changes under Labour. Firstly, the proposal to 'abolish the 
market' was seen as something of an overstatement or a misunderstanding, since there had 
never really been a market to abolish. Nonetheless, the principle of trying to resolve some 
of the problems was generally welcomed. 
However, the second implication is that they were doubtful how far Labour's proposals 
would result in practical improvement, because it appeared that some key problematic 
aspects of the NHS market would remain in place, despite the intention to abolish the 
market. The maintenance of a split between commissioning and providing and the creation 
of GP commissioning are examples of this - 'the concept of commissioning requires a 
purchaser and a provider', as the director of public health in Cambridge and Huntingdon 
pointed out, 'so how can you get rid of the market and still have commissioning?' 
This is not to say that interviewees felt market forces were necessarily of no value; their 
concern was rather that both the current situation and perhaps future plans represented a 
half-way house between market forces and bureaucracy, and that neither was allowed to 
work properly. 
There was some uncertainty about the likely impact of proposed changes on rationing; 
some interviewees thought it might enable a return to implicit rationing to some extent, but 
others disagreed. The growing interest in using fixed budgets, combining implicit clinical 
judgements with an explicit purchaser-led framework, was already having an impact in 
advance of any changes to the internal market. Paradoxically, GP commissioning might 
actually make it harder to pursue this approach. 
There was agreement that political reluctance to acknowledge rationing more openly at 
government level would persist, although it was just possible that Labour's interest in 




The relationship between explicit rationing, the market and other factors 
'Remember, it is not truth which matters but perceptions. And the perception, now 
widespread, is that the NHS is in serious difficulty once again.' (Hunter, 1997a, p.24) 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the findings of the thesis so far, with an analysis of the 
different factors affecting rationing. The results of this analysis are then compared against 
the original three hypotheses. 
Discussion of the research findings 
What kinds of rationing are occurring? 
There is clear evidence from the case studies, and other sources, that explicit rationing is 
growing. This is in two senses: rationing which was already happening implicitly is 
becoming more explicit, and new cases of explicit rationing are occurring, particularly in 
the case of new technologies or drugs. An example of the former is cosmetic surgery, 
which used to be delayed by long waiting lists; an example of the latter is the drug beta-
interferon. 
It is less easy to demonstrate new cases of explicit rationing of services already provided 
but never previously rationed at all. It is virtually impossible to find an existing service 
which was not previously subject to some form of implicit rationing, however well-
concealed. For example, the decision by District Three to limit IVF led to a review of 
other sub-fertility services, with the result that tubal surgery was to be funded on an ECR 
basis only. Yet it is probable that tubal surgery was already being rationed informally by 
individual clinicians, given what was already known about its low effectiveness. It may be 
that once such a service becomes the target of explicit restrictions, however, it is more 
strictly rationed than it was by implicit mechanisms. 
In Chapter Two, three kinds of rationing questions were identified: what should be 
provided, how much and for whom? There is evidence that explicit responses are being 
made to all these questions. 
Health authorities are deciding what should be provided, even in the absence of any 
national lead, and despite the government's rejection of blanket exclusions of any 
potentially effective treatment. Whilst authorities are generally careful to allow clinical 
exceptions, some services are virtually excluded altogether. The possibility that exceptions 
may be made is not always clear from written policies (e.g. IVF in District Three). In other 
cases, the authority may refuse specific funding but allow clinicians to make their own 
exceptions within existing resources (e.g. beta interferon in Avon). In the case of Riluzole, 
Avon had suggested even this possibility should not be allowed. These virtual exclusions 
are sometimes justified by stating that the services not purchased are ineffective and 
therefore do not contravene the ban. Sometimes the justification is that it is a social need 
rather than a health care need - again, IVF is an example. There are also services such as 
homeopathy, osteopathy and acupuncture which never have been part of mainstream NHS 
provision; this provides some justification for arguing they are not an NHS responsibility, 
and lack of evidence on effectiveness helps to support the decision to exclude them. 
How much of a service is purchased is clearly stated in many contracts. The level of detail 
varies substantially - at one level, a contract giving a maximum volume of general medical 
episodes is a form of explicit rationing, although it still leaves generous scope for implicit 
'micro rationing' at individual level (Klein et al, 1996, p.8). This total may be split between 
sub-specialties, groups of procedures, or individual procedures. Maximum numbers of 
individual procedures may still allow for doctors to decide how they will be allocated, 
whether on a first-come first-served basis, on the basis of criteria agreed amongst clinical 
colleagues but not shared with purchasers, or on the basis of each clinician's personal 
judgement. Alternatively, purchasers may use contracts to specify the criteria they would 
like to see applied, which begins to take them into the territory of explicit 'for whom' 
rationing (see below). Sometimes how much of a service is to be bought may be expressed 
in financial rather than activity terms; although this may seem a more implicit way of 
rationing, it can be very explicit where the funding will buy only a small number of cases. 
This approach is found for example in gender reassignment and bone marrow transplants. 
For whom: The suggestion that rationing by exclusion may be giving way to rationing by 
thresholds has been discussed in previous chapters. Whether this is clinician-led or 
purchaser-led, the net result is the development of eligibility criteria or guidelines which 
give explicit support to clinicians in determining who will receive the limited amount of 
treatment available - in other words, who meets the threshold for treatment. Again, these 
criteria may be based on social considerations or on evidence of clinical effectiveness, or 
both. Examples of the former include the marital and parental status of couples seeking 
IVF, and difficulty in obtaining employment as a criterion for offering tattoo removal. 
Examples of the latter include offering IVF, D&Cs and cancer screening only to certain 
age groups and the use of indicative blood cholesterol levels for prescribing lipid lowering 
drugs. There is also a half-way category of selection on the basis of severity of the 
condition, or severity of its impact on the person's life. This applies to some plastic surgery 
interventions, such as birth mark removal - the operation is equally effective whether the 
birthmark is on the face or neck, or elsewhere on the body, but the degree of psychological 
distress caused by the condition is judged to be less if it is not permanently visible. 
There is international evidence that other countries, such as New Zealand, are also moving 
away from exclusions towards an emphasis on guidelines and criteria for treatment. 
The result of this shift of emphasis is a renewed reliance on professionals' clinical 
judgement, but within a more explicit framework than before. Most interviewees felt this 
was a responsible way forward and struck an appropriate balance between public 
accountability and the need for flexibility in the face of complex individual cases. 
Factors affecting explicit rationing 
The following sections examine the evidence for the impact of a number of different 
factors. It will be evident from the text that some are clearly forces in favour of 
explicitness, and a few are equally clearly forces against. However, there are a number 
where the effect is unclear or ambivalent. 
'Money is indeed the most important thing in the world' (Shaw)1 
It is perhaps a truism to say that the fundamental backdrop to explicit rationing is scarcity 
of resources. A particularly strong influence on scarcity and rising expenditure seems to be 
technological advance - this featured more regularly in interviews than the ageing 
population or consumer demand. Interviewees were especially concerned about the impact 
1 See bibliography for sources of section headings 
of new drugs and developments in services such as renal therapy and oncology. 
Evidence from the 1997/98 contracting negotiations initially seemed to demonstrate how 
the temporary relief from scarcity afforded by a more generous budget allocation could 
give purchasers an opportunity to step back from explicit rationing, whereas those still 
facing serious deficits feel compelled to make more explicit choices. 
Scarcity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for explicit rationing - necessary 
because it is unlikely doctors would want to withhold any potentially effective treatments if 
they could all be afforded, and nor would the public want them withheld. It is not sufficient 
because there has always been such scarcity and it has hitherto been dealt with mainly 
implicitly. Theoretically, one response to a worsening financial position could be simply to 
increase the extent of implicit rationing. 
This may in practice no longer be possible, for three reasons: 
1. There may be a limit to how much can be dealt with implicitly. The tighter 
money gets, the more likely it is that the implicit bubble will burst - if implicit 
rationing grows beyond a certain point, it may become too big to hide. Several 
interviewees thought it might be coincidence that there had been greater 
explicitness since the market, the real reason being that by the end of the 1980s 
they had run out of easy efficiency savings and implicit ways of capping supply. 
2. Pandora's box has been opened - it becomes difficult to sustain implicit 
rationing once people know it is happening. Perhaps we are at one of those 
points identified by Calabresi and Bobbitt (1978) where the conflict between 
values has come to the surface and we have to make a clear shift in our 
allocation processes to reassure ourselves (no doubt falsely) that the problem is 
being addressed. As one interviewee suggested, academic fashion has played a 
part in exposing implicit rationing and perhaps taking society beyond the point 
of no return. 
3. The Patient's Charter has blocked off one of the primary implicit rationing 
routes, namely very long waiting lists. Even if we could still pull back from the 
brink of explicit rationing, would there be nowhere to go? 
How convincing are these arguments, particularly in the light of the final interviews? A 
number of problems can be identified. 
Evidence from international comparisons suggests that most countries with a tax-funded 
health service have already reached a point where resource pressures can no longer be 
contained by purely implicit measures. However, it is interesting to note that healthcare 
expenditure in these countries varies substantially, despite the convergence on more 
explicit forms of rationing. It would seem that it is the pressure to spend more that is 
crucial, in conjunction with a perception that the taxable limits have been reached, rather 
than the level of expenditure per se. 
Most explicit rationing to date has been marginal and has not generated major savings. 
Often it has simply formalised an existing position, such as excluding cosmetic surgery 
procedures for which the waiting list was so long they were unlikely ever to be performed. 
If lack of resources is the problem, as virtually all interviewees agreed it was, explicit 
rationing (at least by exclusion) does not seem to offer a solution any more than implicit 
mechanisms. This is borne out by the experience in countries which have tried to formulate 
a national list of excluded services and have had to retreat from the complexities of 
available evidence in most conditions. 
One practical counter-argument is that, whilst explicit rationing may not be making much 
impact on existing expenditure, it does at least pre-empt the need to spend even more 
money to solve a waiting list problem or meet a growing demand for some new alternative 
therapy, such as expensive drugs. 
At a different level, it could be argued that it does not matter whether explicit rationing is 
successful at dealing with scarcity. What matters is that it is clearly a response to scarcity. 
The general climate of financial difficulty affects the way health authorities behave; making 
explicit choices may give them a sense that they are dealing with the problem, even if the 
results are ultimately limited. 
It may be that explicit rationing will become the answer to the problem in the longer term, 
and not just a reaction to it. There is some evidence from interviews that health authorities 
in this country are gradually moving into more major and controversial areas to look for 
financial savings. 
Of crucial importance, however, is the way in which they approach this task. After the first 
round of interviews, lack of resources seemed to be a clear pressure in favour of 
explicitness. As the case studies progressed, however, a more complex picture emerged. 
Purchasers' reactions to worsening resource pressures have gone through distinct phases -
having initially felt driven by them to greater explicitness, particularly in rationing by 
exclusion, they are now concerned that this is not an effective strategy. Those same 
resource pressures that prompted the growth in explicitness are now encouraging renewed 
emphasis on fixed budgets at provider level as a more successful way to manage scarcity. 
It could be argued there is a limit to what can be dealt with explicitly, rather than a limit to 
what can be dealt with implicitly. 
However, this renewed interest in implicit mechanisms does not automatically mean a 
retreat from explicit rationing; there was considerable agreement amongst interviewees 
that explicit decisions would not go away altogether. Rather than a retreat from 
explicitness, this new phase represents a search for a better balance between implicit and 
explicit means of allocating resources, and the pursuit of more sophisticated approaches 
than straightforward exclusion. Waiting lists provide one example of this, where waiting 
times are being allowed to lengthen as a way of coping with financial difficulties but at the 
same time there are moves to develop more explicit and equitable criteria for admission to 
the list. There may also be greater explicitness to the public that rationing is happening and 
a clearer, more consistent decision-making process may be developed, whilst at the same 
time the actual content of individual decisions remains a matter for clinical judgement. 
In summary, then, the effect of resource pressures is still towards explicitness, but towards 
a different kind of explicitness from the early emphasis on exclusion. Simultaneously, it is 
also an influence in favour of more implicit means of capping supply to stay within budget. 
'And mighty proud I am... that I am able to have a spare bed for my friends' (.Pepvs) 
Closely linked to the scarcity of resources argument is the loss of flexibility within 
hospitals; years of efficiency targets and underfunding of inflation have resulted in 
reductions in the number of beds and in lengths of stay, with increased occupancy and 
throughput. This capping of supply has made it more difficult to cope with unexpected 
fluctuations in workload. It has also made clinicians and managers more conscious of 
having to be selective in deciding who gets access to the reduced number of beds, 
particularly when coupled with the requirement to reduce long waiting times. 
Mental health services have been particularly affected by bed losses. Old-style locked 
wards, where severely disturbed patients were confined, have been closed on humanitarian 
grounds, but 'we have moved exactly that provision to the private sector, where it is to be 
had at a price.' This accounts for a substantial element of the pressure experienced in 
mental health ECRs. Professional sub-specialisation in mental health and other fields has 
also led to much tighter definitions of which patients will or will not be accepted on 
particular wards. 
7 do perceive here a divided duty' (Shakespeare) 
The purchaser/provider split (leaving aside for the moment the actual process of 
contracting) has had two major effects: it has freed purchasers from the responsibility of 
managing providers, and in doing so has freed them to make hard choices which are in the 
interests of the population, but may conflict with the interests of providers. Such choices 
may also conflict with the interests of existing individual patients. The corollary to this is 
that providers no longer feel collectively responsible for helping to manage scarce 
resources and to collaborate in implicit means of control. On the contrary, the interests of 
individual trusts are in stimulating greater demand and allowing technology to develop, in 
competition with other trusts and at odds with purchasers' requirement to keep costs 
down. This in turn worsens the lack of resources already discussed. Thus the quasi-market 
may make explicit rationing more likely simply because it weakens informal cost control. 
This is not to say that resource pressures are solely the result of the quasi-market - they 
are clearly not - but to point out that it may reinforce and hasten them. This is in addition 
to the burden of transaction costs discussed later. 
Of course, there have always been tensions between health authorities and hospitals; it has 
always been in the interests of hospitals and individual specialties to make a strong case for 
additional funding, and to give a forceful account of what may happen to patient care if the 
financial crisis is not resolved. However, organisational separation has both made these 
tensions more apparent and required them to be settled by negotiation rather than 
command; without direct management, it is less easy to suppress providers' dissatisfaction 
with the outcome of negotiations. It has resulted in a more open division within the 
managerial class, with provider managers supporting more explicitly the resource 
maximising strategies of their clinicians against the budget holders at district level. 
It is also true that the fixed budget for the NHS as a whole and for each health authority 
has never gone away, but what changed as a result of the quasi-market is the presentation 
of the budget at provider level. The very direct linking of funding and activity embodied in 
contracts has encouraged providers to think less in terms of a fixed budget and more in 
terms of fee-for-service reimbursement, which Whitehead et al. (1997) have noted sits 
uneasily with the requirement to control costs. Theoretically the overall fixed budget may 
still be there, but contracts and the rhetoric of 'money following the patient' have given 
providers the illusion that they individually are not subject to it, and created even stronger 
incentives to increase activity as a way of obtaining additional funding. If funding is not 
forthcoming, both doctors and managers at trust level take the view that it is up to 
purchasers to tell them what to cut. 
It is worth exploring in more detail how this differs from pre-market tensions. In the past, 
hospitals may have used extra activity as an argument in annual budget negotiations, but 
equally often discussions were couched in terms of needing more staff to deal with existing 
levels of workload at a more acceptable level of quality, or having to close beds to stay 
within budget. Bids for new theatre sessions might be made in order to alleviate waiting 
lists - in other words the extra workload would not be undertaken until extra funding had 
been promised. Now the sequence is often reversed - the extra activity is presented as a 
fait accompli, which places additional pressure on purchasers to fund it. 
Of course, this was sometimes used as a tactic even in pre-market days, but arguably it 
stood less chance of success under a fixed budget system than a contract system. The 
measurement of activity was often inaccurate and was generally not broken down in detail 
to different sub-specialties, making it difficult to present a convincing case. Furthermore, 
the link between activity and price or cost was still very weak, whereas it was easy to 
present the cost of staffing requirements, or opening more beds or theatre sessions. 
Increases in activity were generally absorbed within the existing budget through increased 
efficiency, until something snapped and a step-wise increase in funding took place. The 
relation between funding and activity was certainly not linear. 
Indeed, one of the major reasons for the 1991 reforms was precisely that the old system of 
fixed budgets allowed no flexibility to give additional financial rewards to high performing 
hospitals, and even made it potentially in providers' interests to avoid extra workload -
safe in the knowledge that they were unlikely to lose any of their budget (especially if any 
underspendings were quickly spent on equipment and furnishings before the end of the 
financial year). 
As Klein (1995) points out, the government had been steadily moving from an emphasis on 
inputs (beds, staffing) to an emphasis on outputs (activity), to try to get away from the 
relentless pressure for more money which the focus on bed and staffing numbers 
encouraged. (He also notes that their success in achieving this shift was limited, the debate 
between those favouring inputs and those preferring outputs being a 'dialogue of the deaf, 
p. 178). The 1991 reforms represented the logical conclusion of this process - all funding 
was to be linked to activity, and only those producing more would get more money. 
Inefficient hospitals would theoretically lose out. 
Evidence from the case studies suggests there is growing concern that this primary focus 
on activity has stimulated an unmanageable increase in workload as trusts have competed 
on this basis for a larger slice of the cake. Activity-based contracts and confidential 
accounting have also made it difficult for health authorities to establish whether the extra 
activity is actually costing providers as much as they claim, or whether it could in fact be 
absorbed within existing resources. Rationing decisions have also become activity-based, 
rather than facility or staffing-based. These concerns lie behind health authorities' 
increasing disillusion with activity as the basis for negotiations, and their renewed emphasis 
on providers' shared responsibility to manage limited resources; both trends are also 
reflected in the new White Paper (Secretary of State for Health, 1997). 
It is also worth noting, as does the White Paper, that fundholding has 'artificially separated 
responsibility for emergency and planned care5(paragraph 5.5). This, too, has made it more 
difficult to manage emergency pressures implicitly by transferring resources from elective 
services as needed; these resources are now ring-fenced and providers have an incentive to 
maintain elective workload to retain essential income. 
A problem with the lack of corporate feeling between purchasers and providers is that 
whilst it may force purchasers into taking explicit decisions, it may simultaneously 
undermine their implementation. There were examples in the interviews of consultants 
ignoring explicit exclusions or feeling unable to enforce them. Sometimes this comes full 
circle when the monitoring process reveals this divergence between contract and reality, 
and a further tightening of referral criteria is imposed or agreed. A key factor is whether 
clinicians agree that certain procedures ought not to be available but find it hard to say no, 
or whether they disagree fundamentally with the exclusion. 
Although most interviewees concluded that the specification of activity inherent in 
contracts and the contract monitoring process had exerted some influence on explicit 
rationing, most felt contracts were not themselves the major reason for it. Some explicit 
decisions were taken mid-year in response to financial crisis and some were pursued in 
parallel with contract negotiations. Contracts might catch up with this later by formally 
recording the decisions made, but were not necessarily the mechanism by which agreement 
was reached. 
ECRs have been at the cutting edge of explicit rationing, because they were often 
expensive and often dealt with controversial or rare treatments not covered by mainstream 
contracts. Although the initials stand for extra contractual referrals, they were officially 
individual cost per case contracts, and formed an integral part of the contracting system. 
The individual nature of ECRs made their refusal especially sensitive. The Conservative 
Government was planning to abolish the requirement for providers to seek approval from 
the relevant purchaser for elective ECRs; the stated reason was to cut transaction costs, 
but those interviewees who discussed it was driven by political reluctance to allow 
purchasers to challenge GP freedom of referral so obviously and painfully. In fact the 
threatened loss of financial control - which might have proved more expensive than the 
transaction costs of running the system - seems to have prompted the government to defer 
abolishing ECRs for a further year, in effect leaving it for the new Labour government to 
deal with. (See next chapter). 
'Knowledge itself is power' (Bacon) 
To ration explicitly requires more detailed information than was available in the 1980s. 
Contract specifications have been an undoubted influence - district planners, however 
well informed, were unlikely to know in detail which procedures were available in each 
specialty and who was getting them. There were exceptions, for instance when new 
specialist services were being developed - such as new cardiac units being set up to do a 
certain number of CABGs and angioplasties - or when there were specific waiting list 
initiatives on cataracts or hip replacements. However, even in these cases actually 
obtaining the information was often difficult. District planners certainly had no knowledge 
of their residents being treated outside the district, apart from occasional regional specialty 
cases or some long term mental illness and learning disability patients. Discovering where 
all local residents were being treated, however, is more a feature of the purchaser provider 
split generally than contracting specifically. 
There may be some difference here between public health specialists and lay managers; one 
director of public health felt that contracting had made little difference to the level of 
information available, but acknowledged that having a medical background may have been 
important in obtaining information from hospital clinicians. 
'We had evidence and no doubt' (Eliot) 
Contracting is not the only source of additional information; the Resource Management 
Initiative (RMI), clinical audit, and the increase in evidence from research into 
effectiveness and outcomes have all played a non-market part, although RMI has not 
been as successful as the Department of Health had hoped (Cross, 1996). The requirement 
to write contracts may have speeded up the development of information from these other 
sources; it is impossible now to tell whether growing resource pressures would have meant 
that the process would have had to speed up anyway, if contracts had not been there to 
provide momentum. That they did provide momentum is beyond doubt - the lead-up to the 
introduction of the market was characterised by frantic activity to put the necessary IT in 
place. Since then, improvements in IT have enabled further sophistication in contracts. 
The relationship between rationing, contracts and effectiveness evidence is equally 
convoluted. Effectiveness evidence has certainly provided the justification for many of the 
most commonly rationed procedures, but whether it is the cause of explicit rationing is 
another question. Certainly it is not always the decisive factor. 
Part of the explosion in the availability of effectiveness information, which has been 
encouraged by the NHSE, can be explained as a response to the needs of purchasers, 
desperate for sources of independent advice to help them fulfil their new role. However, 
effectiveness research has not been purely driven by the existence of the market, and has 
been gathering pace for some time. Some of the most well-known examples such as 
grommets and D&Cs in women under 40 pre-date the market altogether. Having to 
negotiate contracts with providers, especially provider clinicians, has given purchasers 
additional impetus in seeking and utilising such evidence, and contracts have provided a 
vehicle for expressing a requirement that providers should use evidence-based medicine. 
It should also be borne in mind that not all effectiveness evidence points towards limiting 
or excluding services - some of it may contribute to resource pressures by suggesting that 
more or better services should be purchased. Interviewees were unanimous in pointing to 
the complexity and uncertainty of much evidence and the need to assess effectiveness for 
individual patients. This means it is difficult to justify total exclusions in most cases, which 
in turn means allowing clinicians the flexibility to exercise their judgement - in effect 
confirming the place of implicit rationing, albeit within an explicit framework. 
Despite the growth in effectiveness evidence, there is general agreement that it barely 
scratches the surface and that historical funding patterns continue to form the basis of for 
most allocation decisions. Sometimes even where there is clear evidence either to cut or 
purchase more of something, it may be ignored because the consequences would be 
politically too difficult. 
'They also serve who only stand and wait' (Milton) 
The Patient's Charter and the setting of maximum waiting times have exerted an 
independent influence on explicit rationing. This is an interesting case of a rationing 
mechanism that is in itself essentially implicit (namely waiting lists) being made more 
explicit and also itself producing more explicitness. Although the Patient's Charter reflects 
a general trend towards consumerism, and has an important influence on the quality 
standards set in contracts, it was launched as a separate initiative independently of the 
NHS quasi-market reforms. Again, however, the existence of contracts and the 
accompanying availability of information may have fostered a greater degree of 
explicitness in implementing and monitoring the Patient's Charter than would otherwise 
have been possible. 
The explicit rationing prompted by the Patient's Charter has been mostly on a one-off 
rather than a continuing basis: once the tattoo removals and sterilisation reversals have 
been excluded, it is unlikely that further low priority treatments previously rationed 
implicitly will be unearthed. A possible continuing influence may be in diverting resources 
away from other aspects of care, particularly emergencies and community services, which 
may then be subject to new explicit rationing - alternatively this pressure may be handled 
implicitly, through across-the-board cuts or simple unavailability. However, there were 
signs during 1996/97 that the government would not allow either to happen, especially in 
the run-up to an election. Lengthening waiting times were officially tolerated again in 
order to protect emergency services, and the Treasury made available emergency funding 
of f 25m during 1996/97, as an advance on the settlement for 1997/98 (Cervi, 1996). 
However, relaxation of Patient's Charter targets does not alter the conclusion that meeting 
the original targets did indeed force some rationing decisions out into the open. The 
development of criteria for deciding who will be admitted to a waiting list (on the basis of 
need) suggests the Patient's Charter is continuing to produce more explicit allocation 
mechanisms, to work in conjunction with more traditional implicit mechanisms. 
'The old order changeth yielding place to new' (Tennyson) 
The effect of managerialism and the creation of a culture of priority setting was 
identified by some interviewees as an important influence which had its origins before the 
market. The whole thrust of the Griffiths reforms, which introduced general management 
to the NHS, was to create a clear and authoritative decision-making structure; managers 
were encouraged to challenge traditional clinical practice and to set clear priorities for 
resource allocation. Commentators from a legal background, such as Teff (1994) and 
Newdick (1995), give particular emphasis to the rise of managerial power, and argue it is a 
more influential factor in the exposure of rationing than contracts, even if, as Newdick 
suggests, contracts do to some extent 'force the parties to be more explicit about the 
services which they wish to provide and, by implication, those which they do not' (p.64). 
By legal standards, NHS contracts are not contracts at all, but simply another 
manifestation of hierarchy. Longley (1993) argues 'the actual degree of contractual 
freedom of purchasers and providers is ultimately determined centrally by executive 
decision, not by the market. The true nature of the contract mechanism in the health 
service therefore is not an undertaking of any commercial risk, but merely another 
stratagem for administrative planning' (p.48). 
The managerial challenge to clinical practice was accompanied by developments such as 
the Resource Management Initiative, which aimed to improve knowledge of costs and 
outcomes and to increase awareness amongst clinical staff of the demands of managing 
within a fixed budget. Over the last decade, therefore, the whole NHS has become 
acclimatised to talk of priorities and resources, which has paved the way for explicit 
rationing. 
Although managerial culture has thus promoted the language of priority-setting and the 
tools to carry it out, it has also acted as an obstacle to acknowledging it as rationing. One 
reason for this is that managers may bow to political pressure to keep it quiet and disguise 
its true nature; the increased centralisation of accountability which has accompanied the 
shift to managerialism has undoubtedly strengthened political control. It may also have 
something to do with managers' professional self-interest. May (1997) comments on the 
difficulty of obtaining independent, objective information about local health needs, and 
blames this on the current structure of the NHS: 
'Until recently, for example, annual public health reports gave a reasonably clear 
warts-and-all picture of local problems. Now these have been replaced by 
purchasers' glossy documents. Complete with a politically correct sprinkling of 
multi-ethnic photographs, they link local problems in financial terms with local 
purchasing plans. If there's no money to tackle an issue, it won't be there. The 
prevailing culture means managers are reluctant to acknowledge anything exists 
which might be construed as "management failure'" (p. 18). 
The purchaser provider split may be partly to blame, but May also identifies a more 
general point about management culture. This amounts to implicit rationing by suppressing 
information about unmet need. 
Managerial attitudes seem to exercise a somewhat ambivalent influence, and doubtless 
vary from individual to individual. It is worth remembering, for example, the view 
expressed by one manager that 'fuzzy is good', stressing the positive role ambiguity and 
implicitness can play in managing a complex and uncertain environment. 
The views of the public were seen in some ways an obstacle to greater explicitness: 'the 
pressure of the bureaucracy for a quiet life', and sometimes the need to make a quick 
decision unhampered by the lengthy demands of consultation, meant that there was an 
incentive for managers to avoid bringing difficult issues out into the open. At the same 
time many interviewees felt public attitudes had changed and that they would no longer 
tolerate secrecy. 
From the 1997/98 contracting round, it would seem that some managers may welcome the 
chance of a generous budget to avoid explicit rationing for the time being, however much 
they feel it is right and/or inevitable in the longer term. On the other hand, other managers 
are keen to maintain the momentum towards explicitness. Developments in individual 
districts may therefore be affected not only by the level of the budget each year but also by 
how committed local managers are to the principle and practice of explicitness, and their 
assessment of the best way of achieving it. 
A Conservative Government is an organised hypocrisy (Disraeli) 
There was an absolutely clear agreement that political reluctance to be seen to be 
rationing explicitly was a major obstacle. The insistence by the government that no 
treatments should be subject to a total exclusion unless absolutely ineffective demonstrates 
its unwillingness to allow the ideal of a comprehensive NHS to be openly challenged, even 
if rationing is accepted tacitly. 
Views about whether it would be desirable to have some form of national rationing 
framework differed, but the unanimous view was that in reality it would never happen, 
because it would be politically unacceptable. This applied to all political parties, not just to 
the Conservatives. 
There have been some signs of movement on the political front: the House of Commons 
Health Committee (1995) was exceptionally forthright about the need for rationing 
(although largely couched in terms of priority setting), and as described in Chapter Three 
the NHSE recently endorsed a report which includes the words 'we therefore use the term 
priority setting as a synonym for rationing' (Academy of Medical Royal Colleges et al., 
1997, p. 6). It is significant that neither of these developments involved ministers directly, 
who may prefer to take the line that priority setting may be necessary but it is not for them 
to do it. 
However, since the election there has been little sign of any political willingness to address 
the issue. The new Secretary of State and Ministers declined an invitation to attend a 
conference on rationing in July 1997 organised by the Rationing Agenda Group, BMA and 
King's Fund, amongst others. The Labour backbencher who did attend argued that 
rationing should not be considered until better public health and preventive measures have 
been instituted, and money redirected from the wasteful transaction costs of the internal 
market, the Private Finance Initiative and prescription fraud. She reiterated the 
Conservative emphasis on priority setting (which was required) rather than rationing 
(which was not), and on local rather than national decision-making. (Starkey, 1997) 
More recently, there were suggestions (e.g. Chadda, 1997) that Labour might recommend 
a national priority setting commission as part of the new White Paper (Secretary of State 
for Health, 1997). In the event, however, the potential for the proposed National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence to take a lead on rationing has been considerably down-played, a 
question which is discussed further in the next chapter. 
'Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers' (Wordsworth) 
This section deals with the question of Williamson's organisational failures framework 
(Williamson, 1975) and the impact of transaction costs. 
Although contracting necessitated a quantum leap in the amount of information available, 
there are still large gaps in purchasers' knowledge of what is provided and how worthwhile 
it is. Specifying every detail would be both very expensive and probably not possible, 
however much were spent, supporting Williamson's argument that bounded rationality and 
uncertainty require something more vague and adaptable than a rigid contract 
specification. 
Furthermore, there is evidence of difficulties in monitoring and enforcing compliance 
with contracts and a lack of trust between purchasers and providers. Once lack of 
compliance is discovered, it may lead to the contract being tightened up, with even more 
explicit specification of exclusions. However, several interviewees felt that no matter how 
specific contracts became, they could not replace the need for co-operation, persuasion 
and influence to achieve changes in clinical practice. Very explicit contracts may even 
make it more difficult to achieve change, because they risk hardening positions where 
otherwise compromise might have been possible. 
This problem of compliance fits well with Williamson's description of the results of 
opportunism combined with small numbers exchange. Most interviewees felt there was no 
real market, because local monopolies enabled providers effectively to ignore contracts if 
they so chose. Despite the feeling that purchasers had been liberated from worries about 
provider interests, their continuing sense of shared responsibility for providers' fixed 
infrastructure costs suggests that monopoly provision also restricts their ability to make 
explicit rationing decisions, let alone enforce them. 
Although most interviewees felt providers used the purchaser provider split to force 
rationing back onto purchasers, there was evidence of a return to more implicit 
mechanisms in response to the perceived failure of more explicit methods. Examples 
include the re-inclusion of financial responsibility for tertiary ECRs within secondary 
providers' budgets, and the decision by plastic surgeons in Avon to move away from 
explicit targets for each procedure, which they themselves had originally requested. 
Two districts were actively pursuing the idea of longer term contracts as a response to 
these concerns, and in practice all the districts regarded their contracts as expressions of 
longer term commitment. Their views that little would change if contracts were replaced 
with healthcare agreements under Labour supports the suggestion that they are already 
seeking ways round the market and looking to partnership or even hierarchy rather than 
arm's length contracts to solve their problems. Developments in Cambridge and District 
Three in particular seem to provide support for the theory that managing a fixed budget 
within a quasi-market produces so many irreconcilable tensions that there will be a drift 
back to less visible ways of capping demand, albeit within an explicit framework. 
Interviewees' comments on the relative unimportance of contract negotiations in making 
allocation decisions and the desirability of longer term commitment is supported by the 
findings of the ESRC research programme on contracts and competition. Williams and 
Flynn (1997) conclude: 
'While there may be a cosmetic element in the elimination of the word "contract", 
much of the work reported here, with its emphasis on the need for long-term 
collaboration with limited contestability, would support the strategic and 
organizational sense of the move towards some kind of service-level agreement 
with a longer time-scale. Some may see this as contracting in another guise, but the 
work reported here indicates that much of the important negotiation between 
purchasers and providers takes place outside the contracting process' (p. 158). 
On the other hand, plans to work in partnership with providers may be wishful thinking, 
given the way the purchaser provider split has decoupled providers from shared 
responsibility for managing scarce resources, and encouraged them to stimulate demand 
and develop new services. This pressure may have made explicit rationing all the more 
necessary, but simultaneously made it harder to achieve in practice. Any reforms which 
maintain a purchaser provider split will still have to confront this issue - the extent to 
which the new White Paper in fact maintains such a split is discussed in the final chapter. 
Structural problems reported by interviewees included the existence of generic trusts and 
the sometimes linked problem of inadequate staff numbers and expertise at district 
level. Generic trusts reinforce the difficulty of getting adequate information out of 
providers. They also tend to retain greater control over continued implicit rationing 
between community and acute services, particularly where a previous district management 
team has gone over to the trust virtually intact. Here, perhaps, is an example of 
hierarchical organisation having persisted despite the quasi-market. The knock-on effect is 
to leave the health authority drained of skill, local knowledge and sheer numbers of people. 
However, the question of numbers of purchasing staff is not only a result of trust 
configurations - it is affected by levels of remuneration, perceived attractiveness (or 
otherwise) of doing the job and by government imposition of management cost cutting, in 
response to concerns about transaction costs. 
Views on the extent of transaction costs were somewhat mixed. Most interviewees 
agreed that the major cause of high transaction costs was GP fundholding, where 
contracting in its fullest sense was taken furthest, albeit for a restricted range of services. 
There have undoubtedly been higher management and information technology costs in 
fundholding practices, and providers have also employed extra staff to deal with 
fundholding. It has been pointed out in a recent review of management costs in health 
authorities and GP fundholding practices led by Jenny Griffiths that the existence of two 
parallel systems of purchasing leads to duplication - health authorities cannot necessarily 
shed functions (and costs) in direct proportion to the increasing number of fundholders 
(Millar, 1997). Interviewees' comments that GP fundholding is expensive in its own right 
are to be expected, given that they all come from health authority backgrounds, but it is 
perhaps the persistence of parallel systems that is the problem. 
There was less agreement about transaction costs incurred within health authorities. 
Although they all acknowledged some extra costs had arisen, the picture was complicated 
by management savings arising from mergers and recent cost-cutting exercises. 
Furthermore, it was argued transaction costs were not necessarily in themselves 
prohibitive, if the system was achieving better value for money as a result, for instance in 
preventing an increase in expensive ECRs or in negotiating better contracts. Some 
interviewees did see transaction costs as a more serious problem, although there was a 
general view that much of the extra workload had been absorbed by existing staff and that 
savings from abolishing the market might not be as substantial as suggested. Accountancy 
and information were mentioned as the most obvious areas for savings. 
One director of finance pointed out that most contracts were financially a simple block 
arrangement with each trust, specifically to avoid 'this business of charging all over the 
place for things', although he argued it was still possible to be very specific about activity 
within block contracts. Others were less convinced - the director of public health in the 
same district felt 'it would just be too much work and a waste of time' to have detailed 
activity targets in all contracts, as opposed to a few acknowledged problem contracts. 
This suggests a trade-off was being made between the benefits and costs of greater 
explicitness, which was not necessarily fully acknowledged. There is a point at which the 
costs of obtaining information, negotiating and monitoring does become an obstacle to 
making contracts more specific - interviewees took differing views as to whether this point 
had already been crossed or had been skilfully avoided. The difficulties in monitoring and 
enforcing contracts described above, whilst stemming partly from provider and clinician 
behaviour, would suggest purchasers are already foregoing some potential transaction 
costs; it does not represent good value for money in their eyes to pursue enforcement to 
the last detail. 
Despite these difficulties, most interviewees believed explicit rationing would continue to 
spread, but in selected areas rather than across the board, and through the use of 
thresholds rather than exclusions. The answer to the question of whether transaction costs 
in a complex quasi-market prevent contracts from making clear rationing decisions is 
probably not a simple yes or no, but lies somewhere along a continuum, where the benefits 
of greater explicitness are traded off against the costs involved. Most interviewees thought 
transaction costs had so far been kept reasonably low, but this has not prevented definite 
increases in explicit contracting and rationing. One could perhaps argue that the NHS is 
settling into a half-way house, pursuing the full logic of the market where it suits a 
particular purchaser or provider to do so because of a specific problem, but behaving in a 
more informal way where possible - or perhaps where a problem is so intractable that 
market relationships are seen as unhelpful. 
Most did not believe there was a significantly cheaper way of achieving the same result, 
because they could not envisage a return to a hierarchical and integrated organisation, even 
if this were desirable. The growing emphasis on fixed budgets suggests health authorities 
are trying to move in that direction, but the rationale is mainly to keep expenditure under 
control overall, rather than to limit transaction costs. Most felt Labour's proposals might 
make marginal reductions in transaction costs, but thought the essence of the contracting 
system would remain, and that GP commissioning would create new costs. It was also 
pointed out that even before the purchaser provider split, the NHS had been moving 
towards more sophisticated cost and management accountancy and this would have 
incurred its own transaction costs. 
Conclusive objective information about the impact of the market on transaction costs is 
hard to come by, not least because the basis for measuring management costs has been 
repeatedly changed. Before the 1997 election, the King's Fund reviewed the available 
evidence, and concluded 'our best estimate on the increase in the total administration 
costs.. .is from about 9% of total revenue expenditure in 1988/89 to around 12% in 
1994/95' (King's Fund, 1997, p. 1). What proportion of this is market-related is not stated. 
Let us be moral (Dickens) 
There are a number of ethical and professional concerns which have an impact on 
explicit rationing, both at a collective and at an individual level. 
Most interviewees did comment on the ethical dilemmas of making rationing decisions, 
whether explicit or implicit. At the same time, there was a consensus that explicitness was 
an ethical requirement for purchasers, at least in some circumstances. 
It has become fashionable to characterise implicit rationing as secretive, undemocratic and 
paternalist, whilst explicitness is seen as honest, participative and accountable. The current 
wave of academic discussion of explicit rationing has been a powerful force here. 
Given this background, it is hardly surprising that health authority managers feel an ethical 
obligation to be explicit. Some added their own reasons, including the need to protect the 
disadvantaged - the theory being that it would be easier to discriminate against them in 
secret than in public. (In fact the argument may also work the other way - explicitly 
quantifying the value of different people's lives and health may give lower priority to 
people with severe disabilities, as Maclean (1993) suggests. One interviewee thought 
implicit decision-making gave vulnerable people better protection from popular prejudice). 
However, the belief that explicitness was necessary and morally right was not seen by 
interviewees as an absolute. As one interviewee said, 'I don't think it's bearable' for 
purchasers to try to make all decisions explicit; a distinction is needed between meso level 
rationing, where health authorities have a responsibility to be open about what they are 
doing and why, and micro-level rationing, which may be guided by explicit principles but 
must continue to embrace implicit clinical judgements. 
This growing interest in formalising the value of a mixed approach is also reflected in 
academic literature. Coast (1997) is developing the concept of the utility of ignorance, 
which seeks to express from an economics perspective how the public may benefit from 
not knowing too much about rationing. A number of commentators advocate a mixture of 
implicit and explicit methods, depending on the situation and the level at which the 
decision is being taken (New and Le Grand, 1996; Klein, 1996; Mechanic, 1995) and there 
is increasing interest in the idea of procedural fairness (i.e. an explicit decision-making 
process rather than explicit decisions in every individual case). (Lenaghan, 1996). 
Concerns about inequity in the NHS are a powerful motivating force for managers, 
although their record - and that of the NHS as a whole - in actually tackling inequalities is 
not particularly strong. Needless to say, inequity was a problem long before the market 
was introduced, but in some respects the market has made it worse or made it more 
evident. The purchaser provider split has made differences in level of provision between 
purchasers (both health authorities and GP fundholders) more evident. More explicit 
contracts and contract exclusions have also made people aware of what they are not 
getting; again, the increased availability of information is crucial in detecting inequalities. 
The removal of the potential to obtain treatment elsewhere has also worsened inequity, in 
the sense that there is now an absolute difference in access for people resident in different 
areas, which cannot be ameliorated by even the most assertive patient. The only way to 
obtain services available from another purchaser would be to move house, an option only 
open to the more affluent and well-informed. 
At a different level, the reduction in direct management responsibilities for health 
authorities has led to mergers, which have exposed differences in purchasing policy. 
Managers rightly feel such variation is unacceptable within the boundaries of one district. 
Sometimes the response will be to bring services up the level in the best-provided district, 
but in other cases a choice will be made to restrict services to the lower level. 
Several interviewees mentioned the personal experience of managers as a factor in making 
policy decisions, particularly in the case of infertility services. It was suggested that 
managers' views about whether this was a health service responsibility or not was affected 
by whether they themselves or a close relative or friend had ever experienced infertility. It 
is also clear that health authority members bring their personal values into the debate about 
which services should be excluded, and that this may in the end be more influential than 
effectiveness evidence, costs or numbers of people affected. 
The NHS is made up of a variety of different groups with divergent interests and concerns; 
how these are played out affects resource allocation decisions as much as formal structure, 
if not more so. The focus of this research has been health authority managers, who may 
have very different values, interests and incentives to other groups, which affect their 
response to the question of rationing. These divergent interests may always have been 
present, but may have been magnified or exposed by the purchaser provider split. The 
purchaser provider split may also create new incentives and constraints. An analysis of 
what is at stake for different groups in the NHS may offer some help in understanding the 
impulse to be explicit - can we determine whose interests are best served by explicitness, 
and whose are best served by continued implicit decision-making? 
Politicians have a clear electoral interest in minimising the tax burden, and minimising 
public awareness of rationing. They are therefore unlikely to feel comfortable with any 
explicit rationing, at whatever level of the organisation it takes place, and would certainly 
not wish to take this responsibility themselves. Faced with growing pressure towards 
greater explicitness, their best hope is to ensure responsibility is diffused to local health 
authorities, from whose perhaps unpalatable decisions they can then distance themselves. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, clinicians' interests could be served by either 
implicitness or explicitness, depending on the circumstances. If they themselves have to 
take responsibility for rationing, as a way of preserving their clinical freedom, it is likely 
they will prefer implicitness, to protect themselves both from the emotional costs of what 
they are doing and from the anger of the public and individual patients. However, as 
rationing becomes more extensive and forces them to deny more and more treatments, 
they are less likely to want to retain responsibility. The conflict with their professional, 
ethical imperative to do the best possible for individual patients becomes increasingly 
direct and painful. In this situation, they might support more explicit decision-making if 
responsibility for it can be transferred to purchasers, relieving them of the burden and 
allowing them to lay the blame elsewhere. 
Provider managers' interests are similar - there are advantages for them in terms of 
maximising their resources and minimising responsibility if explicit rationing can be passed 
to purchasers. In a hierarchical situation, where responsibility is shared, providers are more 
likely to prefer implicit decisions. This offers some challenge to the suggestion that a 
quasi-market will fail to produce clear decisions; in fact it makes it easier for providers to 
force purchasers into making explicit choices. 
For the actors considered so far, explicitness is only an advantage if responsibility can be 
passed to someone else. At first sight, this might be true of purchasers, too - just as 
providers are pushing responsibility up to them, so they might wish to pass it further up to 
the national/ political level. Indeed, there is evidence from the current debate that they are 
trying to do this to some extent. At the 'Rationing in the NHS: Time to Get Real' 
conference in July 1997, only seven people out of an audience of approximately 250 
people voted against the motion that the government should take a lead in rationing. 
However, it was apparent from the conference debate, and from the case study interviews, 
that the emphasis is on leadership, rather than on transferring responsibility wholesale. 
Purchasers do not want the government to take all the decisions; as one interviewee 
explained, the support purchasers seek is similar to that sought by clinicians from 
purchasers. If purchasers have set an explicit framework, the clinician can feel "'oh well, at 
least I'm not copping all the responsibility myself', and it enables them to continue their 
own implicit rationing'. Similarly purchasers 'feel uncomfortable about it, we do it all the 
time, we want somebody up there to bear the responsibility alongside us'. The difference is 
that purchasers are seeking support to continue their explicit rationing. 
It seems purchasers are unique in believing not only that explicit rationing is right and 
desirable, but also that they themselves should be doing it. albeit with more overt support 
from government and with less emphasis on exclusion. There are several possible reasons. 
Firstly, it may be because purchasers know the government is more powerful than they are 
and would never agree to take total responsibility for explicit rationing, so they may as 
well say this was not what they wanted anyway. It could also be to avoid relinquishing too 
much responsibility, which could lead to questions over the value of their role. 
Secondly, a number of interviewees pointed to the use of explicit decision-making as a 
resource maximising strategy, by making clear to the government and the public how tight 
resources are and thus increasing pressure for more. It is also resource maximising in the 
sense that it enables money be to diverted away from treatments of low effectiveness or 
low priority to higher priorities, or to meeting savings targets. 
However, as the concerns about equity discussed earlier indicate, this is not the whole 
story. Purchasers' professional interest also lies in making a reality of their role as 
representatives of the local population, distinct from provider organisations. This entails 
several different strands: legitimising and to some extent democratising their decision-
making processes; challenging traditional provider practices and specifying more clearly 
what they should be doing; challenging historical patterns of resource distribution between 
specialties, and between hospital and community services. Their whole raison d'etre is 
precisely to allocate scarce resources; from a public choice perspective, their jobs depend 
on taking responsibility for rationing. Individual and bureaucratic pressures for the quiet 
life may yield to these professional interests, all of which tend towards explicitness. 
Finding legitimacy for decisions includes an element of individual self-defence, too. One 
interviewee explained, 'us quango workers would probably feel more comfortable if we 
could just get on with it, but actually I'm not sure that's the case. We feel quite 
uncomfortable about doing things that really are down to our prejudices. And we do 
occasionally pull ourselves up short...particularly when people get through into the lager, 
you know, and they get through on a telephone to me and I think how am I going to talk 
to this...? I mean, this bloke'll quite often say "well, who said you could do this? I mean 
you're just a bloody civil servant, you wretch... Why haven't you made it clear?" And he's 
right - people feel that.' Being open is hard because it invites criticism from the public and 
the media, but it relieves the burden of bearing responsibility in private and questioning the 
morality of one's actions. 
As noted earlier, the belief that more explicitness is ethically desirable does not mean 
purchasers believe all resource allocation decisions should be explicit. There is still 
considerable emphasis on the need for clinical decision-making - perhaps partly in self-
defence, but also in genuine recognition of the inappropriateness of purchasing usurping 
clinical judgement. The search for an acceptable balance between the two continues. 
Summary of factors affecting explicitness 
From the above discussion, the factors affecting levels of explicitness in rationing can be 
summarised in the following groups: 
Factors for 
Purchaser/provider split 









Views of the public 
Transaction costs 
Managerialism/culture of priority setting 




Inadequate staffing/levels of expertise at district 
How well do the research findings match with the three hypotheses? 
Hypothesis one - rationing in the NHS will become more explicit as a result of the 
introduction of the internal market. 
There is clear evidence that rationing has become more explicit and that a good part of this 
is related to the NHS market, both the purchaser provider split more generally and also the 
process of negotiating, writing and monitoring contracts. Against this, explicit rationing 
remains marginal, many contracts remain vague and implicit rationing still plays a major 
role in decision-making. This is not in itself enough to disprove the hypothesis; the 
development of explicit rationing may be a gradual process - if the internal market were to 
continue, explicit rationing might spread to the more difficult areas mentioned by some 
interviewees. However, it is important to note interviewees' comments on the perceived 
folly and virtual impossibility of being totally explicit in all contracts, and their renewed 
interest in fixed budgets at trust level which place some of the onus back on providers to 
make rationing decisions. 
Although the internal market has played a role in increasing explicitness, it is not the only 
factor. In some cases, it does seem to have been the cause of greater explicitness. In other 
cases it may have simply speeded up the effect of other factors such as the use of 
effectiveness evidence. The use of contracts certainly affects the way explicit rationing 
decisions are expressed, but most interviewees felt contract negotiations were a vehicle for 
making such decisions, rather than the reason for them. 
Hypothesis one does have some validity, but it does not tell the whole story. 
Hypothesis two - the market will fail to produce clear contracts and unambiguous 
allocations, because of transactional, political and ethical costs 
The behaviour of purchasers and providers offers some support to Williamson's 
'organisational failures' framework. As already stated, many contracts remain vague and 
implicit allocation methods remain important. There are some signs of drifting back to 
hierarchy, and in some cases (e.g. generic trusts) of never having left it. However, there is 
still considerable tension between purchasers and providers, and the fact that they are 
pursuing disparate aims is blamed for much of the pressure on resources. This could be 
evidence that Williamson was right about the problems of'self-interest seeking with guile' 
where opportunism and small numbers exchange interact. A return to hierarchy or a new 
emphasis on partnership might provide a solution to this, although relying on participants 
in the market to reach that position by themselves without external reform may be over-
optimistic. 
Transaction costs are cited as a reason for not going into greater detail; although a number 
of purchasers did not see them as a significant obstacle, this is because they are already 
taking action to minimise them. Block financial arrangements may co-exist with detailed 
activity specifications and exclusions, so keeping transaction costs low does not 
automatically preclude explicit rationing. However, it may limit its extent. 
There has been clear political reluctance to acknowledge explicit rationing or to get 
involved in it. Again, however, this is not an insurmountable obstacle. The absence of a 
government-led priorities commission will not prevent local health authorities from taking 
their own action, nor will it prevent academic and professional bodies from stepping in to 
take a national lead. It remains to be seen whether the new National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence will lead ministers to take a more explicit approach in future. 
Ethical obstacles to explicitness were discussed by a number of interviewees, but in general 
there was considerable consensus that the ethical imperative is in favour of explicit 
rationing in at least some circumstances, no matter how difficult and uncomfortable it is. 
Explicitness has become well-established in health authority purchasing decisions, and 
marks a clear difference from pre-market planning. It is possible that ethical costs are 
subject to the same kind of trade-off as transaction costs - purchasers may be avoiding the 
highest ethical costs by hesitating over the most controversial areas and re-emphasising the 
importance of clinical judgement. It is as yet too early to tell how a mixed implicit/explicit 
approach will work in practice, and how far purchasers will feel explicitness should go. 
The evidence thus supports hypothesis two to some extent, but not fully. The fact that 
explicit rationing has continued to grow would suggest that the organisation is not so 
much failing as finding its own level of functioning, trading off transaction (and ethical) 
costs against the benefits of greater explicitness, and still seeking to find the appropriate 
boundary between meso and micro decision-making 
Hypothesis three - other factors, particularly rising expenditure, outcomes research and the 
Patient's Charter may prove so strong that explicit rationing will continue in spite of the 
costs, and regardless of the structural form the NHS takes. 
There is no doubt that other factors are as important, if not more so, than contracting and 
the purchaser provider split. Of these other factors, simple scarcity of resources has 
probably been the most influential, although its impact now seems to be shifting towards 
more implicit means of capping supply. 
All the interviewees thought it was inevitable that explicit rationing would continue and 
increase over the next few years, regardless of structure. However, this was partly based 
on their perception that the current structure will remain fundamentally intact under 
Labour. It also reflects a changing view of the kind of explicit decisions which will be 
made in fixture. 
More fundamentally, once the 'conspiracy' of implicit rationing has been exposed, it is 
uncertain whether it could ever be re-instated, even if the market were fully abolished. One 
possibility is that a substantial injection of additional funds could enable a retreat from 
rationing (both explicit and implicit) that would give time for memories to fade and for 
implicit mechanisms to reassert themselves if financial pressure increased again. Another 
possibility is that existing exclusions could remain in place but gradually become corrupted 
by an ever-widening definition of what constitutes exceptional circumstances. At the same 
time, further developments in explicit rationing could fail to materialise. 
There are two problems with hypothesis three as it is now formulated. Firstly, it assumes 
hypothesis two is correct and that the driving forces behind explicit rationing are the other 
factors listed, not the quasi-market. As already stated, there is good evidence to believe 
that the market has been a vital factor, alongside other influences. If it is abandoned, those 
other factors may ensure explicit rationing continues, but this should not obscure the part 
the market has played in creating the present situation. 
Secondly, it is not sensitive to the distinctions between different kinds of explicit rationing. 
It seems unlikely, on the basis of the evidence presented, that explicit rationing by 
exclusion has much left to offer. A more likely scenario is an evolution towards a different 
kind of explicit rationing, based on thresholds and eligibility criteria for selecting which 
patients will be treated, which reconfirms equity and need as the principles guiding the 
allocation of NHS resources. The application of these principles and criteria to individual 
cases will continue to require the involvement of doctors making implicit judgements. 
Conclusion 
Each of the three hypotheses is supported to some extent by the evidence, but none 
provides a perfect fit. The NHS is a complex organisation, which operates within a 
complex political and ethical context. It is not surprising, therefore, that theories do not 
always match neatly with reality. 
Any new theory will be qualified by the fact that it is impossible to say with certainty what 
would have happened without the introduction of the quasi-market, or what would have 
happened had it been allowed to develop without further national reform. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to reformulate elements of the three original hypotheses into an alternative theory 
of the relationship between explicit rationing, the quasi-market and other factors. 
An alternative theory 
Despite transaction costs, and despite political reluctance, the internal market generally 
and contracting specifically have contributed to explicit rationing in their own right. They 
seem also to have speeded up the operation of other factors, and may in some cases have 
been a catalyst, activating chains of events that would not otherwise have happened. 
Equally, contracting on its own might not have been so influential were it not for other 
pressures happening at the same time, and it is impossible to know now whether these 
pressures would have resulted in explicit rationing in the absence of the internal market. 
It seems likely that explicit rationing will continue to increase, but there is strong evidence 
to suggest that it is changing course and perhaps becoming less dominant in health 
authorities' thinking about how to manage resource allocation. This is partly because the 
quasi-market is not seen to be working well at controlling expenditure. Transaction costs 
form part of the reason for this perception; however, a more significant factor is the 
divergence of interest between purchaser and provider fostered by the quasi-market, and 
the incentives for providers to increase activity. The shift towards a more formally 
recognised mix of implicit and explicit approaches recognises that some alternative to 
formal market relations may offer a more efficient allocative system, but this is a wider 
issue than simply transaction costs. 
This in turn leads to the conclusion that it is too simplistic to say explicit rationing will 
continue to increase regardless of the structure of the NHS. At one level this may be true, 
but structure may have a strong bearing on the kind of explicit rationing which is practised. 
A more hierarchical structure, or one based on partnership rather than contract, may be 
more conducive to the use of an explicit framework of principles and criteria, which guides 
decisions about who should have access to what kinds of treatment, but within which there 
is flexibility to make implicit judgements in response to complex individual cases. 
Chapter Ten 
The implications of the 1997 White Paper 
Introduction 
'An end to rationing - we want to see an end to rationing* (Milburn, 1997) 
With these words, the Minister for Health ended his interview on 'Newsnight' on the day 
'The New NHS' White Paper was published (Secretary of State for Health, 1997). There 
could be no clearer reaffirmation of political reluctance to acknowledge rationing - indeed, 
the refusal to accept even implicit rationing took the political debate several steps back. 
The potential for the National Institute for Clinical Excellence to offer a national lead on 
rationing was denied. 
How realistic is it to seek an end to rationing? Before the 1997 general election, the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies criticised the assertion by both major political parties that their 
low public spending plans would have no detrimental effect on the NHS. 
'At a time when the public's demand for healthcare is inevitably rising, this will 
have serious implications for how well the NHS will be able to continue in its role 
as a comprehensive universal provider of free healthcare' (Dilnot and Johnson, 
1997, p. 15) 
'Either the current shape of the welfare state will be maintained and the next 
government will have to spend and tax more than planned, or the welfare state will 
shrink and provide fewer services to fewer people' (Dilnot and Johnson, 1997, 
press release). 
The availability of resources will remain a crucial factor. In a tax-funded system facing 
major resource constraints, some form of rationing is inevitable. The extent to which this is 
implicit or explicit is determined by a variety of factors as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Opinion from interviewees suggests that the tighter resource constraints become, 
the more likely it is that implicit mechanisms alone will no longer suffice - or at least will 
no longer be thought to suffice by those having to cope with them. Evidence from 
international experience suggests tax-funded systems have been at the forefront of explicit 
rationing, whether or not they have introduced quasi-market reforms. Social or private 
insurance systems may also get to this point eventually, but there is greater leeway in 
raising premiums than in raising taxes, so tax-funded systems will experience resource 
constraints sooner. 
However, having caused an initial upsurge of interest in exclusions and detailed limitations 
on eligibility for treatment, those same resource pressures are now stimulating revived 
interest in fixed budgets framed by explicit but perhaps less interventionist principles. 
Again, this is supported by international evidence. 
Given the complex nature of the relationship presented between explicit rationing, the 
market and other factors, what is the likely effect on rationing of Labour's proposals to 
abolish the market? It should be noted that this question is independent of whether the 
market has been one of the causes in the recent growth in explicit rationing. In a variety of 
ways already described the market has contributed to explicit rationing, both in its own 
right and by speeding up the effect of other influences. However, abolishing the market 
would not necessarily reverse the position. 
To examine the potential effect of Labour's proposals, it is first necessary to outline what 
these proposals are, focusing particularly on those most likely to affect rationing. 
The Content of the White Paper1 
At national level, there are four important developments: one is the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE), which will produce and disseminate 'clinical guidelines based 
on relevant evidence of clinical and cost-effectiveness' (7.11), in a programme of work 
agreed and funded by the Department of Health. The second initiative is to develop 
National Service Frameworks, drawing together the evidence on particular conditions to 
'establish principles for the pattern and level of services required' (7.9). The aim is to 
reduce national variation in service provision. A new Commission for Health 
Improvement will monitor quality at local level, and will have powers to intervene where 
serious problems occur (7.13). It may also develop systematic reviews to ensure NICE 
1 References are to paragraph numbers. 
guidelines and National Service Frameworks are properly implemented. Finally the NHS 
Direct telephone helpline will offer 24-hour information direct to patients (1.11); 
Pencheon (1998) suggests this may be 'part of the solution to managing ever-increasing 
demand' by enabling 'graduated access to the right care at the right time in the right way 
by the right person' (p.215). 
The White Paper states that the market will be abolished; this is expected to reduce 
transaction costs substantially. However, 'the separation between the planning of 
hospital care and its provision9 (2.6) will be retained. Although the word 'purchasing' is 
carefully avoided and replaced by 'commissioning', it is arguable that this simply 
constitutes a renamed purchaser provider split. Contracting is explicitly rejected as a failed 
aspect of the market, which will be 'replaced' by longer term service agreements (9.14). 
Again, the extent to which these will differ from contracts as they have evolved in recent 
years is questionable. 
Responsibility for negotiating service agreements will gradually transfer from health 
authorities to 'primary care groups' (PCGs), which are expected to cover all GPs in the 
country in groups of practices covering up to 100,000 patients (5.16). Fundholding will 
also eventually be replaced by the PCGs. PCGs will be able to develop to different levels, 
from advising the health authority (which negotiates agreements on its behalf) or holding a 
devolved budget, to independent budget holding bodies (Primary Care Trusts), 
accountable to the health authority. In some cases they may also take on responsibility for 
providing all community health services to their population (5.11). 
PCGs will combine the traditionally separate budgets for prescribing, general medical 
services and hospital and community services in one unified and flexible budget. This 
funding will still be population-based, and they will retain the right to withdraw 
services commissioned from a provider who persistently fails to meet required standards 
and transfer them to an alternative provider. 
Health authorities, as well as their residual negotiating role on behalf of PCGs, will have a 
major strategic planning function, and will be responsible for drawing up a local three-year 
Health Improvement Programme (HIP), in consultation with local health and social 
care organisations (4.7). Both PCGs and trusts will have a duty to operate according to 
the HEP. Health authorities may organise authority-wide commissioning of certain more 
specialised services, in discussion with PCGs and trusts. Regional offices may perform a 
similar function for highly specialised services such as bone marrow transplants and 
medium secure psychiatric care (7.23). 
Trusts will retain control over operational management matters, but there are proposals for 
stronger control of costs, with the publication of national reference costs (3.11). A new 
national performance framework will monitor a number of quality indicators, including 
whether trusts are ensuring 'fair access' to their services and are providing effective and 
appropriate services, with a reduction in 'inappropriate treatments' (8.5). Quality 
monitoring will be further supported by a new annual national user survey (8.10). This 
more quality-based approach to performance management will mean 'there will no longer 
be a narrow obsession with counting activity for the sake of it', which has had 'a perverse 
impact on NHS performance' and 'rewarded [trusts] for hospitalising patients even where 
more appropriate treatments may have been given in the community' (8.3, 8.4). Trusts will 
also be monitored on the development of'clinical governance', an important part of 
which is ensuring clinical practice is evidence-based and consistent, and that adverse 
events, service variations and poor practice are identified and dealt with (6.12). 
Significantly trusts will have a new statutory duty of partnership, rather than 
competition, requiring them to contribute to and operate in accordance with the HIP (6.6). 
Regional offices will have powers to intervene on behalf of the Secretary of State where 
monitoring of trusts reveals persistent problems or failure to abide by the HIP (7.18). 
'Partnership will be dependent on sharing of information with other NHS organisations. 
The days of the NHS Trust acting alone without regard for others are over'(6 .7). The 
White Paper notes that 'market-style incentives drove NHS Trusts to compete to expand 
their "business" irrespective of whether this reflected local NHS priorities.' Although some 
tried to 'overcome the limitations of the market' and work in partnership, 'most found 
themselves driven by these inappropriate incentives' (6.2, 6.3). 
The new service agreements, backed by all local GPs, together with authority-wide or 
regional level commissioning of more specialised services, are expected to cover virtually 
all referrals. ECRs will therefore be abolished, 'and replaced by simplified arrangements 
that minimise bureaucracy and eliminate incentives to "play the market".' Instead of 
invoicing, adjustments will be made to PCG and health authority allocations to reflect the 
small number of referrals not covered by agreements. Further guidance on this is scheduled 
for the summer of 1998. The White Paper stresses the importance of aligning clinical and 
financial responsibility, 'coupling the freedom to refer with the ability to fund' (9.17). 
The Implications of the White Paper 
How significant is the change of language from 'purchasing' and 'contracting' to 
'commissioning'? Commissioning does not carry quite the same market assumptions as the 
other two words, but is still compatible with a market framework. Oxford English 
Dictionary definitions of'commission' offer some important clues, including: 'empower, 
give authority to, entrust with an office or duty'; 'authority, especially delegated authority 
to act in a specific capacity or manner'; 'authority to act as agent for another in trade'; 
'command, instruction' ; 'charge or matter entrusted to another to perform; an order for 
the execution of particular work'. These definitions offer an interesting mix of hierarchical 
command on the one hand and trust on the other hand. In a market context, 'commission' 
often carries overtones of command, for example from a patron to a craftsman, rather than 
an exchange negotiated on an equal footing. Yet the relationship involves considerable 
delegation and reliance on the expert's skills to produce the required outcome. 
It is no surely no accident that the word 'commissioning' conveys the same ambivalence 
between hierarchy and trust as does the White Paper, as it seeks an appropriate alternative 
to market relationships for the NHS. The concept of hierarchy may not seem immediately 
relevant, given the White Paper's assertion that 'there will be no return to the old 
centralised command and control systems of the 1970s' (2.1)2. Certainly there will be no 
return to direct management of providers by health authorities, and relationships between 
commissioning bodies and providers will be based on negotiated partnerships rather than 
command. (Many would argue that in practice the NHS has always been based on 
negotiation rather than command to some extent, both between levels or parts of the 
2 Parston and McMahon (1998) note that the Scottish White Paper (Secretary of State for Scotland, 1998) 
leaves commissioning with health boards and does offer the possibility to 'use this reinstated hierarchy of 
command to slip back into operational management' (p.213). 
organisation and between professional groupings, although such negotiations have not 
always been cordial). 
However, it is dangerous to overlook the fact that the NHS is indeed 'the organisation'; 
whilst commissioners and providers may not be in a strictly hierarchical relationship with 
each other, there may be an informal version of hierarchy at work between them. 
Furthermore they are both part of a bureaucratic whole, and are both very clearly in a 
hierarchical relationship with the NHSE. 
Indeed, in a situation where commissioning and providing remain separate, the national 
hierarchy may be all the more important in providing the necessary co-ordination to 
override that separation. The White Paper certainly places strong emphasis on 
performance management, with greater powers at all levels to intervene if partnership fails 
to deliver. 
Nonetheless, the emphasis on partnership is equally strong and sets the tone for the new 
relationship between health authorities, primary care groups and providers. This fits well 
with the growing interest in network theory, which suggests there is 'a third way', as the 
White Paper suggests (2.2), between markets and hierarchies. The theoretical debate is 
summarised in Thompson et ai (1991). Williamson himself suggests intermediate levels of 
uncertainty or asset specificity may lead to intermediate organisational forms, such as 
quasi-vertical integration, with stable long-term 'relational contracts'(Williamson, 1985, 
p.73). However, Bradach and Eccles (1991) argue it is oversimplistic to view markets, 
hierarchies and networks (or relational contracting) as mutually exclusive, and take issue 
with Williamson's attempts to fit networks into his model as a discrete alternative form. 
Rather than seeing price, authority and trust - 'which map roughly on to market, hierarchy 
and relational contracting' (p.279) - as opposed to each other, they emphasise 'how these 
control mechanisms are combined in empirical situations...specifically we examine Plural 
Forms, where distinct and different control mechanisms in the same organizational 
structure are operated simultaneously by a company to perform the same function' 
(p.278). 
The proposals in the White Paper may constitute just such a plural form, where some form 
of market continues to exist, but where relationships between players are governed by 
partnership and trust rather than competition, and supported by hierarchy where necessary. 
Whilst the balance between the elements may have shifted more towards a combination of 
partnership and hierarchy, the claim that the market has been abolished seems premature. 
As described in Chapter Eight, most interviewees thought the political rhetoric of abolition 
was an overstatement or a misunderstanding, since there had never really been a proper 
market to abolish. Nonetheless, the quasi-market as it stood had a number of serious flaws 
which needed to be addressed. However, as one interviewee said, 'how can you get rid of 
the market and still have commissioning?' 
In maintaining a split between commissioning and providing, and developing Primary Care 
Group commissioning, the White Paper leaves in place one of the key causes of explicit 
rationing identified by interviewees. There will still be divergent interests between 
commissioners and providers, which will have to be settled through negotiation rather than 
Diktat, and recorded in service agreements and the HIP. The shift from activity towards 
quality as the currency of agreements may not prevent providers from insisting 
commissioners should tell them explicitly what else to cut in order to maintain the desired 
levels of quality. There is also a remaining threat that commissioners may move their 
services elsewhere if providers do not meet their requirements, although this is as a last 
resort rather than an active encouragement of competitive business-seeking. 
It seems likely, therefore, that Labour's proposals for the NHS will retain many of the 
pressures towards explicitness inherent in the quasi-market, as well as leaving it to contend 
with severe public expenditure control. It remains to be seen whether the inevitable rivalry 
for resources between providers will continue to be played out in the very public and 
explicit way encouraged by the purchaser provider split or whether a new spirit of co-
operation will make a real difference to the way hard decisions are taken. It is also unclear 
whether and how the abolition of the ECR system will make any difference; in theory, at 
least, it could remove one of the more exposed areas of decision-making arising from the 
market. 
One unknown quantity is the effect of placing GPs at the head of the commissioning 
process throughout the NHS. Results of the pilot fieldwork survey (Locock, 1995) 
suggested there was very little explicit rationing amongst GPs at that stage (summer 
1994); Glennerster et al (1994) and Coulter and Bradlow (1993) also reported finding 
little if any evidence that fund-holding was causing GPs to under-refer or under-treat for 
financial reasons. This may be simply because of initially advantageous funding incentives 
for GP fundholders. Alternatively, it may result from deeper reluctance on the part of 
fundholders to acknowledge rationing decisions openly, as this would place them in an 
extremely difficult position in face-to-face contact with individual patients. 
At a more structural level, one of the very reasons why the purchaser provider split made 
decision-making more explicit is because it separated clinicians more sharply from the 
resource allocation process. Lay purchasers cannot make the same kind of implicit, 
informal and individualised rationing decisions that doctors can make, and have been 
obliged to resort to more formalised general statements of what can or cannot be 
purchased. GP fundholding places resource allocation under clinical control (albeit at 
primary rather than secondary care level) and has thus perhaps not forced decisions out 
into the open in the same way. GP commissioning, by realigning clinical and financial 
responsibility, and reintegrating the funding of elective and emergency services, may offer 
scope for a return to more implicit rationing Whether or not they hold budgets could 
prove to be a crucial factor - if PCGs do not themselves have responsibility for managing 
the finances, they may feel more inclined to lay the blame for rationing decisions openly on 
the health authority. 
However, the research cited above suggesting GP fundholders do not do much explicit 
rationing is now somewhat dated and the situation has moved on, no doubt partly as a 
result of a general tightening of finances affecting all types of purchaser. There is now 
some evidence that GP fundholders have begun to think more actively about the need to 
ration (see, for example, Crisp et al1996), even if this is still not widespread and is 
largely at the level of statements of principle rather than action. Total purchasing pilots 
may have accelerated awareness of rationing issues, although there is insufficient empirical 
evidence to be certain. Even if PCGs could revert to more implicit mechanisms, there is 
no guarantee that they would or even that they would want to. 
The government may be attracted to PCGs as 'a way of devolving responsibility and blame 
for unpopular rationing decisions' (Ham, 1998, p.212); however, this very fragmentation 
may increase the pressure on resources by creating smaller risk pools. Fragmentation may 
also be incompatible with the current trend towards fixed budgets for providers and the 
associated increased reliance on implicit mechanisms, because it will be more difficult to 
co-ordinate agreement and compliance amongst all purchasers. The transaction costs 
associated with PCGs are as yet unpredictable, but could be substantial. 
Despite the political reluctance to describe the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) as a priority setting or rationing body, it is one of a number of initiatives in the 
White Paper aimed at reducing variation, eliminating less effective services, identifying 
effective services and targeting them at those individuals who will benefit most, and 
making the consideration of cost-effectiveness a primary concern. Re-emphasising equality 
of access is also a major theme. As discussed in previous chapters, the use of effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness evidence in determining who should have priority in getting 
particular treatments is part of the rationing debate, and cannot legitimately be seen as a 
separate activity. The only exception to this is the elimination of procedures which are 
completely ineffective in all cases, and there are very few of these. 
This important theme reflects two related developments already happening before the 
White Paper. One is the recognition that the complexity of interpreting effectiveness 
evidence for individual patients requires clinical judgement and cannot be specified in 
advance. The other is the recognition that ensuring consistent and effective treatment is 
targeted at those most in need cannot rely solely on the discretion of individual doctors, 
and needs to be guided by more explicit frameworks and criteria. 
These developments were gathering pace within the NHS market; whether this was despite 
the constraints of the market structure, or because the market itself was already being 
unofficially abandoned in some respects, is to some extent irrelevant. What is more 
important is that the new combined model of partnership with strong monitoring and 
powers of intervention lends itself well to this mixed model of rationing, which places trust 
in clinical judgement to interpret the explicit criteria established at meso level. 
This is the theory - how different groups will react in practice to the duty of partnership is 
a different and unpredictable matter. The preference expressed by purchasing interviewees 
for a return to fixed budgets at trust level and greater reliance on providers to make some 
of their own rationing decisions will probably remain attractive to health authorities in their 
new strategic role, and to the new commissioning groups - as Boyce and Lamont (1998) 
note, commissioning skills are thin on the ground, and PCGs will not be able to establish 
elaborate and detailed decision-making structures. The fixed budget approach would 
certainly be popular with politicians. 
As already noted, however, it may not be so attractive to providers. One might speculate 
that a more genuinely integrated organisation will improve the likelihood of their 
compliance, in return for greater involvement in the development of the HIP and greater 
financial stability. Equally, however, trusts might feel they are net losers in the new 
structure, having lost much of their independence and ability to compete, and gained a 
more onerous and interventionist performance management system. If so, they may remain 
unwilling to relieve commissioners of the burden of making the hard choices about what is 
unaffordable. 
One line of thought is that the White Paper will result in increased provider dominance, 
because, it is argued, greater stability for trusts can only be achieved at the cost of 
weakened and fragmented purchasing power and loss of contestability. (Boyce and 
Lamont, 1998; Light, 1998). Whether providers will use their dominance to forcing 
rationing decisions explicitly back to commissioners, or to re-appropriate decision-making 
to themselves, only time will tell. 
How far they will be satisfied if commissioners, and NICE, are prepared to take 
responsibility for developing explicit criteria to guide provider decision-making is equally 
uncertain. It is likely that health authorities at least, and perhaps the new PCGs, will retain 
a sense of ethical obligation to develop a more explicit rationale for resource allocation 
decisions, even if this has to be at the level of principles and has to rely on doctors to 
implement it. Indeed, health authorities liberated not only from operational management 
but now also from the pragmatic pressures of negotiating contracts may feel even more 
able to take explicit decisions in the collective interest, through the HIP. If providers can 
be convinced that partnership will give them greater involvement and restore the emphasis 
on clinical judgement, whilst at the same time not leaving them to bear the whole burden 
of rationing, there may indeed be a way forward. 
The complexity of the NHS and the plurality of interests contained within it make it highly 
unpredictable. It is hard enough to analyse with certainty what has already happened and 
why, let alone to forecast the effect of further changes, given all the different variables. As 
Dixon and Mays (1997) note: 
'at best these reforms could give the service a real chance to manage scarcity better 
- through effective managed care. At worst they could just be the internal market 
with its motor removed, while perennial problems which undermine support for the 
NHS - haphazard rationing, financial deficits, the "winter crises", and lengthening 
waiting time - go unaddressed' (p. 1640). 
Whatever the reactions of different players to the new interests and incentives created by 
the White Paper, the use of effectiveness evidence to set explicit guidelines and thresholds 
seems set to continue irrespective of the structure of the NHS. If it does, it will allow 
explicit rationing to develop on a much broader scale than ever before, but in a direction 
which restores legitimacy to implicit judgement. 
There is of course no certainty that any of these different approaches to resource allocation 
will provide a more efficient or more ethical solution than any of its rivals. Here we return 
to the relevance of Calabresi and Bobbitt's theory that cycles of different allocation 
processes offer a way of preserving conflicting values and limiting the destructive impact 
of openly confronting tragic choices - the NHS also needs to go through cycles to preserve 
a sense that we are doing all we can to act in a morally acceptable way. This applies both 
to explicit versus implicit approaches and market versus hierarchical structures. The White 
Paper may simply form part of this restless search for an unattainable goal. 
'Why do approaches to tragic allocations change? Such changes are not 
mindlessly made; they have, in fact, represented quite rational responses preceded 
by discussions as rational as discussions termed rational usually are. The 
criticisms of the pre-existing system have described in generally accurate detail its 
fundamental flaws and have invoked the basic values which that system degrades. 
But the defenders of the pre-existing system are just as rational. They usually are 
penetrating in their recognition of the flaws inherent in the proposed reform. And 
when the reform is accepted and has become the vested method, it is eventually 
seen to display the very shortcomings which its critics had predicted (and to 
degrade those values which they sought to protect). Are these mistakes? If they 
are not, why do we move restlessly from one system which proves inadequate to 
another? 
'The answer is, we have come to think, that a society may limit the destructive 
impact of tragic choices by choosing to mix approaches over time. Endangered 
values are reaffirmed. The ultimate cost to other values is not immediately borne. 
Change itself brings two dividends, though all too often of an illusory kind we 
have associated with subterfuges. First, a reconceptualization of the problem 
arouses hope that its final price will not be exacted; the certainties of the 
discarded method are replaced. Second, the society is acting, and action has some 
palliative benefit since it too implies that necessity can somehow be evaded if only 
we try harder, plan better than those we followed, avoid their mistakes, and so 
forth. More important, because more honest, the deep knowledge that change will 
come again carries with it the hope that values currently degraded will not for all 
that be abandoned' (Calabresi and Bobbitt, 1978, p. 196-7). 
Or, in the words of one interviewee: 
People keep casting around for the Holy Grail, and I don't think there is one.' 
Is the search therefore fruitless? Or does the solution lie, not in any one method of 
resource allocation, but precisely in the search for a method, as Calabresi and Bobbitt 
imply? Perhaps change itself is the Holy Grail. 
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